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ABSTRACT 
 Representation is a basic component of democracy and yet scientific 
understanding of how it works has been limited to the national level of government, 
especially in the developing world. This research develops and tests theories regarding 
two key aspects of local representation: government responsiveness and procedural 
inclusiveness. I examine local representation in the context of decentralization because 
local officials and citizens interact according to the set of decentralization policies that 
define the local political sphere. I find that both contextual factors and individual-level 
factors are important determinants of local representation.   
This study takes three approaches to studying the relationship between local 
representation and decentralization. First, it uses formal theory to explore the impact of 
electoral competition on local representation in the dimensions of sector and scope. 
Decentralization and local capacity are found to constrain the behavior of the mayor. 
Next, it takes an in-depth look at the representational orientations of mayors, using data 
collected during fieldwork in Ecuador. It predicts the emergence of attitudes of political 
openness and administrative responsibility using both individual-level and county-level 
covariates. Lastly, I consider representation from the citizen’s point of view. Using data 
from 18 countries in Latin America and two samples of counties in Ecuador, I test the 
impact of participation on citizen evaluations of local government. I find that 
participation in general has a limited impact on citizen evaluations, with the exception of 
direct contact with government.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: EXPLORING REPRESENTATION IN THE 
DECENTRALIZATED CONTEXT 
Why Study Local Representation? 
Political scientists have long studied the concept of political representation, or 
how politicians respond to and act in the interests of citizens (see Pitkin 1967). In 
democratic countries, elected officials are expected to be accountable to citizens and 
behave in accordance with their wishes. Unfortunately, students of Latin American 
politics are all too familiar with the consequences of poor representation which occurs 
when the critical linkages between citizens and their government officials break down. 
At the very least, corrupt politicians regularly rob the poor of their political voice 
(Taylor-Robinson 2011); dissatisfied citizens may take to the street to demand the 
resignation of the president as in Ecuador in 2005 (Mainwaring 2006); or the entire 
system of political parties may collapse as in Venezuela in the late 1990s (Morgan 
2011). Clearly the quality of political representation affects the quality of democracy, 
but again our understanding of how it works is largely limited to the national level of 
government.  
So representation matters, but why should we study it at the local level? Local 
governments are arguably the smallest meaningful microcosm of democracy that citizens 
will encounter, and they will encounter their local government with more frequency than 
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the state/provincial or national government1. Local governments, in the context of 
decentralization, which will be examined shortly, are also in charge of providing the 
basic services that citizens use every day such as water, sewage, and trash collection. 
When these important services are noticeably absent from the lives of citizens, they are 
likely to be quite unhappy. In fact when local governments perform better, we expect 
that citizens will feel more satisfied with not only their local government but perhaps 
democracy itself.  So local governments are important because they are the most 
proximate democratic entity to the citizen and they provide services that directly impact 
the life quality of citizens. Furthermore, if local officials are democratically elected, then 
they should have incentives to be responsive to local needs. They should represent their 
constituents, if not along abstract left-right ideological lines, then in basic and practical 
ways. Thus, in this dissertation I investigate features and determinants of local 
representation. 
Why Study Decentralization? 
 In recent decades, policy analysts and academics alike have considered the merits 
(and demerits) of one possible solution to unresponsive national government: 
decentralization. Decentralization is defined as “a process of state reform composed of a 
set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to 
lower levels of government” (Falleti 2005, p. 328). This theory argues that local 
                                                 
1 I make this assumption for Latin America, and it may extend to other parts of the developing world. I 
acknowledge that is likely not universally true, and realize an important possible scope condition is that 
this research is limited to Latin America. However, there is some evidence that the assumption may hold 
for the United States. See for example, Thomas and Streib 2003 and Bimber 1999, who argue that citizens 
in the U.S. have more contact with local than national government. 
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governments should be given authority, resources, and responsibilities because they are 
closer to the people they serve and have better information about local needs and 
preferences. While on the surface decentralization appears to be a straightforward 
solution to weak representational linkages, its detractors argue that local officials may be 
just as corrupt as national officials and they may lack the ability (or incentives) to 
provide quality representation to their citizens. If this is the case, decentralization is no 
solution at all. I argue that decentralization merits study not just because its effects are 
controversial in the literature, but because it promises citizens better governance and 
may even raise their expectations about what local government should do.  It has the 
power to either strengthen citizen trust in democracy or further erode it. 
The Puzzle of Local Representation in the Context of Decentralization 
 This dissertation addresses the question, does decentralization improve local 
representation? If so, when and where (that is in which contexts)?  While the literature 
has not explicitly connected decentralization with enhanced representation, yet this is 
often assumed to be the case. Why? The idea flows logically from what we already 
know about the purported benefits of decentralization. First, if decentralization enhances 
local accountability by allowing the public (rather than national officials) to select the 
mayor and council members, then we can assume that the incentives of local officials to 
be responsive to their constituents also increases as they face electoral constraints. 
Decentralization may also increase transparency, meaning that citizens have more 
information about what their local officials do (or don’t do), and thus they are better 
equipped to hold them accountable. Secondly, decentralization usually increases the 
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amount of resources available to local government officials, which allows them to 
provide the public works projects that take care of citizen needs, which is a part of 
representation2. Lastly, decentralization brings service delivery closer to the people, 
meaning that the local government has more responsibilities in a decentralized context. 
This should mean that local officials are directly accountable to the citizens for things 
like water, sewage, trash, and transportation services3. Due to decentralization, we know 
that mayors are under increased scrutiny from the public and have more functions to 
perform, but they also have an opportunity to do the most good in their municipality in 
terms of representing their constituents. The purpose of this research is to find out 
whether or not they rise to the occasion.  
 This “rising to the occasion” need not happen uniformly within a nation. In fact, 
we know that in the developing world subnational units do not develop at homogenous 
rates economically, and we should not expect them to develop at homogenous rates 
democratically. Yet, this is exactly what some of the literature on decentralization has 
done when it has considered decentralization to be a national-level institutional 
characteristic that is constant across all local contexts in a given country. My research 
design allows me to relax this assumption and explicitly test the impact of 
decentralization on representation at the local level.  
Some local governments are more likely than others to produce quality 
                                                 
2 This is assuming that local officials are not just stealing or misappropriating the money allocated to the 
local government. Theory tells us that local governance will not flourish in the face of corruption (see 
Escobar-Lemmon and Ross, 2013) 
3 In many places in Ecuador, the location of the mayor’s house is public knowledge, and citizens will track 
him/her down at any hour if they are dissatisfied with their services. This may serve as an incentive for 
even the most reticent officials to be responsive.  
 5 
 
democratic representation, so I am careful to address a variety of relevant contextual 
factors which vary across subnational units, including level of urbanization, economic 
development, political experience, and partisan affiliation. In sum, I add to the literature 
on local governance by explicitly connecting and testing the relationship between 
decentralization and local representation, which was previously an untested assumption 
in the literature. I also innovate by allowing decentralization to vary subnationally, 
which allows me to better predict differences in local representation and to consider the 
influence of contextual factors on democratic development within a given locality.  
Conceptualizing Decentralization 
 The school of thought in comparative politics known as new institutionalism (see 
March and Olsen, 1984) has challenged political scientists to think about how political 
institutions shape important outcomes such as democracy, inequality, representation. 
New institutionalism implies that if the rules of the game change, politicians will behave 
differently. In general, we expect that the political behavior of elected officials is molded 
by the institutions in which the actors find themselves. Scholarly work on national-level 
institutions has done much to confirm this expectation, but the impact of local-level 
political institutions has received considerably less attention.  
 For the purpose of my research, I conceptualize decentralization as part of the 
institutional context. A recurring theme throughout this dissertation is investigating and 
testing how the behavior of local officials responds to their institutional context, the 
chief component of which is decentralization. Decentralization is measured differently in 
each of the three empirical chapters, but in all cases it is considered to be part of the 
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local context in which citizens and their elected officials interact. More specific details 
about decentralization and its measurement are provided in each chapter.  
Conceptualizing Representation 
 There are a number of different conceptualizations of representation that are 
possible, given the long history of study in this area of political science. As a preface to 
this discussion, I wish to be clear that in this research project I am primarily concerned 
with representation in the general sense of local elected officials acting on the behalf of 
their constituents (Pitkin 1967). The study of representation has strong roots in the 
American politics literature that generally seeks to understand how legislators represent 
the majority (or median voter) of their constituents based on their legislative actions and 
in particular, roll-call votes4 (see, for example, Bartels 1991, Erickson and Wright 1980, 
Wright 1989, and Hill 2010). I mention this literature because my dissertation holds to 
the basic concept of elected officials responding to citizens as a whole rather than as 
particular types of citizens5. Thus, I am not especially concerned with the representation 
of specific groups such as women or ethnic minorities, and I recognize that 
representation of the majority may look very different from representation of 
traditionally excluded groups (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, forthcoming). 
However, I do test for gender and ethnicity effects in Chapter III, and I consider 
inclusiveness in governance style to be one representational orientation that officials can 
                                                 
4 Scholars of American politics refer to this conceptualization of representation and the predictors of roll-
call votes as the “standard model” of representation, which entails partisanship and constituency 
preferences.   
5 To be fair, the American literature on the subject certainly has examined ideas of group and issue 
representation, but I am citing canonical ideas here in order to show the basis for my approach to local 
representation which I will talk about in more detail shortly. 
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exhibit. In future research, I plan to clarify types of local representation, making 
distinctions between general and group-oriented representation. 
Conceptualizing Local Representation 
 Since the literature on representation has focused heavily on the national level, 
building a conceptualization of local representation requires some reshaping of past 
conceptualizations to fit the local government context.  At the local level, I choose to 
focus on government responsiveness which is closely related to the concept of 
representation, particularly substantive representation. Pitkin defines representation 
broadly as “acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them” 
(1967, p. 209). Schwindt-Bayer (2010) provides a working definition of substantive 
representation that is germane to my research on local governments. For her, 
representation involves policy responsiveness in attitude and behavior; it includes both 
having preferences that match one’s constituents, and responsiveness in policymaking 
(see p. 20). To enhance conceptual clarity within this project, I limit my consideration to 
two aspects of substantive representation without attempting to describe other forms of 
representation such as passive or descriptive representation that might simultaneously 
operate between citizens and elected officials. The first aspect is responsiveness, which 
for the purpose of this research, can be thought of as the alignment between government 
decisions and citizen preferences. The second is procedural inclusiveness which can be 
thought of as the degree to which a government allows a diversity of actors into the 
decision-making process (see Orentlicher 2001). 
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 These dimensions of responsiveness and procedural inclusiveness have 
additional ties to the literature. Responsiveness at the local level can be thought of as 
what Mansbridge (2003) calls anticipatory representation, which occurs when 
representatives focus on what they think their constituents will approve of in the next 
election. I argue6 that in the local context, mayors are very retrospective in their 
thinking, and seek to have a list of public works projects that they can produce as 
evidence that they should continue in office.  Local politicians tend to frame their 
achievements in terms of which citizen needs they have responded to during their term. 
What I term procedural inclusiveness is related loosely to Mansbridge’s (2003) idea of 
surrogate representation, in which a legislator may represent constituents outside of their 
district because of their issue interests. The connection here is that sometimes members 
of marginalized groups find that their needs are addressed by someone in the legislature 
that they did not vote for because that person strongly advocates for the interests of their 
group.  In the local context, because there is only one executive (the mayor), he or she 
must exhibit inclusiveness in order for the group to receive representation (at least from 
the executive official). Essentially, if there is no possibility of surrogate representation 
(e.g., there is no other mayor that can give your village water.), then inclusiveness 
becomes even more crucial to the quality of local representation. Thus we see that the 
                                                 
6I should add that this idea is consistent with how the mayors in Ecuador talked about elections during my 
fieldwork interviews. 
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ideas of responsiveness and procedural inclusiveness emerge from the literature but can 
be adapted to fit the local context7.  
Local Representation in Each Chapter 
 The major goals of this research project are as follows: 1) to formulate a theory 
about local representation that is broadly and cross-nationally testable; 2) to investigate 
the dimensions of representational behavior among local official; and 3) to capture a 
bottom-up view of representation and local government by incorporating citizen 
attitudes and opinions. In order to fulfill these goals, I develop three corresponding 
conceptualizations of local representation in each of the substantive chapters. I will now 
explain how each chapter conceptualizes representation and summarize its main 
contributions. 
 First, we can evaluate local representation in terms of outcomes that a mayor 
produces. More specifically, I argue that electorally successful mayors select a 
representational strategy that allocates resources to the sectors of greatest popular 
concern and in a way that suits their constituents. In this part of the dissertation, local 
representation is conceptualized as the fit between the mayor’s allocation choices and 
popular preferences broadly construed. I develop the idea that representational outcomes 
must match citizen preferences both in terms of the sector of the service provided and 
the scope of its provision, as a broadly available or narrowly targeted good.  In the game 
                                                 
7 Additional literature on representation is considered in Chapter II and each empirical chapter contains 
additional pertinent literature. 
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theoretic model, mayor representational choices are shaped by beliefs about citizen 
support in the next election. The model generates several hypotheses, some of which are 
tested in the following two chapters. Several brief case studies of Ecuadorian cantons 
follow the game and use budgetary data to illustrate how mayors make choices that 
impact both the sector and the scope of goods that citizen receive. The purpose of the 
chapter is to present a broad conceptualization of local representation in terms of 
outcomes and to demonstrate that the decentralization context as well as the mayor’s 
personal capacity can shape these outcomes. I find that there is a threshold level of 
representation that mayors must provide to citizens in order to be electorally viable, and 
the mayor’s ability to provide this level is constrained by the local institutional context. 
 However, conceptualizations of local representation that stop at outcomes are 
incomplete because mayors (and local officials more generally) are constrained in a 
number of ways by their local context, including the depth and breadth of urgent needs 
in the canton, institutional capacity, and the size of their budget. If a mayor fails to 
provide local representation in terms of scope and sector, it is because he or she is either 
unwilling or unable to do so. In some cases, a willing mayor might not be able to 
produce the outcomes that he/she would like to because of these structural challenges. In 
order to address this issue, I look directly at mayoral attitudes and consider what they 
say about themselves and their constituents. Thus I explore the roots of representation 
through a conceptualization of local representation along two dimensions: political 
openness and administrative responsibility. As presented in Chapter III, political 
openness captures the mayor’s willingness to include marginalized populations and 
 11 
 
increase citizen participation, and administrative responsibility captures whether or not 
the mayor actively engages in planning and performing works projects that meet citizen 
needs.  
 This chapter provides an in-depth look at the representational strategies of 
mayors using interview and survey data collected by the author during fieldwork in 
Ecuador. I code mayors according to their representational attitudes on the dimensions of 
political openness and administrative responsibility. I then test hypotheses about which 
local conditions and individual characteristics are associated with different 
representational strategies. I show that both contextual- and individual-level factors are 
predictors of representational attitudes, but individual-level findings are stronger on the 
whole. For instance, women and indigenous mayors are more likely to exhibit attitudes 
of political openness, and education is an important predictor of attitudes of 
administrative responsibility. 
 Again, if we stop there the story of local representation is still incomplete, 
because the first two conceptualizations of local representation make assumptions about 
citizen preferences rather than examining them directly. In my third and final 
conceptualization of local representation, I think of representation as an ongoing 
dialogue between citizens and elected officials through participation in which citizen can 
express complaints and evaluate the service delivery provided by their local government.  
 The final empirical chapter supplies the citizen’s view of local government 
representation through examination of mass survey data from Ecuador and 18 countries 
in Latin America. I use multi-level models to assess how individual- and canton-level 
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factors shape citizen evaluations of local government responsiveness. It examines the 
impact of individual behaviors such as participation, activism, and beliefs about 
corruption, as well as canton-level variables such as decentralization and the mayor’s 
representational attitudes (political openness and administrative responsibility) on citizen 
opinions. AmericasBarometer data are combined with interview data collected by the 
author during fieldwork in Ecuador. The findings make it clear that increasing 
participation alone is not enough to turn dissatisfied citizens into satisfied citizens; in 
doing so, they point to the need for other conceptualizations of local representation that 
emphasize elite outcomes and attitudes, such as those found in Chapters II and III. 
 As a final note on the conceptualization of local representation, there are 
admittedly other possible ways to define local representation, including some that 
explicitly involve political parties. I choose not to include them explicitly in my 
conceptualization of representation primarily because they are not uniformly relevant at 
the local level. Scholars that have theorized about the importance of political parties for 
national representation generally assume that representation occurs along left-right 
ideological lines. I argue that the abstract ideological aspects of representation are often 
not present at the local level of government; so, by beginning without strong 
presuppositions about how partisan ideologies work in local government, my theory 
better fits most local contexts. It is appropriate for the contexts where parties do not play 
a strong role in local politics, and it is adaptable to contexts where they do. In fact, in the 
third chapter I look at the role that political parties play in shaping the representational 
attitudes of mayors, but they are not assumed to be the only vehicle through which 
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representation occurs. In future research, I plan to clarify the role that political parties 
play in shaping local representation. 
Why Study Local Representation in Latin America and Ecuador? 
 The puzzle of local representation is particularly relevant in Latin America. Most 
countries in Latin America have experimented with some form of decentralization, even 
if they lack federal constitutions (see Escobar-Lemmon, 2002). This has been done for 
many different reasons, some of which have to do with national governments attempting 
to make governance more efficient, democratic, and participatory in order to bolster 
regime legitimacy (Smith 2012). International donors such as the World Bank and the 
IMF have also strongly promoted decentralization in Latin America as a part of 
neoliberal economic reforms and structural adjustment packages crafted to save 
countries from the economic crises of the 1980s. Additionally, decentralization was seen 
as a part of re-democratization after authoritarian interludes, and several countries in 
Latin America introduced elections for local officials concurrent with their return to 
democracy8.  Some countries, such as Ecuador and Bolivia, even favored the local level 
of government over the state or principal level of government when crafting 
decentralization policies (see Eaton, 2011).  Thus, local governments throughout Latin 
America have become more relevant to citizens and elected officials alike in recent 
decades. 
 Two of the three empirical tests conducted as part of understanding how local 
representation is constructed and construed, are based on data from Ecuador.  While 
                                                 
8 This is the case for Ecuador, which will be discussed in more detail shortly.  
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perhaps not the most salient case that comes to mind when one thinks of local 
representation, Ecuador is an ideal place to explore the way in which decentralization 
has created a context for local representation to flourish; it also has created variation.  I 
selected Ecuador as the main ground in which to set the theory for several reasons. On a 
theoretical level, Ecuador is an attractive country to study because it provides the 
researcher with subnational heterogeneity in two important ways. First, the structure of 
Ecuador’s decentralization policy allows local officials to request competencies from the 
national government in up to seven sectors (see Chapter II). Thus some municipalities 
took on additional service provision and administrative responsibilities while others did 
not, leading to a situation in which some citizens and local officials within the same 
country experience more decentralization than others. This is quite unique in the Latin 
American context because the level of decentralization experienced varies sub-
nationally9.  
 Secondly, for a country its size, Ecuador has extraordinary amounts of variation 
in local political context, culture, and economy. It contains three distinct regions: 1) the 
agriculturally productive but still underdeveloped coastal plains (with the exception of 
Guayaquil which is a major metropolis and the commercial center for Ecuador); 2) the 
Andean highlands where indigenous groups strongly encourage norms of local 
democracy and the national government in Quito proclaims the leftist-socialist 
“Citizen’s Revolution”; and 3) the Amazon basin where local government is a relatively 
newly established entity in the midst of oil companies, indigenous disputes, and 
                                                 
9 Ecuadorian decentralization policies are discusses in further detail in Chapter III. 
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organized crime syndicates. (In this region, anything goes in politics, including murder, 
death threats, and suitcases full of money to bribe your opponent.) So I have sufficient 
variation in context to allow me to test hypotheses about when and where local 
representation will be strongest. 
 The amount of variation in Ecuador is truly astounding and requires local 
officials to develop their cantons in different ways. There is no single model of local 
development for Ecuador, which makes it difficult to capture all the strategies of 
representation that may be occurring. However, the goal of this research is not just to 
describe Ecuadorian heterogeneity but more importantly to investigate recurring patterns 
in local representation and governance. In addition, I argue that the heterogeneity in 
local contexts increases the generalizability of the Ecuadorian finding to other countries. 
For example, what we learn about the Andean highlands in Ecuador may inform work in 
Bolivia and Peru, and what we learn about the Amazon basin may be a useful tool for 
understanding representation in that region of Brazil. Even beyond the Ecuadorian 
context, the motive of my research is to articulate theories about local representation that 
can be transported and re-tested in diverse local contexts. Ecuador is the country where I 
choose to begin my study of local representation, but I hope to explore the concepts of 
local representation cross-nationally in future research. 
Conclusion 
 This research aims to conceptualize and test how decentralization shapes local 
representation. It also investigates the contexts in which (when and where) local 
representation will emerge in order to account for the real-world subnational 
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heterogeneity in the rate of democratic development within a nation. To test whether or 
not decentralization impacts local representation, we first needed to create a few working 
conceptualizations of local representation by drawing on past literature and shaping it to 
fit the local context. The following three chapters have slightly different findings about 
the impact of decentralization on representation, but each leads to the conclusion that to 
some extent, both individual-level factors (race, gender, education) and contextual 
factors, such as decentralization, are important predictors of local representation. This 
supports the idea that institutional context matters and that the individuals work within 
their context to produce local representation outcomes. 
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CHAPTER II 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION AND DECENTRALIZATION:  A 
FORMAL MODEL WITH EVIDENCE FROM LOCAL BUDGETS IN ECUADOR 
Introduction 
 As mentioned in the introduction, my research investigates how institutional 
context (decentralization) shapes the behavior of local officials and their constituents 
(representation). In the next two chapters of my dissertation, I focus on the behavior of 
local officials in the context of decentralization reforms. The final chapter will discuss 
representation from the citizen’s perspective. In this chapter, I develop a formal model 
for mayoral representation in sector and scope and illustrate its implications using 
budget data from two cantons in Latin America. In particular, I address the following 
question: how does decentralization shape mayoral representational behavior? In order 
to do this, I consider how mayors make decisions to allocate their time and resources 
(responsiveness), given their political concerns about reelection. The formal model 
predicts that when institutional constraints (such as insufficient decentralization) prevent 
the mayor from allocating sufficient resources, his/her expectations of continuing in 
office are low and thus the representation offered is of lesser quality. Case-study analysis 
of local budgets suggests that this is indeed the case and points to the need for examining 
mayoral attitudes in greater detail, which is done in Chapter III.  
 Although decentralization has made local governments more important for both 
citizens and elected officials, a theory of local representation in the context of 
decentralization reform has not been developed or tested. My research treads into new 
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territory by dealing explicitly with the strategic representational choices of elected 
officials at the local level. The gap in the literature is partly due to a lack of empirical 
data on the attitudes and actions of local elites and their constituents. During my 
fieldwork in Ecuador, I gathered original data that allow me to test my theoretical 
expectations. However, the chief need in this literature is for theoretical concepts to be 
connected solidly with empirical methods. My research addresses this concern by 
creating a mathematical formalization of concepts and by paying explicit attention to fit 
between theoretical and empirical methods. While the current data available are not 
sufficient to test all the implications of the model that I develop in this paper, I am able 
to shed new light on the subject by combining the formal model with new data on local 
mayors. 
Representation Defined 
 As mentioned in the introduction, a basic tenant of democracy is that elected 
officials are expected to be accountable to citizens and behave in accordance with their 
wishes (Dahl 1971). I use a definition of representation from Schwindt-Bayer (2012) in 
which representation involves policy responsiveness in attitude and behavior; both of 
having preferences that match one’s constituents and responsiveness in policymaking 
(see p. 20). In general, I am focusing on two dimensions of substantive representation 
and leaving passive or descriptive representation (Pitkin 1967) for investigation in future 
research. The first aspect is responsiveness, or more specifically, the alignment between 
government decisions and citizen preferences. The idea of responsiveness as 
representation is common in the literature, both in American and comparative research 
 19 
 
traditions (see Eulau and Karps 1977, Fishel 1973, Kang and Powell 2010).  The second 
is procedural inclusiveness which can be thought of as the degree to which a 
government allows diversity of actors into the decision-making process (see Orentlicher 
2001, Vallejo and Hauselmann 2004, Haywood 2009).  This particular chapter focuses 
on the responsiveness aspects of representation (see Chapter III for consideration of 
procedural inclusiveness) and further breaks down the concept of responsiveness into 
representation in sector and scope, which are explained in the next section.  
More on Local Representation 
 At the local level, government executives (usually termed mayors) are often 
elected from county-wide constituencies, and legislators (usually termed councilors) 
may be elected from countywide or precinct elections10. To further elaborate on my 
conceptualization of local representation as responsiveness, I consider two avenues of 
representation, representation in scope and representation in sector. Representation in 
scope refers to how closely local elected officials match citizen preferences for public 
and private goods. Representation in sector means how closely local elected officials 
match citizen preferences for different types of goods in various sectors such as 
transportation, education, water, sanitation, healthcare, etc.   
 Conceptually, representation in scope comes from the literature on programmatic 
versus particularistic goods. For example, Morgan (2011) argues that representational 
                                                 
10 This statement seems to cover what is typical in most of Latin America, given that a country has enacted 
minimal forms of political decentralization to allow for local elections. In the case of Ecuador, from which 
I draw the empirical evidence for this research, councilors are elected from precincts that have been 
previously designated as either rural or urban. In Ecuador both mayor and councilors are often unaffiliated 
with any political party or have changed parties several times. 
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links between citizens and government can be clientelistic (Politician provides 
individually targeted benefits.), corporatist (Politician incorporates major actors in 
society by providing group benefits.), or programmatic (Politician uses ideology to 
provide benefits to voters.). In general, policy or programmatic representation has been 
the considered the “most democratic” linkage type (Morgan 2011, Sartori 1976, Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, Kitschelt et al. 2010), while clientelism and the provision 
of private goods are seen as offering only limited political representation to clients 
(Taylor-Robinson 2011, Cleary and Stokes 2005).  
All of these conceptualizations of local representation were developed at the 
national rather than the local level of government and therefore require adjustment to 
better fit the dynamics of local politics. Accordingly, I expand Morgan’s (2011) linkage 
typology to be more applicable to the local setting, by allowing programmatic 
representation to include the creation of local projects, regulations, and services for 
citizens, even if clear ideological positions on these issues are not articulated by elite or 
mass opinion. In short, programmatic representation at the local level involves engaging 
in activities that are targeted at broad segments of the population irrespective of their 
individual or group status. It is less about standing for an abstract ideology, especially 
when local issues (such as building roads or providing access to clean water) may have 
no nationally salient ideological referent. Thus the scope of an official’s actions can 
range from extremely broad, in which all time, energy, and resources are focused on 
providing programmatic goods, to extremely narrow where all efforts target only 
individuals with excludable goods.  
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Of course, local officials may strategically provide benefits to individuals or 
groups in conjunction with activities that are widely beneficial to the mass citizenry 
(programmatic). In some cases a project that appears to benefit a broad segment of the 
population may actually privilege one group over another. For example, spending money 
to improve higher education instead of primary education may be a way of favoring 
wealthy citizens over impoverished citizens. This is where the idea of representation in 
sector becomes important.  I argue that quality representation means not only providing 
programmatic local benefits, but also providing the type of benefits that align with the 
preferences of the majority of the citizens in the municipality, without seriously harming 
minority populations. For example, if the main problem in municipality A is a lack of 
clean water, and the mayor focuses time and attention on building a road instead, he or 
she may be providing proper representation in scope, but not in sector. For 
representation in sector to occur, the fit between the type of good preferred by the 
citizen and the good provided by the official is necessary. My conceptualization is 
consistent with the principal-agent framework of accountability, where citizens are the 
primary agent for elected officials who are principals (see Przeworski, Stokes, and 
Manin 1999, Fearon 1999). 
Considering Citizen Preferences 
The actions of local officials are central to representation, but in order to truly 
have representation, the preferences of citizens must also be considered. I assume that 
citizens have preferences over both the sector in which goods are provided and the scope 
of how they are provided. For example, the majority of citizens may agree that education 
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is the most important sector for the government to invest in, but their preference as to the 
scope of investment may differ.  One citizen expects that more money will be spent on 
buying desks and textbooks for all students, while another expects that his friend, the 
mayor, to provide a placement for his son at the regional university. Alternatively, it is 
quite conceivable that citizens may agree that the government should provide a public 
good but differ as to the sector of the good, as suggested previously. Therefore, 
representation in scope and sector are conceptually distinct, and good representation 
occurs when local officials are attentive to both types of preferences.  
It is admittedly difficult to aggregate citizen preferences when one acknowledges 
that they do not speak with one voice, but rather have heterogeneous expectations about 
what the government should do. I choose to make the simplifying assumption that each 
local unit (or canton) has a majority coalition of voters that agree about what they want 
the mayor to provide in terms of sector and scope, even if they disagree on other political 
matters. This is different from the median voter, who is often conceptualized as moving 
to the left or the right on a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. At the local level, left-
right ideology probably does not drive agreement between citizens about what the mayor 
should do, but it is necessary to assume that there is some identifiable majority of voters 
that the mayor can aim at pleasing in order to get reelected11. My personal experience in 
Ecuador suggests that this is a valid assumption. 
                                                 
11 I recognize the possibility that majoritarian outcomes can be significantly nonlinear, meaning that 
policies need not smoothly change from one mix to another as the mix of underlying represented groups 
changes. Rather, because of the twist at 50%, a small, smooth change in the mix of underlying groups may 
nonetheless manifest itself in policy discontinuity.  I recognize that this is a large simplifying assumption 
and welcome ideas on how it can be adjusted to better mirror political reality. 
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Decentralization and Representation 
In the case of local governments, the institutional rules that distribute power 
between national and subnational governments are supposed to shape the behavior of 
local elected representatives. This set of rules is often referred to as decentralization, 
especially in the developing world where countries may lack constitutional federalism 
but still reserve considerable power and resources for subnational, especially local, units 
of government (see Rodden 2004). Additionally, comparative studies of representation 
link institutions to representational outcomes. Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999) 
state that although elections allow voters a measure of control over the actions of 
officials, voting is an imperfect instrument of control. According to these authors, we 
need to consider the merits of institutional structures that are transparent and provide 
citizens (voters) with the necessary information to punish or reward officials (p. 50). 
Some scholars argue that decentralization is one such institutional structure. 
Local officials are assumed to have better information about the preferences and 
interests of their constituents (Mitchinson 2003), and voters can monitor local officials 
more effectively (Khemani 2001). Thus decentralization is hypothesized not only to 
influence local governance outcomes (such as improving access to water and sanitation) 
but also to affect the processes by which citizens and governments interact to produce 
these outcomes. Faguet (2004) finds that after decentralization government spending in 
Bolivia altered considerably to pursue public works projects likely preferred by citizens.  
These findings have not gone uncontested by scholars. Madison (Federalist 10) 
famously argued that some policy domains should be nationalized rather than 
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decentralized in order to improve local-level outcomes and to safeguard against 
situations in which local majorities tyrannize local minorities. More recently, Treisman 
(2007) argues that decentralization should not be expected to enhance government 
accountability or improve representation of minorities. Gelineau and Remmer (2005) 
find that citizens do not always separate national politics from local politics, which may 
lessen their ability to hold the correct level of government responsible.  Keefer, Narayan, 
and Vishwanath (2006) warn that local governments can only be more accountable to 
citizens if citizens have adequate information about local affairs and if local officials 
provide credible promises to voters. This literature suggests that decentralization does 
not always improve local governance, but rather that the effects of decentralization on 
context. 
Considering Types of Decentralization 
A serious consideration of the effects of decentralization must account for the 
differences between the types of decentralization and the divergent incentives they may 
provide to local officials (see Falleti 2005, 2010). Political decentralization 
fundamentally changes the incentives of local officials because it mandates that local 
mayors and council members must be popularly elected rather than appointed by 
national officials (Eaton and Schroeder 2010). This creates new incentives for 
representation (of some quality) at the local level. Morgan (2011) examines political 
parties in Venezuela and finds that political decentralization weakens clientelistic 
representation. However, this study used parties as the unit of analysis, and the findings 
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may obscure important intraparty heterogeneity in the behavior of officials12. Local 
politicians may begin to rely strategically on programmatic representation after 
decentralization, especially as further devolution of resources and authority takes place.  
Administrative decentralization involves the devolution of responsibilities from 
national to subnational units. In the case of local governments, administrative 
decentralization often involves handing over the responsibility to provide basic services 
such as potable water, plumbing, and waste management. Local governments may also 
administer the transit system, the making of streets, parks, and monuments, and the 
creation of schools and healthcare facilities. In fact there is wide range of things that 
local governments can do, but clearly what they actually do varies greatly both cross-
nationally and sub-nationally. As elected officials face increasing expectations for 
service provision, they may conclude that they must invest in programmatic works of 
broad scope to efficiently promote their reelection.  However, some local officials may 
be able to use personal wealth or strong clientelistic connections to stay in office without 
investing seriously in programmatic representation (Auyero 2001; Piattoni 2001).  
Fiscal decentralization is arguably the favorite type of decentralization for the 
local official because they receive an increase in the amount of money that they can 
distribute (see Falleti 2005, 2010). Essentially, the size of the local financial pie to be 
divided between various goods of different scopes and sectors can increase dramatically 
as a result of fiscal decentralization. As a result, mayors and councilors become more 
                                                 
12 Also the finding about representation may be driven by Venezuelan politics, meaning that the 
generalizability of this particular finding is unclear.  
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salient actors to citizens and advocacy groups competing for a share in government 
resources.  In this scenario, there is more potential for goods distribution, but it is not 
certain that the local officials will spend the money in ways that reflect the preferences 
of citizens.  In subsequent sections I develop a formal model of local officials’ 
representational strategies in the institutional context of various levels of each type of 
decentralization.  
Accounting for Capacity 
Finally, it is important to mention that local officials are unlike national 
politicians in that they are often both politicians and administrators. While national 
officials rarely administer the programs or public works that they fund, local officials 
must often make such decisions about the placement of water pipes or trash collection 
schedules for example. Consequently, the capacity of the local government plays a role 
in how local officials choose to represent citizens by determining the type and scope of 
goods that can be provided. Capacity refers to the ability, competency, and efficiency of 
subnational governments to plan, implement, manage, and evaluate policies, strategies, 
or programs designed to impact social conditions in the jurisdiction (Shafritz 1986). 
Capacity can be thought of both in terms of human and physical capital (Azfar et al. 
2004). Human capital includes the education and experience of local officials and staff, 
while physical capital refers to access to phones, computers, transportation, and other 
items necessary for governance.  
Previous scholars have argued that decentralization combined with a lack of local 
capacity can lead to suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes, especially in the 
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developing world (Prud'homme 1995; Fiszbein 1997; Azfar et al. 2004; Smoke 2010). 
This research has considered outcomes such as economic efficiency and service 
delivery, while the relationship between local capacity and representation has not been 
explicitly examined. It is assumed that as capacity increases, so will the quality of 
representation. However, if municipalities have a high capacity to provide goods in one 
sector but not in another, the mayor may choose to create a project in the easiest sector 
rather than the most necessary one. Thus, incentive structures for local officials imply 
that the relationship is likely to be more complex that the current literature suggests.  In 
the following sections I develop a formal model of the strategic choices of local elected 
officials who must decide how to represent citizens both as politicians and 
administrators.  
Setting Up the Model 
 This model uses these well-known ideas to contribute to the literatures on 
representation and decentralization in two ways13. First, I parameterize each type of 
decentralization, allowing them to have separate effects on the mayor’s choice set. 
Secondly, I build a model that has implications for representation both in scope and 
sector.  
 I employ a principal-agent model in which a local official (referred to as the 
Mayor) selects either the relative amount of public to private goods or the level of 
                                                 
13 The game theoretic contributions to the literature on decentralization and the allocation of resources 
should not be overlooked. Models of strategic behavior have been an important part of the literature on 
local government. One canonical example is Tiebout’s (1956) idea of economic efficiency gained through 
voting with one’s feet.  Additionally, Beasley and Coate (2000) have shown that decentralization allows 
for the level of public goods to differ in each district. 
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resources to be invested in the sector identified by the public as containing the “most 
important problem”14. 
  
Figure 2-1: Choice Sets. 
 
A 
𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟′𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡,𝑀 = { 0 ≤  𝑟𝑖 ≤ 1}15 
B 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡, 𝑉 = {𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛} 
Figure 2-1: Choice Sets. (A) This equation represents the mayor’s choice set. (B) This equation 
represents the voter’s choice set. 
 
 
 
The Voter then decides to replace or retain the Mayor based on the difference 
(squared) between his/her preferred amount (of either public to private goods or 
investment in a certain sector) and that chosen by the Mayor. There are two states of the 
world, one in which the Mayor’s electoral opponent (referred to as the Challenger) is 
able to select a relative amount of public goods (rc) that is closer to the Voter’s ideal 
point (rm) than that selected by the Mayor (ri) and the other in which the Challenger is 
unable to select a level that the Voter prefers more than the level already selected by the 
Mayor. Figure 2-2 provides a sketch of the sequence of moves.  
 
 
                                                 
14 The mechanics of the matching game are the same in my framework, the only thing that changes is 
which of two representation choices the Mayor is making, i.e., scope or sector. 
15 I also assume that every value of r belongs to the set of real numbers, thus 𝑟𝑐 , 𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑣 ∈ ℝ 
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Figure 2-2: Game Tree. 
 
Figure 2-2: Game Tree. This game tree shows the actions and payoffs for all actors. 
  
I assume that both the Mayor and the Voter know each other’s personal ideal points (rv 
and rm respectively) as well as the relative value that is actually selected by the Mayor 
(ri). However, neither knows the type of the Challenger (referred to as either weak or 
strong). 
 
Figure 2-3: Types of Challenger. 
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 =  {
𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑖𝑓 (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 ≥ (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑓 (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 < (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2} 
Figure 2-3: Types of Challenger. This figure shows the condition which the Challenger takes 
either the strong or weak type. 
 
 
Furthermore, I assume that the Voter will decide to retain or replace the Mayor 
based only on the relative amount of public goods and his/her beliefs about the type of 
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the Challenger. Payoffs accrue to the Mayor and the Voter as follows in Table 2-1 for 
the strong Challenger and the weak Challenger types. Figure 2-4 further explains the 
payoffs of the Mayor and Voter. 
 
Table 2-1: Voter and Mayor Payoffs 
 Strong Challenger Weak Challenger 
Mayor (ri, retain) = ri –c ri - rm 
Mayor (ri, replace) = -c rm -c 
Voter (ri, retain) = ri- (ri-rv)2 ri- ((ri-rm)-rv)2 
Voter (ri, replace) = ri- (rc-rv)2 ri-rm- (rc-rv)2 
rmax (scope)= (ƒ/(α+θ))-(1/ δ) (ƒ/(α+θ))-(1/ δ) 
rmax (sector)= (ƒ/(α+θ))(1/λ)-(1/ δ) (ƒ/(α+θ))(1/λ)-(1/ δ) 
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Figure 2-4: Payoffs. 
A 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑀(ri; V; C) = {
ri – c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
– c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
ri – rm 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
rm – c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
}  
 
B 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑉(ri; V; C)
=
{
 
 
 
 𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑟𝑖 − ((𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚)−𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 }
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Payoffs. This figure shows the payoffs for all players given the Challenger’s type. 
Figure (A) displays payoffs for the Mayor, and (B) displays payoffs for the Voters 
 
 
The rmax terms for both sector and scope represent the max value of ri that the 
Mayor can select given his institutional context and capacity. The level of fiscal 
decentralization is represented by ƒ (which can be any positive real number) and controls 
the total amount of goods that can be distributed by the Mayor. The level of 
administrative decentralization is represented by α (which can be any non-negative real 
number) where larger values represent more responsibilities to provide public goods in 
any sector. 
 The level of political decentralization enters the game in two ways. First, it is 
implicit in the fact that a local election has taken place that there at least a basic level of 
political decentralization in which voters select their officials rather than the officials 
being appointed by the national government. Secondly, some researchers have suggested 
the local political competition is part of political decentralization because it offers voters 
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a variety of choices (see Treisman 2007). In this case, the idea of having a strong and 
weak Challenger for the Mayor captures the situations where citizens may have a viable 
alternative to the current local official.  
 The θ parameter symbolizes the amount of private resources that the mayor 
invested in private goods. I assume that the sum of the amount of administrative 
responsibilities and the amount of resources invested in private goods is greater than or 
equal to the amount of fiscal decentralization. The transfers that reach the local 
government due to fiscal decentralization are often not the only source of revenue for the 
municipality which may also get funds from local taxes and the collection of fees for 
services. This assumption allows me to include the idea of these addition revenues 
without adding additional parameters to the model.  
 The capacity of the local municipality is δ (which can be any positive real 
number) and is a simplified term representing both the human and technological aspect 
of capacity. Another way to think about δ is as the inverse of a cost, so that as capacity 
increases, the cost of providing a certain level of public goods decreases (ri). The 
parameter c indicates the cost the Mayor has to pay if he is replaced, in terms of status or 
position; the more the Mayor values his position, the more he has to lose if he is not 
reelected. The ideal proportion of public to private spending for the Mayor and Voter are 
denoted by rm and rv respectively. Additionally, rc refers the relative amount of public to 
private goods that the Challenger would select if the Mayor is replaced by the Voter. 
Finally, the difference between the rmax equations for scope and sector is simply the 
inclusion of an addition term, λ, for the sector equation, indicating the number of 
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additional relevant sectors into which the mayor must further divide fiscal resources. 
Equilibria 
 The conditions for Nash equilibria require that no player is strictly better off by 
deviating from the given state. The strategy of the Voter is characterized by Figure 2-5 
and that of the Mayor is in Figure 2-6.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Strategy of the Voter. 
A 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦  𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑟𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 >
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 <
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣) }
 
 
 
 
 
B 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑝(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟);  𝑟𝑖)
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 >  
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚     
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
{
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 1: 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 2: 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
}  
Figure 2-5: Strategy of the Voter. This figure shows the best response functions and strategy 
sets for the Voter. (A)The best response function of the Voter for any allocation value is shown. 
(B) Here is shown the strategy set of the Voter. (C) These equations show the cases in which the 
Voter will retain the Mayor. 
 
 
The Voter will retain the Mayor for a given level of allocation (ri) in either of the 
following two cases, given that both conditions are true. Here we see that the Voter will 
retain the Mayor when the relative amount of public goods is either very high or very 
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low, relative to the ideal points of the Challenger, Voter, and Mayor.  
 
Figure 2-6: Strategy of the Mayor. 
A 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑟𝑖) =  {
𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚
𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑐 − 𝑟𝑚
} 
B 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑖) = {
𝑟𝑚 > 𝑝𝑟𝑚 + 𝑐
𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑟𝑚
} 
C 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑝(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟); 
𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒)) =
{
  
 
  
 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑐 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 1
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 > 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 =  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑟𝑚 }
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Strategy of the Mayor. This figure show the respective best responses of the 
Mayor if he is retained in part (A), and if he is replaced by the Voter in part (B). (C) This shows 
the strategy of the Mayor given his beliefs about the strength of the Challenger. 
 
 
 
The best response function for the Voter and Mayor are characterized by Figure 
2-7, and Figure 2-8 describes the Equilibria (proofs of equations are in Appendix A).  
We see that in the case that the Mayor is retained, we will select ri strategically; but if he 
is to be replaced, he will consider the relative costs of holding (and losing) office as well 
as his own ideal level of public goods. 
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Figure 2-7: The Best Response Functions of Voter and Mayor. 
A  
𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑟𝑖) =
1
2
(𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣 ±√−4𝑟𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣) 
B 
 𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟( 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑟𝑖)  𝑟𝑚 =
𝑟𝑖−𝑐
2
 
𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑝𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟 (𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑖)    𝑟𝑚 = 𝑐 
Figure 2-7: The Best Response Functions of Voter and Mayor. This figure displays the best 
response functions for both the Voter (A) and the Mayor (B).  
 
 
 
Figure 2-8: Equilibria.  
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 1 𝑟𝑖
∗ =
1
4
(7𝑟𝑣−2𝑐± √−81𝑟𝑣2−32𝑟𝑐+64𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣−20𝑟𝑣𝑐)
𝑟𝑚∗ =
1
7
(6𝑐−22𝑟𝑣±√512𝑟𝑣2−320𝑟𝑣𝑐+64𝑐2+448𝑟𝑐−896𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣)
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 2 𝑟𝑖
∗ = 
1
2
(𝑐+2𝑟𝑣±√−4𝑟𝑐+(𝑐)
2
+8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣+2(𝑐)𝑟𝑣)
𝑟𝑚∗ = 𝑐
 
 
Figure 2-8: Equilibria. This characterized the equilibria that are found when each best response 
function is substituted in the best response function of the other actor. 
 
 
 
So we see that the Mayor has incentives to allocate more goods as the probability 
that he/she is facing a strong challenger increases, provided he thinks that it is possible 
that he will be retained by voters. If he thinks that he will not be retained, then he has no 
incentive to provide a level of goods that differs from his/her own preferences.  
Additionally, we can gain insight about the utility space by graphing the best 
response functions of the Voter and Mayor. Figure 2-9 shows that the best response 
function of the Voter is hyperbolic, while the best response of the Mayor is linear.  
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Figure 2-9: A Broad View of the Utility Space. 
 
Figure 2-9: A Broad View of the Utility Space. This figure shows all the possible equilibria 
points for the hyperbolic best response function of the Voter and linear best response functions 
of the Mayor. Since we are working in multidimensional space, the parameters not relevant to 
the equilibria were set to one-half. 
 
 
 
For the sake of clarity, I have graphed the Mayor’s best response function in two 
situations: when he observes that the Voter retains him, and when he observes that the 
Voter replaces him. We also see that there are several places where the utility of the 
Mayor crosses the utility of the Voter, indicating a Nash Equilibrium. However, because 
all of the parameters in the model are bounded between zero and one (inclusive), there 
are only two equilibria that are relevant for analysis of this particular model. If we graph 
the functions only over the range of possible x-values, (0-1) Figure 2-10 is produced.  
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Figure 2-10: The Utility Space Graphed Over the Range of Possible X-Values. 
 
Figure 2-10: The Utility Space Graphed Over the Range of Possible X-Values. Here we see 
the best responses of the Mayor and Voter, for the parameter range of the model. 
 
 
 
 The difficulty with this figure is that it is still difficult to get a clear view of 
intersection of the functions. Figure 2-11 takes an even more narrow view of this 
intersection and indicates the equilibria points more visibly.  
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Figure 2-11: A Close-up View of the Equilibria Points. 
 
Figure 2-11: Figure 2-11: A Close-up View of the Equilibria Points. This figure provides a 
closer look at the intersection of the Mayor and Voter best response functions. 
 
 
 
In Figure 2-11 we see that the equilibria are both near the origin, but the 
equilibrium point for the case in which the Mayor is retained is observably non-zero, 
while the intersection for the Mayor being replaced is not observably different from 
zero. These findings indicate that the Mayor will increase the value of the allocations in 
response to his belief that he will be retained. It is consistent with Case 1, above, in 
which the Mayor is retained, though he chooses to allocate only a small amount of 
goods. Future research will be needed to parse out the implications of this interesting 
pathology of local government that allows the Mayor to be retained in spite of his/her 
seemingly inept representational performance.  
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The previous analysis assumes that rmax=1 and that the Mayor is able to select 
any value of ri between zero and one, but what if this is not possible? The purpose of the 
rmax equations given above is to analyze cases where institutions and capacity do not 
allow the Mayor to have complete flexibility over what he/she will do. In these cases, it 
matters how low rmax is relative to the other ideal preferences of the actors. The most 
interesting case occurs where rmax is less than the ideal level of voter rv. When this 
happens only Case 1 enumerated above is possible in equilibrium, which means that 
very low levels of goods are provided and the mayor is retained if there is any doubt 
(p<1) about the strength of the Challenger. Therefore, rmax > rv acts as a threshold that a 
canton must exceed in order for the second equilibrium case, in which the Mayor 
allocates higher values of goods, to be possible. Given that this is the case, we can 
formulate hypotheses about what institutional combinations are necessary for a canton to 
exceed the threshold in order to allow mayors to provide better local representation. 
Empirical Implications 
 While the equilibria in the model yield many empirical implications, I choose to 
focus on two particular types: 1) those that deal with the electoral implication of the 
game, and 2) those dealing with the institutional structure of the government and its 
relationship to the political behavior of elites. First, the equilibria show that as the 
probability that the Mayor faces a strong challenger increases, he/she will increase the 
level of resources allocated to the sector that citizens are most concerned about or 
provide representation in the broader scope in order to strengthen his/her electoral 
chances. This includes providing levels of goods that are above the Mayor’s preferred 
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amount at times. In the empirical world, perhaps we can observe that increases in 
electoral competition will lead to increases in representation. In particular, we should 
focus on whether or not the challenger candidate is backed by a national party or the 
party of a president as both these two characteristics could signal the general strength of 
the challenger, depending on how the party system functions in a particular area.  
H1: Mayors facing a challenger candidate that is “strong” will increase the 
amount of resources that are allocated to the area of citizen concern and 
provide them in a broader way.  
 It also should not be overlooked that in several cases, the Mayor has incentives to 
provide the representation in sector and scope at his level of his/her preference. This 
leads to the rather obvious suggestion that some mayors may have higher ideal points 
than others, but the cause of this variation is not discussed in this chapter. However, for 
the sake of research in the next chapter, it is important to acknowledge that the 
individual variance in the preferences of mayors for certain levels of allocation matters 
for the outcome level of representation provided. 
H2: Mayors that prefer higher allocations will increase the level of 
representation they provide.  
 Moving to consideration of the institutional variables, since the setup for the 
game in scope and sector is the same, so are the equilibria. In either case, we see that 
Mayor is retained when he/she selects either a relatively large or very small level of 
allocation. In both cases there are institutional constraints (rmax) on these values. When 
considering representation in scope, we see that it could be impossible for the Mayor to 
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provide an allocation level that is high enough relative to expectations of the Voter and 
the efforts of the Challenger, especially if λ takes a high value, indicating that there are 
many sectors that warrant attention in the local budget.  
H3: All other things being equal, increases in the complexity of budget 
demands will decrease the amount of spending invested by the Mayor. 
H3a: As a consequence of H1, representation in sector may be observed less 
frequently than representation in scope. 
 Secondly, when considering the level of fiscal decentralization, ƒ, it is apparent 
that the danger to both the Mayor and the Citizen lies in the value being too small. If the 
value is too small, the way that the Mayor decides to spend the resources is not likely to 
be satisfying to the Mayor because it will almost certainly be much smaller than the 
Voter’s ideal point, and the Challenger cannot be expected to change the level of fiscal 
decentralization. So if there are insufficient funds coming from the state, the locality 
may just be stuck in a cycle of poor representation unless local officials can creatively 
solicit aid from non-government sources. These findings add an insight to the literature 
on fiscal decentralization which has warned of the dangers of too much fiscal 
decentralization leading to inefficient government. While this danger has been shown to 
be an empirical reality in some countries, my model suggests that in places that are 
poorly developed a sheer lack of resources can also lead to a trap of unresponsive 
governance.  
H4: All other things being equal, as fiscal decentralization increases, more 
instances of representation in scope and sector will be observed. 
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Administrative decentralization forces the Mayor to divide the pie in order to provide the 
public goods that are legally required of him/her. More administrative decentralization 
can be associated with lower levels of possible allocation (rmax), and may impact 
representation in a way similar to the number of sectors in which a local government 
must provide services.  
H5: All other things being equal, as administrative decentralization 
increases, the fit between the level of resources selected by the mayor and 
desired by the voter will decrease. 
 Finally, the implication for political decentralization is that if the Mayor will not 
be reelected with certainty his allocation choice will depend on his own tastes, rm, rather 
than those of the voter, rv. This implies that though elections may not be sufficient to 
ensure representation they appear to be necessary conditions. As regards the viability of 
the challengers, we see that as the probability of the Challenger being a strong type 
increases so does relative value of ri that the Mayor must select in order to avoid being 
ousted by the Challenger. This implies that political competition may increase the 
amount of public expenditures and expenditures in the important sector that the Mayor is 
willing to make. 
H6: All other things being equal, if local elections are present, a minimum 
level of representation can be observed. 
 Capacity is supposed to increase the maximum value of allocation possible and 
thus the chances that the Mayor will be able to provide a value of ri that is amenable to 
the Voter; this also may lessen the responsiveness of the local government. Fortunately, 
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the reverse should also be true. In empirical research, capacity can be measured by 
observing, for example, the education and experience of the mayor and the number of 
local employees with a college degree. 
H7: All other things being equal, as capacity increases so will instances of 
representation in both scope and sector. 
The following section discusses the methods that I use to investigate some of these 
empirical implications. 
Methods 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I use budget data for two specific Ecuadorian 
cases. Ecuador is an excellent case for testing my hypotheses for several reasons. First, 
although technically a unitary state, Ecuador has recently devolved considerable power 
to the local level of government, rather than the state level as is the case with most 
federal systems. This makes Ecuador moderately decentralized, rather than an extreme 
case (see Daughters and Harper 2007). 
Ecuador also provides me with unique levels of subnational heterogeneity in 
local institutional structures. Although each municipality in Ecuador has experienced the 
same basic level of decentralization, the municipalities in the subnational sample do 
differ in the level of decentralized services that they provide to citizens. According to 
Faust and Harbers (2012) the 1998 Ecuadorian constitution strengthened the position of 
subnational governments relative to the national government by allowing them to apply 
for the competencies of their choosing in up to seven sectors, including health, 
education, social welfare, environmental protection, agriculture, and transportation. 
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Municipalities requesting competencies would also receive funds in addition to what 
they already received from the national government via the 15 percent law of 1997, 
which stipulated that 15% of the national income must be transferred to local 
governments. As a result, in 2004 municipalities within Ecuador were experiencing 
different levels of decentralization simultaneously. This variation within Ecuador allows 
me to test the implications of my theory related to the addition of service responsibilities.  
The two cases, Rumiñahui and Saraguro, which highlight the analytical potential 
for budget data, were not selected randomly but were chosen by the researcher to include 
variation in the dimensions of decentralization, and rural versus urban capacity 
considerations. They were also selected over other cases that might have offered similar 
variation due to the availability of mass survey data from the AmericasBarometer to 
evaluate citizen opinions in each municipality. Budget data for these cantons were not 
available online, but were collected in person from municipal accountants during 
fieldwork conducted by the author. 
A Tale of Two Budgets: Rumiñahui and Saraguro 
 Rumiñahui and Saraguro are both located in the mountain region of Ecuador, but 
the similarity stops there. Rumiñahui is a bustling suburb of the capital city, Quito, as 
well as home to wealthy landowners attempting to escape from urban crowding. Being 
so near to Quito, it has a relatively healthy economy (by Ecuadorian standards), and its 
citizens have access to basic services and a variety of transportation options. However, 
Quito also shares with Rumiñahui its urban problems such as organized crime and drug 
trafficking. According to the AmericasBarometer survey, the most important problem 
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facing citizens of that municipality is security. Saraguro, on the other hand lies far to the 
south, about a two-hour bus trip away from the nearest urban center of Loja. Nestled in a 
small Andean valley, the quiet town of Saraguro is surrounded by land used primarily 
for small-scale agricultural production. While crime is not as problematic in this canton, 
providing basic services such as water and sewage systems to a highly dispersed rural 
population is a major challenge for the local government. In the AmericasBarometer 
survey, the citizens of Saraguro identified a lack of clean water as their most important 
problem. Clearly, for local officials in Rumiñahui and Saraguro, representation in sector 
will mean allocating resources so as to address issues of security and water respectively.  
In order to assess representation in scope from budget data, I consider the proportion of 
the budget that was spent on jobs as opposed to public works. While there are other ways 
for local officials to provide narrowly targeted benefits, the provision of employment to 
specific citizens (mostly likely friends, relatives, or political supporters) is widely 
practiced throughout the country. Thus this measure of representation in scope 
(jobs/public works) makes sense for both Rumiñahui and Saraguro. Figure 2-12 displays 
the income of each municipality, divided into own-source revenue and revenue received 
from transfers. 
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Figure 2-12: Municipal Income. 
A 
 
B 
 
Figure 2-12: Municipal Income. These pie graphs show that the canton with the larger income, 
Rumiñahui, is less dependent on national transfers. (A) shows the municipal income for 
Rumiñahui, while (B) shows the municipal income data for Saraguro.  
0.71 
0.29
Rumiñahui Income
Other
Income
National
Transfers
Total Income: $29,816,262.00 
0.270.73
Saraguro Income
Other
Income
National
Transfers
Total Income: $6,291,131.32
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The figure shows that Rumiñahui has a much larger budget and is much less dependent 
on transfers from the national government than its poorer counterpart. The literature on 
fiscal decentralization may lead us to believe that since Rumiñahui has more money to 
allocate (and more of it is coming from local rather than national sources), it will be 
more responsive than Saraguro. Figure 2-13 shows the expenditures for Rumiñahui and 
Saraguro. 
 
 
Figure 2-13: Municipal Expenditures. 
A 
 
Figure 2-13: Municipal Expenditures. These pie graphs show that representation in sector is 
poor. (A) Less than a tenth of a percent of Rumiñahui’s municipal expenditures went toward 
their constituents’ most important sector. (B) The smaller canton, Saraguro, does only slightly 
better. 
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B 
 
Figure 2-13 Continued. 
 
 
 
We see that Saraguro spends proportionally more money on jobs than does Rumiñahui, 
but in the absence of data on the preferences of citizens for job versus public works, we 
cannot conclude that Rumiñahui does a better job providing representation in scope. 
However, it is clear that officials in Saraguro spend more money on targeted goods. 
Representation in sector, on the other hand, seems to show Saraguro doing a slightly 
better job than Rumiñahui, although the difference between the two percentages (5% and 
3% respectively) is not statistically significant. However, neither municipality does very 
well at channeling resources to the sector that is under public scrutiny. This follows 
logically from the implications of the formal model (H3a) which states that 
representation in sector may be more difficult to achieve empirically as demands on the 
local budget become more complex. It could be that since Rumiñahui is in charge of 
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providing more services to citizens16, it has to divide its fiscal resources into more bins, 
which means that each category will receive a small percentage of support.  Either way, 
the findings point to a problem that is common in Ecuador and perhaps in other parts of 
that developing world as well, which is that providing targeted instead of broad 
representation in scope can crowd out representation in sector, because too much of the 
local budget has been spent on paying workers and there is not enough left over to 
address other citizen needs. 
Conclusion 
 Theories of new institutionalism have emphasized the role that “rules of the 
game” play in determining the behavior of elected officials. At the national level, some 
political rules have been found to enhance representation, but scholars have largely 
neglected the potential implications of local institutional structures for enhancing 
democracy. This study addresses the question, does decentralization shape local 
representation outcomes? It likewise contributes to the literature by explicitly 
considering the institutional contexts of decentralization in a way that aligns with past 
research on the topic. My game-theoretic formalization of the local electoral situation of 
mayors allows me to focus on officials’ strategies and incentives when they face 
competition (captured by the strength of the challenger) and the level of representation 
they can provide is constrained by decentralization, which dictates the political, fiscal, 
                                                 
16 Urban municipalities do not always provide more services or request more competencies than rural 
municipalities, but it happens to be true in this particular case. Having been to each of these cantons 
personally, I also know that just because Rumiñahui provides more services than Saraguro, this does not 
mean that it provides them more effectively. 
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and administrative rules of the game. Additionally, through fieldwork, I have come to 
believe that capacity issues are pervasive in the developing world, and warrant serious 
consideration. Accordingly, I have included both institutional and local capacity as 
contextual factors that influence the maximum level of resources that can be allocated by 
a mayor. 
 The equilibria of the formal model show that the mayor will allocate more goods 
in situations where he is uncertain about his electoral prospects. If he is certain that his 
competition for the next election is stronger or weaker than himself, he will default to 
providing the amount of representation that he most prefers. Where he is uncertain about 
the status of the challenger and he believes he has a chance of being reelected by the 
citizens, he will provide allocations that are even greater and broader than his preferred 
ratio in order to please more citizens and avoid being ousted by his competitor. All this 
assumes that mayors can select a level of allocation that is amenable to citizens. 
However, if this is not the case and institutions constrain the options of the mayor to the 
extent that his maximum possible allocation choice is less than that preferred by the 
voters, then he will likely not be retained by the voters. Anticipating defeat, he will have 
little incentive to provide anything more than his own preferred level. Thus both 
electoral and contextual factors are important determinants of the quality of 
representation. In Chapter III, I will address how several of these factors shape 
representation.  
 The case studies are added here to illustrate that it is possible to measure 
representation in sector and scope empirically through looking at a combination of local 
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budget and public opinion data. Through contrasting these two budgets, we see that as 
predicted by the model, representation in sector seems hard to achieve as both 
municipalities allocate only a small percentage of their resources to the sector that the 
majority of citizens identified as the most important problem. Furthermore, as predicted 
by the decentralization literature, in the canton with greater fiscal independence from the 
national government, we see less money being spent on targeted goods (jobs).  Of course 
these conclusions must be tentatively held due to the small sample size. Fortunately, I 
have access to additional budget data from cantons in Ecuador, which can be coded in 
similar ways. At the conclusion of this process, I anticipate that I will have sufficient 
data for a small sample multivariate test of the relationship between decentralization and 
representation using evidence from local budgets in Ecuador and thus be able to test 
more fully the empirical implications developed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLITICAL OPENNESS AND ADMINSITRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY: 
REPRESENTATIONAL ATTITUDES OF MAYORS IN ECUADOR 
Introduction 
 
 This research project addresses the question, does decentralization enhance 
representation, and if so, in which contexts? Each chapter contributes a unique 
conceptualization of representation and a set of evidence to answer this question.  In the 
previous chapter, I explored the concept of representation as an allocation decision that 
mayors make and developed a theory about how these decisions are made with regard to 
sector and scope. I found that decentralization contexts can either constrain or enable 
representative behavior. In this chapter, I address the impact of decentralization on 
representation by taking an in-depth look at mayoral attitudes, or what I call their 
representative orientation in the context of decentralization reforms. I investigate when 
and where mayoral orientations become most responsive and inclusive in order to find 
out whether decentralization provides a conducive context for representation. 
 By way of reminder, the conceptualization of representation in the project as a 
whole focuses on two dimensions of substantive representation, responsiveness and 
procedural inclusiveness, which have been discussed in the introduction and previous 
chapter. Whereas in the last chapter I looked exclusively at the responsiveness 
dimension, in this chapter I also include a measure of procedural inclusiveness. In doing 
so, I suggest that ideal local executives are both inclusive in the way they relate to 
citizens and responsive in their provision of goods and services, although they may do a 
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better job at one dimension than the other. Hence, I evaluate local officials on each 
dimension so that I can test whether or not the dimensions have distinct predictors. I find 
that inclusiveness and responsiveness do indeed emerge under different circumstances 
and thus should be treated as distinct entities. The empirical consideration of both 
varieties of representation at the local level is an innovation in scholarly research that I 
hope to continue exploring in the future research. 
Local Mayors: Politicians and Administrators 
 Mayors juggle two distinct representational roles. They are simultaneously 
administrators and politicians. On one hand, they are often directly involved in the daily 
operations of a municipality and the details of producing public work projects, and on 
the other hand their role as elected politicians demands that they consider votes and 
political support when making decisions. Mayors can be held directly accountable for 
the works they produce and the quality of life that citizens experience17. In this way they 
are distinct from national legislators and presidents whose job it is to create and execute 
policies that are often more abstract from the citizen perspective. They are also distinct 
from bureaucrats and hired “city managers” because they are directly elected by citizens 
and are assumed to govern with politics in mind.  In order to determine if a mayor is 
providing good quality representation, one must take into account the expectations of 
citizens. What is it that citizens expect from their mayor? While I recognize that there 
are a plethora of possible answers and that some citizen expectations may conflict with 
                                                 
17 Even if they cannot be directly reelected themselves, mayors may have ambitions to higher office or 
their party can be reelected, so they behave as if they are facing the possibility of reelection.  This 
argument has been made by Taylor (1992) concerning legislators. 
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each other, I make the simplifying assumption that there are at least two things that all 
citizens want.  
 The first thing that citizens want is a government that works, that is, a 
government that provides good quality services and is competent in the way it invests 
resources. This requires the mayor to have sense of what I term administrative 
responsibility in the way that he or she approaches his/her job. Since this study focuses 
on what mayors choose to tell me about themselves and their job, it does not capture the 
outcomes of what the mayor produces18. I argue that this can be a positive thing. For 
instance, it is likely that outcome measures of canton development are the result of more 
than just the administrative responsibility of the mayor.  They are also the result of 
factors such as the technical capacity of the labors executing the work, the amount of 
funds available in a given year, and even the weather. (This is especially the case in 
countries such as Ecuador which are prone to flooding, landslides, and earthquakes.)  
However, government responsiveness starts with the attitudes and actions of the local 
officials, and examining these perspectives will give us a picture of the roots of 
representation19.  
 The second thing that I assume citizens expect from their local government is 
                                                 
18 Some canton-level measures of development are used in subsequent analysis, but they are considered 
covariates and not central dependent variables because it is hard to know how much a particular mayor is 
to blame for the current state of development in the canton. I have witnessed cases where a current mayor 
has inherited a fiscal and administrative nightmare from a predecessor and is “swimming upstream” to fix 
things. On the other hand, a mayor of questionable competence may look great if he/she has received a 
prosperous and well-governed canton from the previous mayor. (Personal interviews, Provinces of Loja 
and Esmeraldas,  April 2nd and 24th, 2013) 
19 The public management literature suggests that the mayor’s ability to manage matters (see for instance 
Avellaneda, 2009). I agree with the literature that skill is an important determinant of the quality of 
representation provided, and I consider the effects of education and prior experience as a proxy for one’s 
level of skill that can impact representational orientation.  
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political openness; citizens want the government to respond to them as individuals and 
as a group, whether they are elites or peasants. Political openness means that the local 
officials have contact with the people both in groups and as individuals20. It also means 
that officials engage in participatory mechanisms by which they gain information from 
the people about their needs and priorities and conduct informational sessions during 
which they communicate the actions of the government to the population. Political 
openness is often associated with strengthening democracy at the local level21. As noted 
earlier, representational crises in Latin America have been brought about by the 
weakening and breakdown of linkages between citizens and their officials. In fact, the 
wave of leftist governments elected in many countries throughout Latin America is at 
least in part a reaction to the previous marginalization of the impoverished, rural, and 
indigenous sectors of the population (see Smith 2012). In Ecuador, decentralization 
reforms that were once a part of the neoliberal economic agenda, have now been 
recycled by the leftist government of President Correa as a means to improve citizen 
participation22. These recent reforms have raised the expectations of citizens for political 
                                                 
20 Obviously in larger municipalities the level of individual contact must decrease. However, I have 
observed that citizens still hold the expectation that a personal meeting with the mayor can fix all their 
problems. Almost all municipal buildings are crowded with people who are trying to see someone about 
their issue. It can be argued that the pervasiveness of individual care can perpetuate clientelism. I do not 
deny this, but I argue that popular beliefs about the roles of government change slowly. Thus, in order to 
be truly responsive, mayors must put in a least a modest amount of time to attend the people. (Personal 
interviews, Provinces of Pichincha and Cotopaxi, February 19th and April 25th, 2014) 
21 In keeping with past research (Orentlicher 2001, Vallejo and Hauselmann 2004, Haywood 2009), I 
consider it to be a part of how officials provide representation rather than a component of democracy 
itself. But because it has close ties to local democracy, the argument could be made that it is part of the 
deepening of democracy. 
22 This raises an important point about what political openness does not mean. It does not mean that a 
mayor attempts to engage in partisan maneuvering, targeting of public works project only to political 
supporters, or overtly prioritizing his or her party’s agenda over the good of the canton. It does not mean 
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openness along with better services and responsive government. The next section 
discusses the case of Ecuador in more detail.  
Why Ecuador? 
 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I use a combination of data from in-depth 
personal interviews collected from a sample of 45 mayors and vice-mayors23 from 
different cantons (like counties) in every region of Ecuador. Ecuador is an excellent case 
for testing my hypotheses for several reasons.  As previously mentioned, though 
technically a unitary state, Ecuador has recently devolved considerable power to the 
local level of government. This is in lieu of empowering the state level which is the case 
with most federal systems. This makes Ecuador moderately decentralized, rather than 
highly decentralized (see Daughters and Harper 2007). Additionally, in Ecuador, as in 
many countries in Latin America, local electoral calendars were deliberately moved so 
as not to be concurrent with nationally scheduled elections. In theory, these reforms 
should draw more popular attention to local issues rather than allowing them to be 
overshadowed by national debates (Manor 1995, Peterson 1997).  
Ecuador also provides me with unique levels of subnational heterogeneity in 
local institutional structures. Although each municipality in Ecuador had experienced the 
same basic level of decentralization, the municipalities in the sample also differ in the 
                                                                                                                                                
politics the way most Ecuadorians have experienced it. In fact, mayors are often quick to tout the lack of 
such “politics” in their canton as a virtue. (Personal interviews, Provinces of Pichincha and Cascales, 
March 11th and 25th,2014) 
23 Vice-mayors are included because according to Ecuadorian law (as well as in practice) they are often 
required to perform mayoral duties in the mayor’s absence.  Therefore, it seems that they have an 
understanding of the executive and administrative functions of the mayoral position in ways that other 
council members do not. Vice-mayors are elected from and by the cantonal council (of which the mayor is 
a member) for a two-year term. 
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level of decentralized services that they provide to citizens.  As mentioned in Chapter II, 
the 1998 Ecuadorian constitution strengthened the position of subnational governments 
relative to the national government by allowing them to apply for the competencies of 
their choosing in up to seven sectors, including health, education, social welfare, 
environmental protection, agriculture, and transportation. As a result, municipalities 
within Ecuador are experiencing different levels of decentralization simultaneously24. 
Figure 3-1 shows the mean number of competencies requested by municipalities in my 
sample by region. As we can see, the average is less than one for every region, but 
cantons in the mountain region were markedly more likely to request competencies. I 
discuss regional differences shortly. 
In 2009, a new constitution was put in place which attempted to clarify the roles 
and competencies pertaining to each level of government. The process attempted to 
deepen decentralization in several ways. First, new laws made fiscal transfers between 
national and local women. Furthermore, all municipalities were charged to assume the 
responsibility for basic services in the rural sectors25 and as well as transportation. Most 
municipalities have both a rural and an urban sector, with some exceptions being large 
cities such as Quito, Guayaquil, and Cuenca. This change to administrative 
decentralization meant different things for different municipalities. Some experienced no  
                                                 
24 About 34% of the cantons in my sample have requested at least one competency from the national 
government, and this is less than the national average in which about half of the cantons—48% according 
to a 2009 study by the Ecuadorian State Bank—have requested at least one competency. Information on 
exactly which sectors these competencies fall into is not available.  
25 Previously, local governments were only responsible for providing services in the urban sector. The new 
constitution and COOTAD—the organic code which provides specific rules and laws for municipalities—
have divided cantons into rural versus urban sectors and enumerated local government responsibilities for 
each sector type.  
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Figure 3-1: The Average Number of Competencies Requested by Cantons in the 
Sample by Ecuadorian Region. 
 
Figure 3-1: The Average Number of Competencies Requested by Cantons in the Sample by 
Ecuadorian Region. This figure shows that cantons in the mountain region, on average 
requested more competencies than those in either the coastal or Amazon region. 
 
 
 
change, while others experienced an unwelcome increase or decrease in the amount of 
services they are responsible for. While this reform may eventually reduce the variation 
in the level of decentralization, my recent study shows that it has not yet done so because 
of the slow pace of de facto change. (For example, municipalities have until 2015 to 
assume responsibility for transit, and even then smaller cantons need only assume part of 
this competency). The laws related to local governance also give significant space for 
mayors to maneuver; a proactive mayor can push administrative decentralization 
forward quickly in his canton, but a passive mayor need not be in such a hurry to do so. 
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The result is substantial variation in the amount of decentralization that citizens from 
different cantons around the country experience. 
The 45 (out of 220) municipalities sampled within Ecuador were selected based 
on the availability of survey data of citizen preferences from the AmericasBarometer 
that is used in another chapter of my dissertation project. The AmericasBarometer uses 
several forms of random selection to create a nationally representative survey of 
individuals, but it is not clear that the cantons were selected randomly26. Though not 
random, the cantonal sample is quite representative of the population of the country as a 
whole and includes cantons from every region and almost every province. (There are 29 
provinces.) It includes urban/rural, ethnic, geographic, and economic heterogeneity. The 
local officials in my sample constitute a wide variety of partisan backgrounds, political 
experience, and educational attainment, which will be detailed in subsequent sections27. 
Defining Representational Typologies 
 
 Starting from the assumption that citizens expect mayors to make decisions based 
on attitudes of administrative responsibility and political openness, I coded mayoral 
attitudes based on the coding scheme in Table 3-1. The responses of mayors to several 
                                                 
26 The match between AmericasBarometer data and my interviews was necessary for two parts of my 
dissertation, the first being in Chapter II where I match budget data with data on citizen preferences, and 
the second being in Chapter IV where I match mayor characteristics with citizen evaluations of 
responsiveness. This data matchup allows me to make connections across the analysis conducted in 
different chapters. 
27 Additional details about my fieldwork in Ecuador can be found in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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open-ended questions were evaluated and classified as high, medium, or low. Questions 
asked included the following28: 
 What are your most important duties and responsibilities as mayor? 
 What is the most important problem in your municipality? 
 What is your most important accomplishment?  
 How is citizen participation here in your municipality (high, low…)? 
 
 What are the difficulties of serving the rural sector of your canton? 
 What is your schedule like? Do you have regular hours to attend the 
people, to 
work with the council, or to review works projects? 
 
 Do you meet with groups of citizens as well as individuals? 
 
 What does representation mean to you?29 
 
As Table 3-1 suggests, in order to be coded high on either administrative responsibility 
or political openness, a mayor had to fulfill all of the different requirements for either 
dimension of representation. To be clear, fulfilling some but not all of the requirements 
was grounds for being coded as medium and not high on a given dimension. Being coded 
as medium was much easier to achieve as the mayor only needed to mention some of the 
requirements and rather than all of them.  Being coded as low required the mayor to 
display either a distinct lack of purpose or reticence toward that dimension. In order to 
                                                 
28 Due to the conversational setup of the interviews, responses were coded in their entirety, including 
responses to questions that may have seemed off topic. For instance, if a mayor talked about citizen 
participation or public work projects as a part of his response to questions about how the municipal 
council worked, these attitudes were also taken into account.  At times the mayor or vice mayor was 
prompted by the interviewer to elaborate on certain themes, so I am confident that the respondent was 
given ample opportunity to express his or her views. 
29 This is not a complete list of all the questions used in the interview, but rather a list of those that were 
primarily used in coding. A comprehensive list is available from the author upon request.  
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illustrate the type of language that was used by mayors and how it was coded, Table 3-2 
contains examples of responses that contributed to the coding of each mayor’s response. 
 
 
Table 3-1: Coding Scheme of Representational Attitudes 
 Administrative Responsibility Political Openness 
high Emphasizes (mentions multiple 
times or once with extended 
commentary) the following: 
1) the importance of public works in 
general especially as a tool for 
evaluating their job success; 
2) the completion of public works 
projects or attempts to obtain money 
for such projects; 
3) the importance of planning, 
order, or efficiency within the 
municipality; and  
4) the desire to improve services 
and citizen quality of life. 
Emphasizes (mentions multiple 
times or once with extended 
commentary) the following: 
1) the importance of attending to 
marginalized populations including 
the rural, indigenous, women, or the 
poor; 
2)  interaction with citizens both as 
individuals and groups both in the 
office and in the neighborhoods or 
communities; and  
3) the importance of having fully 
implemented measures of citizen 
participation 
medium Mentions some of the above one or 
two times, but lacks emphasis in 
some areas 
Mentions some of the above one or 
two times, but lacks emphasis in 
some areas 
low Fails to mentions the above, or 
clearly signifies that they are not a 
priority by expressing reticence to 
implement projects 
Fails to mentions the above, or 
clearly signifies that they are not a 
priority by expressing excessive 
frustration with citizens and 
participatory processes 
 
 
 Words that are considered as contributing to the coding of the mayor as high, 
medium, or low on the dimensions of political openness or administrative responsibility 
are in bolded print. It is important to keep in mind that these samples are responses to 
different questions and that interviews were considered holistically and not solely based 
on the small excerpts shown below. 
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Table 3-2: Sample Wording 
 Administrative responsibility Political Openness 
high Q: “How do you relate to the people?” 
A: “I have work projects on the weekends 
in what we call the “solidarity mingas”. All 
the technical people and machinery are 
there on Saturday and Sunday to help the 
people with their needs and maintaining 
of services—including water and 
electricity. This can also extend to the 
giving of healthcare and taking doctors out 
into the communities. So these projects 
come from planning with the citizens.”  
(Personal interview, Province of Ibarra, 
March 18th 2013) 
Q: “How do you relate to the people?” 
A: “We have these new laws, and they are 
part of the social dynamic. I have to make 
the budget, and now I have to consult the 
communities so that they can prioritize the 
works. So in order to do a project you have 
to have an intimate relationship [with the 
people]. I have a system that passes through 
the organization of society, including 
representatives of different neighborhood 
and social groups including youth, older 
adults, laborers, peasants, indigenous 
groups, etc. So now we also comply with 
the law, but our process has more than 10 
years of experience and is well known in 
the communities. I have my own days for 
attending the people. All day on Tuesday, I 
attend them. 
(Personal interview, Province of Ibarra, 
March 18th 2013) 
medium Q: What is the most important problem in 
your municipality? 
A: “Basic services: water, sewage, and 
paving the streets…The highway that is 
being built is an important work for our 
economy and tourism, and it will make our 
canton a key place between the mountains 
and the coastal region. But it also creates 
issues for administering the canton”  
(Personal interview, Province of Cotopaxi, 
February 18th 2013) 
Q: How do you spend your time? 
A: “I spend time visiting rural areas…My 
first works that I did as mayor were in the 
rural sector with peasants. The natural 
beauty of our canton should be captured. 
How the municipality attends the people is 
important and can resolve doubts and 
concerns that they may have.” 
(Personal interview, Province of Cotopaxi, 
February 18th 2013) 
low Q: What is your most important 
accomplishment? 
A: “It’s really hard to be in charge of an 
institution, but I’ve seen that we can help 
others. I’ve met so many people. Before I 
came to the [municipality] I didn’t 
understand how the [indigenous] peoples 
lived…This is the best thing about my job, 
to serve the communities.”  
(Personal interview, Province of 
Sucumbios, March 25th 2013) 
Q: How is citizen participation here in your 
canton? 
A: “They do the budgets and the planning; 
otherwise they won’t be given resources. 
We are building a soccer field that is 
beautiful. We are also building a fair 
grounds…”  
(Personal interview, Province of 
Sucumbios, March 26th 2013) 
  
 
Beyond coding mayors on these dimensions, what other generalizations might we 
make about the way they behave? Table 3-3 is an attempt at defining typologies based 
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on a two-dimensional array of administrative responsibility and political openness. 
 
 
Table 3-3: Mayor Typologies 
 Administrative Responsibility 
Political 
Openness 
 high medium low 
high Superstar Populist-leaner Populists 
medium Technocrat-leaner Compliant Populist-failure 
low Technocrats Technocrat-failure Failure 
 
 
 
In the upper left cell we have the Superstar mayors. These are mayors who have fully 
embraced the role of planning public projects and administering the municipal 
government and exhibited remarkable proficiency in making room for different actors to 
participate. I make the assumption that they are a sort of ideal type of representative. In 
the middle of the table we have those mayors that I call the Compliant mayors. These 
mayors understand what is required of them by the new constitution in terms of 
providing for services and citizen participation, but they are not particularly passionate 
or representative in either area. In the bottom right cell, we have the Failures. These 
mayors clearly fail to provide representation to citizens on either political or 
administrative dimensions. They are not likely to get reelected and may even be forced 
out of office before the end of their term30. The upper right cell contains the mayors that 
                                                 
30 Having a Failure mayor would probably result in what the Ecuadorians term “votes of shame”. As one 
secretary explained it to me, the “vote of shame” occurs when a citizen votes for a candidate and is later 
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I label Populists. They are very committed to involving everyone in the political process, 
but are not committed to the tasks of administering works. They use democratic rhetoric 
to get elected, but they do not make service delivery or administration a priority while 
they govern31. Finally, in the lower left cell reside the Technocrats. These mayors are 
more committed to tangible results and efficiency than citizen involvement. They are 
strong administrators but weak in terms of political outreach.  Those officials who fall 
into the off-diagonal cells are coded according to their leanings. For example a 
Technocrat-leaner is someone who is stronger in the dimension of administrative 
responsibility than political openness (with the opposite being true for a Populist-
leaner). A Technocrat-failure is someone who is compliant only on the dimension of 
administrative responsibility but fails when it comes to providing the dimension of 
political openness; a Populist-failure moderately includes citizens but fails to provide 
services.  
Predicting Representational Orientations 
 In this analysis, I consider several variables that measure an official’s political 
and institutional context including strength of partisanship, the level of administrative 
decentralization, and the vote share received in the previous election. However, I expect 
that the decision-making calculus of the local officials may be shaped by additional 
factors because the mayor cannot neglect his administrative role for the sake of political 
                                                                                                                                                
ashamed to admit that he/she was duped into giving the official his/her vote. (Personal interview, Province 
of Ibarra, March 19th, 2014) 
31 Again, one must remember that what is being measured here is the overall orientation or willingness of 
the mayor to provide the service and whether or not they see it as an important part of their job. It speaks 
more to the focus and the drive of the mayor rather than how competent he or she may be (which is 
probably more a product of education and experience).  
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pursuits. Thus I will consider a variety of other predictors that I organize into individual-
level and canton-level factors. I begin with individual-level factors and examine 
variation in three categories:  1) demographic characteristics, 2) political attitudes, and 
3) the political and electoral positions of individual officials. In the second part of the 
analysis, I deal with canton-level predictors that may limit the choice set of mayors and 
influence the emergence of representational types, including the geographic region, 
urbanization, economic development, and the level of administrative decentralization. In 
doing so, I build multivariate and bivariate models for each dimension of 
representational attitudes. Next, I describe the distribution of mayoral types in Ecuador. 
The Distribution of Mayoral Types 
 
 In order to evaluate the hypotheses, I coded the responses of Ecuadorian mayors 
according to the system enumerated above. Table 3-4 contains the distribution of mayors 
according to high, medium, and low levels of administrative responsibility and political 
openness. The cells contain the number (count) of mayors followed by the percentage 
(of the total observations) that fell into each category in parentheses. The results show 
that most mayors fall in the middle of the distribution, but more mayors fall 
disproportionately into or near the Technocrat type as opposed to the Populist type.  
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Table 3-4: Mayor Densities by Type 
 
 
 
 There are many possible explanations for this distribution, and an exhaustive 
look at all the variables that shape it is outside the scope of this study. However, I 
believe that this distribution is likely a consequence of both decentralization laws and the 
priority that citizens place on seeing results from their local government in terms of 
solutions to problems and quality services. It appears that mayors are responding 
rationally to the pressures to take on new constitutionally mandated competencies and 
implement more organized and planned administration. They may also reason that 
citizens are more likely to vote favorably for them or someone in their party in the next 
election if they notice a real improvement in their quality of life. The Technocrats are 
willing to bet that citizen may not notice that they are being excluded from the political 
process if their services work better than before (Personal interview, Province of 
Cotopaxi, February 19th 2013). 
 When we consider the distribution of cases along the diagonal from the top left to 
the bottom right, or from Superstar mayors to Failures, we see some good news. There 
are five mayors that qualify as Superstars and none that qualify as Failures. Notably, 
there is one canton in the sample that likely had a mayor that would qualify as a Failure, 
 Administrative Responsibility  
Political 
Openness 
 high medium low total 
high Superstar 
5 (11.1%) 
Populist-leaner 
7 (15.6%) 
Populist 
 (4.4%) 
14 (31.1%) 
medium Technocrat-leaner 
9 (20.0%) 
Compliant 
10 (22.2%) 
Populist-Failure 
2 (4.4)% 
21 (46.7%) 
low Technocrat 
7 (15.6%) 
Technocrat-Failure 
3 (6.67%) 
Failure 
0 (0.0%) 
10 (22.2%) 
 total 21 (46.7%) 20 (44.4%) 4 (8.9%) 45 (100%) 
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but he was caught in a corruption scandal and forced to leave by an angry mob of 
citizens a few months before I arrived for an interview. While the vice-mayor (who was 
then the acting mayor) was classified as Compliant rather than a Failure, his municipal 
building lacked computers and the canton’s capital city smelled strongly of the trash 
piled outside of dilapidated buildings, all of which are reminders that Failure mayors can 
leave a terrible mess in their wake.   
Individual-level Predictors 
Demographics 
 In this section I take a look at who these mayors are in terms of gender, race, and 
education. Since Ecuador adopted gender quotas in 1997, women have steadily gained 
greater presence in the national legislature (see Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Rules in the 
2008 constitution about the placement of women on party ballots require parties to create 
lists that alternate between male and female (or female and male) candidates32. This 
applies to all legislative seats, both at the national and local level. However, mayors are 
local executives and are elected off of separate lists from the cantonal council (local 
legislative body) in which each party runs one candidate. As such, gender quotas are 
only relevant for legislative elections (canton council) and not for executive elections 
(mayors). 
My sample contained only two female mayors in addition to two vice-mayors. I 
also interviewed seven other female councilors. In general, it seems that women still 
                                                 
32 Laws requiring every other candidate to be a female are sometimes called a zipper quotas. For more 
information on zipper quotas and the types of gender quotas that are used internationally, please see 
Dahlerup 2008. 
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have difficulty arriving at executive posts in the cantonal government, but it is much 
easier for them to gain spots on the council (via quotas). Women may be rare in my 
sample, but if they measure up to males in representation they may leave a good 
impression on citizens, paving the way for the election of other women. Additionally, 
since females are political outsiders in Ecuador, we may anticipate that they will stress 
the dimension of political openness, because they have personal experience with 
marginalization. In fact, every female mayor or vice-mayor I interviewed mentioned 
political discrimination in some way. One mayor pointedly said that the male candidates 
practiced “political cannibalism” during the campaign. Another mentioned specific 
instances of death threats and attempts on her life (Personal interviews, Provinces of 
Napo and Babahoyo, March 4th and April 16th). However, it is not clear that we should 
expect women to differ from men when it comes to administrative responsibility.  
H1: Women mayors are more likely to rank high on the political openness 
dimension of representation.  
 Like women, racial and ethnic minority officials are also political outsiders. They 
may also be swift to bring the needs of the marginalized to the forefront of municipal 
operations because of past experiences and because they are expected to do so by their 
minority constituents. However, there is no reason to believe that these respondents will 
perform any differently from mestizo mayors when it comes to administrative 
responsibility. 
H2: Mayors who are members of racial and ethnic minorities will be more 
likely to rank high on political openness than those who are not.  
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 My sample contains 11 mayors and vice-mayors that are from ethnic minorities 
(defined as those who self-identify as indigenous, Afro-descendants, or Montubios33). 
Six of them rank high on political openness. Four are ranked medium, and only one 
ranks low.  
 Finally, the prediction for education is rather straightforward. Avellaneda and 
Escobar-Lemmon (2012) have shown that education impacts the success of Colombian 
mayors, and I have reason to believe that Ecuadorian mayors will also exhibit more 
representative attitudes as a result of education (see also Avellaneda, 2012). We might 
expect that mayors with higher education are particularly well situated to be responsible 
administrators, and they may also be politically open because their education may have 
added to their awareness of the issues and needs of marginalized sectors. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between increased levels of education 
and attitudes of political openness and administrative responsibility.  
 The most common level of education is a bachelor’s or university degree 
(38.7%). 22.5 percent of mayors hold a graduate degree. 16.13% have only a high-
school diploma equivalent and 22.5 have an incomplete university degree (some college 
experience or a degree in progress). All Superstar mayors hold a college degree, and 
only one Technocrat does not. The same is not true of the few Populists in the sample, 
none of whom hold college degrees.  
 
                                                 
33 Montubios are officially recognized as a distinct people group by Ecuadorian law. They reside in the 
coastal plains and have distinct cultural practices that often isolate them from other groups. However, they 
are similar in appearance and dress to mestizos and speak Spanish (both historically and currently).  
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Political Attitudes about Decentralization 
 In this section, I will address the relationship between a mayor’s representation 
orientation and some of his/her political attitudes, namely attitudes about 
decentralization. To be sure, the vast majority of mayors want more decentralization34 
but they do not agree about how it should be done, what it should do, or whether the 
current decentralization policies are actually beneficial for local governments35. In both 
my survey and interviews I asked respondents to give opinions about decentralization. 
When asked to express an opinion, only about 24% of respondents suggested no changes 
were needed to the current decentralization plan. The rest of the respondents were quick 
to opine on what they felt was lacking in the current version of decentralization outlined 
in the 2008 constitution and COOTAD, the organic laws regulating local governance. 
Responses were then coded based on whether the grievances mentioned had to do with 
fiscal, political, or administrative aspects of decentralization. These dimensions are often 
used in the literature on local governments to measure types of decentralization that may 
vary across time and space (see Falleti, 2005). Moreover, several mayors expressed 
concerns about the clarity and construction of laws governing municipalities that were 
not strictly related to any of the above three types of decentralization. So I created an 
                                                 
34 Only two mayors responded that they wanted the national government to assume more responsibilities. 
All other mayors said that they wanted more money and responsibilities from the national government.  
(Personal surveys, Province of Loja and Esmeraldas, April 4th and 23rd 2013) 
35  18% of mayors stated that the amount of re-centralization was greater than the amount of 
decentralization so that there was effectively no decentralization. The rest felt that there had been at least 
some level of decentralization. The reason for this variance in the levels of decentralization and mayoral 
perception is an interesting puzzle in itself, but it is not the focus of this chapter. I leave it for future 
research, though I do have some ideas about how relationships between cantons, provinces, and national 
governments shape these perceptions.  
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additional category which I will subsequently refer to as “lack of planning”. Some 
mayors expressed concern about more than one dimension, so I have allowed mayors to 
enter more than one category.  
 Only 10% of mayors were concerned about political aspects of decentralization, 
which were related to claims that the national government did not respect the political 
choices of the local government. Thirty-two percent expressed dissatisfaction with the 
fiscal arrangement, particularly lack of money. Over half, 52%, complained about 
administrative aspects of decentralization, often citing a change in the amount of service 
responsibility. Surprisingly the majority of those complaining about administrative 
decentralization actually wanted to take on more services36. Another 29% bemoaned the 
lack of planning and clarity in the legislation, and hoped that reforms would better the 
design of decentralization37.  
 How might these attitudes impact a mayor’s representational strategy? First, one 
might think that mayors who are not able to work well within the present system of 
decentralization will be less competent when it comes to administrative responsibility. 
Remember that the Ecuadorian laws are still quite open in terms of what mayors can do 
and where they can borrow or be granted money. We might also expect that mayors who 
are zealous for the political autonomy of the canton may be more likely to demonstrate 
                                                 
36 In several cases, mayors complained about the competency of agriculture being moved away from local 
governments and into the hands of provincial governments, who they believed to be ineffective and out of 
touch with the people. Six of the mayors surveyed also talked about making roads in the rural areas, which 
is a competency that belongs to the provincial government but has often been left unattended. (Personal 
interviews, Province of Guayas and Atacames, April 11th and 23rd, 2013) 
37 Mayors that want to provide additional services than the ones required by the law can petition the 
government for the right to work in this sector. These competency requests are described in a subsequent 
section. 
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political openness because they want to protect the rights of the marginalized and insure 
them a voice in local spaces. Accordingly, I coded mayors based on their overall 
satisfaction with decentralization on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 is not satisfied, 2 is 
somewhat satisfied, and 3 is very satisfied. In general, I expect that as satisfaction 
increases so will the ability to govern, because mayors have figured out the new rules of 
the game and can use them to benefit the canton. Unfortunately it is difficult to 
determine the direction of causality from the present data. I argue that one’s 
representational orientation is shaped by one’s feeling about the context one works in, 
but is also possible to argue that representational orientation may impact one’s feeling 
about the system. I check for reverse causality in my analysis. 
H4: Mayors that feel decentralization is lacking fiscal or administrative 
dimensions will demonstrate less administrative responsibility.  
H5: Mayors that feel decentralization is lacking in the political dimension 
will demonstrate more political openness.  
H6: Mayors that are generally satisfied with decentralization will 
demonstrate more political openness and administrative responsibility.  
Political Situation 
 However, playing with the hand you are dealt can be easier if you have the 
winning combination of electoral and partisan support. In this section I explore the 
relationship between representational attitudes and other factors that have traditionally 
defined the political space, including the partisanship of the mayor, his/her margin of 
victory in the previous election, length of time in office, whether or not he or she ran for 
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re-election, and whether or not he/she was actually re-elected.  In terms of partisanship, 
22% of mayors claimed to be completely independent, even if they were elected through 
a political party. Of the partisan mayors, 55% (43% of the overall sample) claim 
affiliation with Alianza Pais, the leftist-socialist party of the recently reelected and 
wildly popular president Rafael Correa. Another 8% of partisan mayors report affiliation 
the P.S.P, (Partido Sociedad Patriotica) a populist/personalist party, and another 6% or 
so affiliated with the Pachakutik, an indigenous-leftist party. The center-right party, the 
P.S.C. (Partido Social Cristiano) also claims about 6% of the partisan mayors. The 
remaining 33 % of partisan mayors (26% of overall sample) belong to local or regional 
parties that are not represented in the national legislature. All things considered, about 
60% of mayors belong to a party that has representation in the national legislature and as 
mentioned above 43% of mayors are from the president’s party. Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995) have a hypothesized that institutionalized parties enhance accountability and 
representation. Ecuador as a whole in no way qualifies as having an institutionalized 
party system (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mainwaring, 1999), but perhaps it is the 
case that local officials who are affiliated with a national party will behave more 
responsively. It could be that political parties enhance representation in several ways. 
First, national parties may be most skilled at recruiting the most qualified individuals to 
run on their list, and they may provide opportunities for the advancement of a 
politician’s career. Also, they may oversee local officials and incentivize responsiveness 
for mayors who cannot be reelected but who care about the future of their political party 
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and do not want to damage its reputation in their municipality. 38. 
H7: Mayors who are affiliated with a national party will exhibit higher 
levels of representational attitudes in both the administrative and political 
dimensions.  
 Furthermore, the case can be made that those mayors who are affiliated with the 
president’s party should embrace the ideals of his “Citizen’s Revolution” which 
emphasizes political inclusiveness and openness. The same might be true for mayors of 
the indigenous Pachakutik party which has been a constant advocate of indigenous 
rights.  
H8: Mayors who are affiliated with Alianza Pais or Pachakutik will display 
high amounts of political openness. 
 Next, I consider the electoral strength of the mayor in terms of his/her past 
margin of victory and future electoral success. We might suppose that a mayor’s past 
margin of victory may coincide with his/her representative ability. If elections are 
effective mechanisms by which voters select the mayors that they believe to be good 
types (see Fearon 1999), we anticipate that more voters will show more aggressive 
support of mayors that go on to perform well. It is also possible that mayors with a larger 
margin of victory will feel they have a strong mandate to represent the people who 
elected them.  
H9: Mayors with large margins of victory will be more likely to demonstrate 
                                                 
38 I believe that given the chaotic nature of the Ecuadorian system, the last mechanism occurs less 
frequently, but I think that it might be present in in Alianza País, the party of the president.  
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representation in both political and administrative dimensions. 
Additionally, mayors that are strong on both dimensions of representation will likely feel 
that they have done their job well and will decide to run for re-election based on their 
past performance39.  
H10: Mayors with who run for reelection will be more representative in 
both dimensions.  
  Finally where does previous experience with electoral success come into this 
puzzle? If an official has been elected before, I imagine that the mayor has provided 
citizens with at least moderate levels of representation. Given the general electoral 
climate of instability and the low reelection rates, being in office for more than one 
period could signal that an official has governed effectively. At the same time, if the 
rhetoric of Correa and his movement is to be believed, these older politicians are all part 
of the old aristocratic ruling class that has oppressed the poor and the marginalized 
throughout the centuries, and they must be done away with in order to move the country 
forward. Based on this argument, we might expect mayors who have served for a long 
time to be less politically open in their representational orientation. Thus these two 
theories are at least partially in conflict, so hypothesis 11b is added to test the idea that 
new mayors will be better than old ones at political openness administrative 
responsibility. 
H11a: Officials who have had prior experience with the same elected 
                                                 
39 This assumes that all good mayors will run for reelection and does not explicitly take into account that 
some good mayors may be frustrated with the system at the end of the term and decide not to run for 
reelection. This is a very interesting possibility that I would like to explore in future research.  
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position will be more likely to display attitudes of political openness and 
administrative responsibility.  
H11b: Officials who have had prior experience with the same elected 
position will be less likely to display attitudes of political openness and 
administrative responsibility. 
Canton-level Predictors 
 While playing with the institutional hand you are dealt may be key to 
representation, it’s important to recognize that not all mayors are dealt the same hand.  In 
this section, I explore the relationship between canton-level factors with which a mayor 
must grapple and attitudes of representation. In this section I address the following 
covariates:  the level of decentralization (both as fiscal dependent on the national 
government and competency request), the level of urbanization, geographic location, and 
the level of local development. At times it is unclear that there are theoretical 
expectations for how these canton-level predictors will shape attitudes (with the 
exception of decentralization), so rather than formulate hypotheses for all of them, I 
discuss possibilities which are explored in subsequent models. 
Mayors can inherit certain fiscal and administrative situations. Among them 
being the number of competencies the municipality has as well as the level of fiscal 
dependence on national government transfers. All local governments are required to 
provide certain basic services such as water and sewage, but they can increase their level 
of administrative decentralization through petitioning the government to work in other 
sectors such as agriculture and health care which are areas in which local governments 
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are not required to provide services. Since mayors can shape these situations as well as 
be shaped by them, I consider the possibility that causality works in both directions. 
However, I use canton-level data from 200940 which would be the first year that the 
mayors in my sample held office. Consequently, there is reason to believe that these 
statistics reflect the work of past officials, expect in cases where the mayor had held 
office for multiple terms. In general, we might expect that mayors who create situations 
in which their municipality takes on more administrative responsibilities do so to signal 
their competence to their constituencies.  
Moreover, I surmise that mayors who are in cantons that have higher levels of 
fiscal independence will also display higher representative orientations because they are 
actively developing the revenue generating sectors of the canton and they are able to 
collect taxes.41 As mentioned earlier, due to legal flexibilities, different cantons can 
experience different levels of decentralization simultaneously because their fiscal and 
administrative situations can vary dramatically. If decentralization enhances 
representation, mayors who are in cantons that are experience more decentralization will 
be more representative of their citizens.  
                                                 
40 The source for the canton level data on water and plumbing coverage, administrative competencies, and 
fiscal self-sufficiency is the Basic Municipal Evaluation conducted in 2009 by the Ecuadorian government 
in association with the German Institute for Development (GIZ) and made available online by the State 
Bank of Ecuador. 
41 Apparently it takes special ability for mayor to be able to collect taxes or even charge for services 
provided by the municipality. Mayors believe that this is the result of broken trust from past government 
officials who have been corrupt. They believe that once the government proves that it can be trusted with 
citizen money, citizens will pay (personal interview conducted April 8th and 9th, El Oro and Guayas 
Province, Ecuador).  
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H12: Mayors of cantons that have requested administrative responsibilities 
will be more likely to demonstrate high levels of political and administrative 
representation.  
H13: Mayors of cantons that are fiscally dependent on the national 
government will be less likely to demonstrate high levels of political and 
administrative representation. 
In order to measure variance in administrative decentralization, I use a 
dichotomous measure for whether or not the canton had ever requested an additional 
competency42.  Fiscal dependence is measured as the percentage of the municipal budget 
that comes from national government transfers and ranges in the sample from 53 to 99 
percent.   
 The government of Ecuador has divided each canton into rural and urban sector 
and then measures the population of each sector. This is done because rurality (which is 
just the mathematical opposite of urbanization, in terms of percentage) is part of the 
formula that determines how much money a canton receives from the state. 
Notwithstanding these recent attempts by the national government to correct for what is 
sometimes an appalling lack of development in the rural sectors, having a large 
percentage of the population living in the rural sector still presents a significant 
challenge to local officials. Mayors explain that in urban areas it is just easier to provide 
basic services because users are concentrated geographically, so there are more users to 
                                                 
42 In general it is assumed that all municipalities that requested a competency were granted it. This is 
consistent with analysis by Faust and Harbors (2011), and I have not seen any contradictory cases thus far.  
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help share the cost of the pipes and maintenance (personal interviews, provinces of 
Pichincha and Sucumbios, March 18th and 25th 2013). The new constitution of 2008 
requires that local governments service the rural as well as the urban sector with potable 
water. In some areas this means cutting through miles and miles of jungle or climbing 
over towering mountains to get water to each far-flung community. Additionally, the 
rural sector is traditionally less educated, less wealthy, and less mestizo (containing 
minority populations). This often means less tax dollars for the municipality to collect.  
We might expect that mayors who come from less urbanized areas to be less 
representative on the administrative dimension because they have fewer resources to 
work with and a much harder task. On the other hand, representational orientation is 
about having plans and desires to be responsive so perhaps mayors in rural areas will be 
more aware of the needs around them and have a great desire to administer responsively. 
Since we lack clear expectations about the relationship between urbanization and 
administrative responsibility, we will allow for the relationship to go either way.  
In terms of political openness, having a large rural sector generally means that 
you de facto have more peasants and indigenous peoples to respond to, and it is logical 
to think that a mayor would work to include these constituencies. On the other hand, 
having these constituencies does not of necessity mean that the mayor will respond to 
them, and the matter is open for investigation. 
 Additionally, it has been suggested by academics as well as the mayors 
themselves that in Ecuador that there are differences between the coastal, mountain 
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(sierra), and Amazonian (oriente) regions (see Lucero 2001)43. Some coastal mayors 
have used the idea of regional differences to explain everything from low popular 
participation to low tax revenues (because, as they explain, there isn’t a culture of paying 
in the coastal region) (Personal interviews, province of Guayas, April 9th and 11th 2013). 
Do local officials also behave differently depending on the region? Could it be that those 
in the mountain region (sierra) are more representative in terms of both administrative 
responsibility and political openness, while those in the coastal region are less so? It is 
also difficult to know what to expect from the Amazon region, other than less 
urbanization and development due to the remoteness of the region.  
 The total population size of the canton is a simple but necessary covariate to 
include in analysis. I believe that cantons with a larger population size, regardless of 
whether or not they are predominately rural or urban, need a mayor who has strong 
administrative skills because the demands on that official will be greater. Furthermore, I 
could be that in places where the mayor simply has more people to attend to, he/she will 
not be able to give as much face-to-face attention to groups and marginalized people, so 
I anticipate that as population size increases, political openness will decrease.  
 While it is true that the mayor is the executive of the canton and responsible for 
guiding its economic development, some mayors inherit cantons that are in a better place 
in terms of development and administration than others. This is especially salient when 
                                                 
43 Diligent search has not been able to find any empirical tests demonstrating actual differences in political 
behavior between the three regions. It should be noted that only recently (after the discovery of oil 
deposits) has the Amazonian region become a player in national politics. The historical cleavage has been 
between the highlands Quito and coastal Guayaquil.  See Eaton 2013 for more on the Guayaquil-led 
separatist movement. 
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we consider that a large percent of mayors were not governing their canton in the 
previous term. We might surmise that when a city fails to provide basic services, this is 
either the result of past inattention or current neglect44. Either the mayor will work 
harder to overcome past difficulties, or he/she will capitulate to the inherited difficulties 
of the situation and fail to provide the appropriate representation. In general, it is 
possible that high levels of development in terms of provision of basic services lead to 
better representational performance, unless the mayor chooses to rise above his/her 
situation. Since representation is about one’s orientation and attitude, even if it is hard to 
provide services in the jungle, a driven and purposeful mayor can still be a Superstar, 
whereas a mayor can be a Failure if he or she has an easier situation but lacks the correct 
perspective. Therefore, I will include measures of local development in the model, but I 
do not have strong expectations about their relationship to representational attitudes. I 
define basic services as the percentage of the canton that has access to potable water and 
plumbing. My sample contains cantons ranging from 46 to 100% population having 
access to potable water and from 10 to 97% having access to plumbing systems. 
Putting It All Together: Multivariate Models of Representational Attitudes 
 In this section I use ordinal logistic regression to predict political openness and 
administrative responsibility using demographic, personal attitudes, political situation, 
and canton-level covariates. For the sake of sample size, in a following section I will 
also look at models with one or at most two covariates.  Table 3-5 shows multiple 
                                                 
44 Of course it could always be that providing services in the jungle is just more difficult than providing 
them on the coast, but this goes back to geography.  
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regression coefficients for covariates by category, including demographics, attitudes 
about decentralization, political characteristics, and canton-level predictors which are 
further divided into two groups, the first deals with geography and population and the 
second deals with governance45. 
In general, we see that demographic variables are stronger predictors of the 
political dimension of representation than the administrative dimension, with the notable 
exception of education which seems to be the most important factor in that category for 
administrative responsibility. Attitudes about decentralization are not strong predictors 
in general, except for complaints about fiscal decentralization, which is related to 
increases in political openness and decreases in administrative responsiveness. 
Complaining about the lack of fiscal decentralization is associated with increases in 
political representation, and it seems that overall satisfaction with decentralization also 
improves it. This could be because politically open mayors tend to come from small 
more rural cantons that may face greater fiscal constraints. Therefore these complaints 
about fiscal decentralization should not be taken to mean that the mayor is unwilling or 
unable to work within the new system, but rather that doing so regularly brings to mind 
the scarcity of resources. Additionally, fighting for more resources for ones canton is 
sometimes seen as part of the mayor’s job; so if they did not complain, there would be 
cause for concern. 
 
                                                 
45 Since my sample size is so small, I will refer to p-values that are less than .1 as statistically significant, 
but I will also report exact p-values so that reader can judge for him/herself. 
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Table 3-5: Multivariate Analysis of Representation Attitudes by Categories 
 
Demographics 
Attitude about 
Decentralization  Politics 
Canton  
factors 1 
Canton 
factors 2 
 
P.O. A.R. P.O. A.R. P.O. A.R. P.O. A.R. P.O. A.R. 
Female 1.14 16.5 
        
p-value 0.41 0.99 
        Ethnic 
minority 1.71** 0.43 
        
p-value 0.04 0.59 
        
Education -0.66* 0.72** 
        
p-value 0.08 0.05 
        
Lack fiscal 
  
2.20** -1.72* 
      
p-value 
  
0.03 0.08 
      Lack admin. 
 
0.34 -0.20 
      
p-value 
  
0.74 0.82 
      Lack political 
 
2.41 0.10 
      
p-value 
  
0.14 0.93 
      Lack planning 
 
0.23 0.87 
      
p-value 
  
0.85 0.42 
      
Overall satisfaction  
 
1.60** 0.48 
      
p-value 
  
0.05 0.36 
      
Political experience 
   
-0.81 -0.24 
    
p-value 
    
0.22 0.73 
    
National party 
   
1.42** 1.38** 
    
p-value 
    
0.03 0.05 
    
Run for reelection 
   
-1.07* 0.18 
    
p-value 
    
0.10 0.78 
    
Percent urban 
     
-2.61** 1.59 
  
p-value 
      
0.04 0.23 
  
Sierra 
      
-0.10 0.57 
  
p-value 
      
0.90 0.47 
  
Costa 
      
-0.38 0.27 
  
p-value 
      
0.65 0.82 
  
Water coverage 
       
0.02 -0.02 
p-value 
        
0.45 0.30 
Dependence  
       
0.05* -0.03 
p-value 
        
0.07 0.33 
Competency request 
      
-0.49 0.95 
p-value 
        
0.41 0.13 
Psedo-R2 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 
N 31 31 31 31 44 44 45 45 43 43 
 84 
 
 In terms of political factors, we see that being a part of a national party is far and 
away the most important predictor, as it is positive and significant for both models. This 
indicates that national parties can provide a real boost to representation, even in 
fragmented party system such as Ecuador. Running for reelection is significant (but 
barely so) and negative for the political openness model, suggesting that mayors of all 
stripes can run for reelection, and sometimes those who choose to do run do so based on 
their administrative accomplishments (technocrats and technocrat-leaners) rather than 
connections with the people. In terms of canton-level predictors, none are clearly 
associated with administrative responsibility, but urbanization and dependence on the 
national government are significantly related to political openness. In the case of 
urbanization, it is no surprise that a highly open style of governance becomes difficult in 
cantons with large urban populations. Given the previous findings, it is likely that these 
cantons may have difficultly generating their own revenue are thus more dependent on 
the national government. In the end, these findings may say more about the correlation 
between urbanization and national government dependence, which is negative (r= -.58) 
and highly significant (p=.00) than representational success of the mayor. 
 If more observations were available, we would certainly test of all the covariates 
together in one model. Unfortunately this is not possible due to the small sample size. So 
Table 3-6 is an attempt to test the strength of covariates across categories. For instance, 
it allows us the see the effect of education on political openness while controlling for 
attitudes about decentralization. The rule of thumb used in Table 3-6, was to gather those 
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coefficients that were significant in each category in Table 3-5, and the total population 
size is added to the political openness model as a control variable. 
The findings here are generally what one would expect from the last model. For political 
openness, the lack of fiscal resources, the overall satisfaction with decentralization, and 
running for reelection stand out as the most important predictors (reelection predicts less 
political openness). For administrative responsibility, education and national party 
participation are strong positive predictors and running for reelection and complaining 
about fiscal decentralization are strong negative predictors. The most surprising finding 
here is likely that running for reelection is a negative predictor for administrative 
responsibility and perhaps attests to the generally chaotic nature of partisan politics in 
Ecuador. It may also be that mayoral motives for providing citizens with representation 
are less about the next election than previously thought. 
Determinants of Representation: Bivariate Analysis 
This section takes an additional look at the support for each hypothesis, 
beginning with individual level characteristics, and then considering political situations 
and canton-level predictors as well. This is done to assure that important relationships 
that may exist in the data are not overlooked due to sample size. 
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Table 3-6: Multivariate Analysis of Representation Attitudes across 
Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal Characteristics 
H1: Women mayors are more likely to rank high on the political openness 
dimension of representation.  
Out of the four females in my sample, three ranked high in political openness and 
one ranked medium. Two ranked high in administrative responsiveness; one ranked 
medium, and one ranked low. In sum, the sample contains one female superstar mayor, 
one female populist, and two that were compliant in terms of administrative 
 
P.O. A.R. 
Ethnic minority 3.22 
 p-value 0.11 
 Education -0.93 1.27** 
p-value 0.21 0.05 
Lack fiscal 5.27* -3.67** 
p-value 0.08 0.02 
Lack administrative 
 
-0.91 
p-value 
 
0.47 
Overall satisfaction  2.52* 
 p-value 0.08 
 National party -1.54 4.01** 
p-value 0.40 0.02 
Run for reelection -6.78** -3.44** 
p-value 0.03 0.05 
Percent urban -6.78 
 p-value 0.98 
 Nat'l gov. dependence -0.11 
 p-value 0.21 
 Total population -0.00** 
 p-value 0.03 
 Pseudo-R2 0.36 0.41 
N 21 21 
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responsibility and high on political openness. In fact there is a positive correlation (.284) 
between begin a women and political openness (p=.058), but no correlation between 
being female and administrative responsibility (r= -.06, p=.69)46.  Evidence supports H1 
and suggests the women mayors are not less adept at representation than men, certainly 
when it comes to knowing how include the marginalized sector.  
H2: Mayors who are members of racial and ethnic minorities will be more 
likely to rank high on political openness than those who are not.  
Political openness is positively correlated (r=.297) with being a member of a 
racial minority group (p=.056). In administrative responsibility, six minority mayors are 
ranked high and five are ranked medium, which is good but since it almost exactly 
mirrors the distribution of the entire sample, the correlation here (r=.148) is not 
statistically significant (p=.33).  The sample contains two indigenous mayors who are a 
classified as Superstars. Like women, ethnic minorities are not lagging behind their 
counterparts in embracing attitudes of representation.  
 Interestingly, when combined into one measure of “political outsiders”, women 
and ethnic minorities account for half of all mayors ranked high on political openness (7 
out of 14). The correlation between being a political outsider and political openness 
(r=.358) increases in size and statistical significance (p=.02)47.  It is important to 
remember how the variable for political openness was coded. In order to be ranked as 
                                                 
46  Pearson’s chi-squared tests for tabular association were also used to corroborate each of the bivariate 
correlations in the analysis and are available from the author upon request.   
47 The coefficient from a bivariate ordinal logit with political openness as the dependent variable and being 
a political outside as an independent variable is positive and statistically significant at p=.014 
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high, a mayor had not only to talk about helping one group of constituents such as co-
ethnics or women but also had to embrace mechanisms of participation in general and 
talk about having a close relationship with the people. So I have reason to believe that 
these political outsiders, though they are few in number, could actually be bringing 
something fresh into political system that may strengthen Ecuadorian democracy (as 
opposed to only distributing exclusive goods to particular groups). Furthermore, this is 
something that decentralization scholars predicted would be the consequence of opening 
the local political spaces.  
H3: There is a positive relationship between increased levels of education 
and attitudes of political openness and administrative responsibility.  
The correlation between political openness and education is actually negative (r= 
-.23), but it is not statistically significant (p=0.21). However the correlation between 
administrative responsibility and education (r= .34) is positive and significant (p=.06)48. 
So we must conclude that H3 is partially supported. It is supported with respect to 
education increasing attitudes of administrative responsibility, but there is no 
corresponding increase in political openness. This suggests that education can help a 
mayor be more responsive on the administrative dimension, but successful 
representation in the openness dimension may have its origins in other personal 
experiences caused by race and gender.  Figure 3-2 presents the mean education level 
across each of the nine types of mayors explained in Tables 3-3 and 3-4. Overall, 
                                                 
48 Unfortunately information about educational attainment was only available for 31 out of 45 of the 
respondents.  
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Superstars have the highest education, but the effect of education seems to differ within 
each level of political openness. At the highest level of political openness, education 
increases with levels of administrative responsibility, but at low and medium levels of 
openness, education decreases as levels of administrative responsibility increase. This 
suggests that education boosts orientations of administrative responsiveness, but only 
those individuals with high political openness. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Average Education among Mayor Types. 
 
Figure 3-2: Average Education among Mayor Types. This figure shows education in improve 
representation among mayors who ranked high in political openness, but the relationship is 
negative for those ranking medium and low. 
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Attitudes about Decentralization  
H4: Mayors that feel decentralization is lacking fiscal or administrative 
dimensions will demonstrate less administrative responsibility.  
H5: Mayors that feel decentralization is lacking in the political dimension 
will demonstrate more political openness.  
H6: Mayors that are generally satisfied with decentralization will 
demonstrate more political openness and administrative responsibility. 
Correlation coefficients yield little support for these hypotheses. The only 
statistically significant result is the relationship between complaining about fiscal 
decentralization and levels of administrative responsibility (r= -.35 p= .05). The 
relationship between complaints about administrative decentralization and administrative 
responsibility is negative but not statistically significant, perhaps due to the varied nature 
of the reasons that respondents complained about this dimension. Hypothesis five is also 
not supported by correlation evidence (r= .14 p= 0.45), possibly because so few 
respondents complained about this element of decentralization. Correlations for 
hypothesis 6 relating to a mayor’s overall satisfaction with decentralization are positive 
(political openness r= .23; administrative responsibility r=.17) but not statistically 
significant (p=0.35 and p=0.18 respectively).  I also checked each instance the 
possibility of reverse causality in which opinions about decentralization may lead to 
representational orientations, using bivariate logistic and ordinal logistic regressions. I 
encountered a significant relationship (p=.07) only for complaints about fiscal 
decentralization. In this case, orientations of high administrative responsibility predict 
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less frustration with levels of fiscal decentralization.  
Though we are not able to make strong statements about the direction of 
causality, all in all, it seems possible that when the attitudes of mayors stay positive 
about decentralization and they work creatively within the system, they demonstrate 
strong administrative abilities to constituents.  The mayors I interviewed also made it 
clear that decentralization is a process (Personal interview, Province of Ambato, 
February 20th 2013), and that the in the face of institutional instability, the best mayors 
do not wait for institutional change, they play with the hand they are dealt. 
Political Situation 
H7: Mayors who are affiliated with a national party will exhibit higher 
levels of representational attitudes in both the administrative and political 
dimensions.  
I find support for this hypothesis in several ways. First, the correlation 
coefficients for belonging to a national party and political openness (r= 0.35, p= 0.02) 
and administrative responsiveness (r= 0.38, p= 0.01) are positive and statistically 
significant. Also, the coefficients on an ordinal logistic regression model with national 
party affiliation as the independent variable and political openness and administrative 
responsiveness as dependent variables are positive and significant at p= .03 and p=.02 
respectively. These findings suggest that mayors who have national party affiliations 
perform better because they have more accountability and incentives to consider the 
long-term political game. It may also be the case that these parties are adept at finding, 
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recruiting, and co-opting talented mayoral candidates49. This might be particularly true 
for the party of president, Alianza Pais, which first ran candidates in the 2006 general 
elections and is a relatively new party on the Ecuadorian political scene. So, somehow 
the best mayors and the national parties have found each other. In any case, if citizens 
can trust the mayors who connect with major political parties, perhaps they will learn to 
trust the political system more as a whole, and this could have positive implications for 
democratic stability.  
H8: Mayors who are affiliated with Alianza Pais or Pachakutik will display 
high amounts of political openness. 
An ordinal logistic regression with political openness as the dependent variable 
and a dichotomous variable for being affiliated with these two parties is the independent 
variable shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship. The same is true of 
the correlation coefficients. However when the causal assumptions are reversed, I find 
that both political openness and administrative responsibility predict participation in 
their Alianza Pais or the Pachakutik party (and not the other way around for political 
openness)50. This implies that political open and representative mayors are members of 
these parties for whatever reason and not necessarily that partisanship causes 
                                                 
49 Ordinal logit models with political openness and administrative responsibility as the dependent variables 
and national party affiliation as the independent variable show evidence that the causality could be 
working in this direction as well.  
50 Incidentally there is a positive and significant relationship between AP and Pachakutik membership (IV) 
and administrative responsibility (DV). I had not expected to find this relationship, but I think that it is 
interesting nonetheless because it shows that while these parties may focus their rhetoric on political 
openness, they are actually more effective in administration. This also raises important questions about 
whether the national government may be funneling extra money to municipalities whose mayors are co-
partisans and hence the increases in administrative responsibility performance.  
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representative behavior. 
H9: Mayors with large margins of victory will be more likely to demonstrate 
representation in both political and administrative dimensions. 
In order to assess hypothesis 9 and 10, I used two ordinal logistic models in 
which the dependent variables were political openness and administrative responsiveness 
and the independent variables are the past margin of victory and being a candidate for 
mayor (on the ballot) in the next elections. None of the relationships come near 
statistical significance, even when possible reverse causality is considered. Correlation 
coefficients are not statistically significant. In terms of margin of victory, it could be the 
case that some mayors are just from districts with more competitive elections and more 
qualified candidates or that a very popular mayor is not challenged because of his 
success, and thus the tightness of the election in itself has nothing to do with the mayor’s 
actual performance.  
H10: Mayors with who run for reelection will be more representative in 
both dimensions.  
Seventy-four percent of mayors in the sample ran for re-election51 (and 50% of 
the vice-mayors ran for reelection to the council). This includes some mayors that were 
failures in one of the dimensions (political openness and administrative responsiveness). 
Interestingly, some of the Superstar mayors did not run for reelection after telling me in 
the interview that they were planning to do so. As these mayors were partisans, it is 
                                                 
51 All mayors were legally eligible for reelection because they were all only elected to one period after the 
ratification of the new constitution in 2008. 
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possible that their party decided that they should not run in order to help them campaign 
for national office in the 2017 national elections. Many mayors ran for reelection, but 
only 30% of those who ran were reelected. There are also no statistically significant 
relationships between being reelected and representational success on either dimension. 
In total, 8 mayors out of 35 (about 23%) were reelected and 5 vice-mayors out of 10 (all 
5 that ran) were reelected. I believe the difference illustrations that the mayor’s position 
is the most coveted and therefore the most competitive race. It also shows an astonishing 
amount of electoral turnover in local executives, that isn’t limited to municipalities 
where mayors failed to exhibit representational attitudes and behaviors. Data from past 
Ecuadorian local elections are not readily available for comparison purposes, but studies 
of Brazilian municipalities52 in the 1999s and early 2000s show reelection rates between 
37 and 15 percent. So these rates are on the low side, but certainly not unheard of.  One 
the one hand, low reelection rate are good because it may indicate that citizens are not 
afraid to vote out bad mayors. On the other hand, not allowing mayors to continue in 
office may be detrimental to the development representational skills in the individual 
official53.  
H11a: Officials who have had prior experience with the same elected 
position will be more likely to display attitudes of political openness and 
administrative responsibility.  
                                                 
52 Brazil is a relevant comparison case because it also has a multiparty presidential system that is less 
institutionalized according to Mainwaring (1999). 
53 In this round of elections, all mayors were eligible for reelection because of recent constitutional 
changes that essentially reset the electoral clock for all local officials, regardless of how many past periods 
they had served.  
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H11b: Officials who have had prior experience with the same elected 
position will be less likely to display attitudes of political openness and 
administrative responsibility. 
In keeping with the idea that few local officials, particularly mayors, are 
reelected, at the time of the interview 71% of officials interviewed were serving in that 
position for the first time. 13% were serving a second term, and about 16% were serving 
a third term in office.  A dichotomous variable, political experience was created to 
measure whether or not the official had been reelected (either once or twice) to his/her 
position. Ordinal logistic regressions with political openness and administrative 
responsiveness as dependent variables and political experience as the independent 
variable demonstration that there is no significant relationship between political 
experience and administrative responsibility (though the coefficient is negative). 
However, there a negative and significant (p=.06) relationship between political 
openness and experience, which supports our hypothesis 11b and does suggests that 
perhaps newer mayors are more open.  
 In order to further investigate the matter, I use a multinomial regression model in 
which the dependent variable is the representational type of the official as presented in 
Table 3-3 (Populist, Superstar, Complaint, etc.). When compared to the base-category of 
being Compliant, only the coefficient for being a Technocrat-leaner achieves statistical 
significance (p=.05) and is negative. This suggests that there is a negative relationship 
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between political experience and technical/administrative expertise54. This does not bode 
well for hypothesis 11a, although with so few observations one should be careful not to 
read too much into the lack of significant statistical findings.  It is worth mentioning that 
of the five mayors coded as Superstars, only two had prior mayoral experience, and of 
the remaining three mayors, all were allied with a national party and two were from 
marginalized groups. Thus we have not found prior experience as mayor to be as 
important in determining administrative orientations of the mayor as his or her 
demographic and partisan characteristics, and experience may even work against 
orientations of political openness. 
 In conclusion, in a country where the next election is a chaotic gamble at best, it 
is little wonder that some mayors tell me that they can do the most good by not 
constantly obsessing over how many votes a work will get them. Many have told me that 
doing their job well comes before concerns about the next election and that partisanship 
should essentially be checked at the door so that everyone can work together for the 
good of the canton. Of course, “One has to take off the flag of one’s party and put on the 
flag of one’s canton” (personal interview, province of Imbabura, March 19th 2013). 
Despite the fact that political decentralization has politicized the local space, many 
mayors feel that partisan politics is detrimental to the provision of local services 
(personal interviews, provinces of Babahoyo, Loja, and Zamora, April 16thand 1st, and 
March 31st). This is likely because in Ecuador partisan politics is closely associated with 
clientelistic targeting of goods, but perhaps this can change as mayors who are attentive 
                                                 
54 Table with coefficients is reported in the Appendix 
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to popular concerns and who are also gifted administrators restore popular confidence in 
the government and its local spaces.  
Decentralization 
H12: Mayors of cantons that have requested administrative responsibilities 
will be more likely to demonstrate high levels of political and administrative 
representation.  
H13: Mayors of cantons that are fiscally dependent on the national 
government will be less likely to demonstrate high levels of political and 
administrative representation. 
In evaluation of hypothesis 12, no significant coefficients can be found; however 
all the coefficients (from correlations and ordinal logistic models) show a positive 
relationship between requesting a competency and levels of administrative 
responsibility55 and a negative relationship between political openness. So with a larger 
sample, we might expect to see that administrative decentralization predicts 
administrative responsibility rather than political openness. Similar methods were used 
to evaluate hypothesis 13. This time, the covariate of interest is measured as the 
percentage of the municipal budget that comes from national government transfers and 
ranges in the sample from 53 to 99 percent. Coefficients for the relationship between 
administrative responsibility and dependency are negative as predicted by hypothesis 13 
                                                 
55 The coefficient for the competency covariate in the logistic model predicting administrative 
responsibility has a p-value of 0.15. Ordinal logistic regression models were also use to check for reverse 
causality. While no covariates were statistically significant in these models either, the pattern of positive 
coefficients for administrative responsibility and negative coefficients for political openness mentioned 
above holds.  
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but none of them reach statistical significance. Interestingly, the coefficients for the 
relationship between fiscal dependency and political openness are positive and the p-
value for the ordinal logistic coefficient on dependency is 0.09, which is significant since 
we are using 0.10 as the threshold p-value. So it seems that perhaps in a larger sample 
we would see the expected negative relationship between administrative responsibility 
and fiscal dependence, but an unexpected positive relationship between fiscal 
dependence and political openness56. These findings suggest the value of separating out 
the two dimensions, because they seem to have different causal predictors57. 
Other Canton-Level Factors  
 Urbanization 
In general, it is important to note that the sample contains a wide variety of 
urbanization, including urban populations ranging from 1240 to 1,599,361 residents and 
between 12% and 95% of the canton population. Ordinal logistical regressions with 
administrative responsiveness and political openness as the dependent variables and 
percent of the population living in an urban zone as the independent variable do not find 
any significant relationships. However, there is negative and significant (p= .03) 
relationship between urbanization and political openness.  
 
                                                 
56 The only explanation that I have for this unexpected finding is that political openness may be related to 
a style of governance that is not as strict about tax collection or the payment of fees because it emphasizes 
dealing with citizens. This is only a tentative conjecture and more research is need to determine why this is 
the case.  
57 Indeed, the political openness dimension seems to be negatively correlated with total population in the 
canton while administrative responsibility is positively correlated with it. Fiscal dependence is also 
negatively correlated with population size, suggesting that a mayor’s representational attitudes may be 
most constrained by the number of people he/she has to take care of.  
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 Region 
My sample contains 15 cantons from the sierra, 16 cantons from the coast, and 7 
cantons from the Amazon region. I have almost achieved parity in the number of cantons 
between the two major regions and I have a good showing for the Amazon region, as 
well. Unfortunately neither coefficients from the appropriate ordinal logistic models nor 
correlation coefficients show any statistically significant relationships. However, the 
sign on both the logistic and the correlation coefficients are negative in relation to 
political openness, suggesting that in a larger sample, one might discover that there is 
less citizen participation and inclusion of marginalized sectors in this region. Figure 3-3 
presents the mean level of representational orientations by region. It demonstrates that 
while there is not a difference in administrative responsiveness between the coast and the 
sierra or mountains region, the coastal region does have a lower mean (1.9) of political 
openness as compared to the sierra (2.2). The Amazon region has lower administrative 
responsibility than either of the other regions, but comes out tied with the mountains and 
ahead of the coastal region in political openness. 
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Figure 3-3: Levels of Representation Orientation by Region in Ecuador. 
 
Figure 3-3: Levels of Representation Orientation by Region in Ecuador. This figure shows 
that the average level of political openness differs among regions, but the average administrative 
responsibility does not. 
 
 
 Population Size 
 Correlation coefficients seem to support the idea the urbanization negatively 
impacts political openness but is positively related to administrative responsiveness. The 
correlation between population size and administrative responsibility is positive (r=.27) 
and significant (p=0.07); the correlation between population size and political openness 
is negative (r= -.30) and significant (p=0.05). Ordinal logistic coefficients show similar 
levels of significance (p=.11 and p=.05 for administrative responsiveness and political 
openness respectively) and the same signs.  
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 Basic Services 
 Unfortunately, neither administrative responsibility nor political openness are 
significantly related to the level of basic services (based on correlations and ordinal 
logistic regression), but notably signs on all coefficients for water and plumbing are 
negative in the models for administrative responsibility. This could support that idea that 
where mayors know the situation is grim, they focus intensively on works projects to 
improve basic service provision.  
Summary of Findings 
 Tables 3-7a and 3-7b summarize the theoretical expectations and findings for 
almost all covariates across the three sections of analysis. In the table headings, 
“Bivariate finding” refers to the findings reported in the paragraphs immediately above; 
“Multivariate by category” refers to Table 3-5, and “Multivariate across category” refers 
to Table 3-6. Most importantly, we see that there is a fair degree of divergence in the 
covariates that predict political openness and administrative responsibility, which further 
suggests that are in fact separate dimensions and should be treated as such.  
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Table 3-7a: Theoretical Expectations and Findings for Political Openness 
Political Openness 
Covariate 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Expectation 
Bivariate 
finding 
Multivariate 
by Category 
Multivariate 
across Category 
Female 
1 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ not included 
Ethnic minority 
2 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ 
Education 3 + - - and p<0.1 - 
Decentralization 
lack- fiscal 
4 none none 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and p<0.1 
Decentralization 
lack- 
administrative 
4 none none + not included 
Decentralization 
lack- political 
5 + + + not included 
Overall 
satisfaction  
6 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ 
National party 
7 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and 
p<0.1 
- and p<0.1 
Alianza Pais or 
Pachakutik 
8 + + 
not 
included 
not included 
Margin of victory 
9 + + 
not 
included 
not included 
Run for reelection 10 + + - and p<0.1 - and p<0.1 
Political 
experience 
11a and 
11b 
+ (a) and 
 - (b) 
- and 
p<0.1 
- not included 
Administrative 
request 
12 + - - not included 
Nat'l gov. 
dependence 
13 - 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and 
p<0.1 
- 
Percent urban 
 - 
- and 
p<0.1 
- and p<0.1 - 
Sierra  + + - not included 
Costa  - - - not included 
Total population 
 - 
- and 
p<0.1 
not 
included 
- and p<0.1 
Water coverage  + + + not included 
Tables 3-7a and 3-7b: In the table headings, “Bivariate finding” refers to the findings reported 
in the paragraphs immediately above; “Multivariate by category” refers to Table 3-5, and 
“Multivariate across category” refers to Table 3-6. 
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Table 3-7b: Theoretical Expectations and Findings for Administrative 
Responsibility 
Administrative Responsibility 
Covariate 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Expectation 
Bivariate 
finding 
Multivariate 
by Category 
Multivariate 
across Category 
Female 1 none + + not included 
Ethnic minority 2 none + + not included 
Education 
3 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and p<0.1 + and p<0.1 
Decentralization 
lack- fiscal 
4 - - and p<0.1 - and p<0.1 - and p<0.1 
Decentralization 
lack- 
administrative 
4 - - - - 
Decentralization 
lack- political 
5 none none + not included 
Overall satisfaction  6 + + + not included 
National party 
7 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
+ and p<0.1 + and p<0.1 
Alianza Pais or 
Pachakutik 
8 + + not included not included 
Margin of victory 9 + + not included not included 
Run for reelection 10 + + + - and p<0.1 
Political experience 
11a and 
11b 
+ (a) and - 
(b) 
- - not included 
Administrative 
request 
12 + + + not included 
Nat'l gov. 
dependence 
13 - - - not included 
Percent urban  + or  – + + not included 
Sierra  + + + not included 
Costa  - - + not included 
Total population 
 + 
+ and 
p<0.1 
not included not included 
Water coverage  + - - not included 
Tables 3-7a and 3-7b: In the table headings, “Bivariate finding” refers to the findings reported 
in the paragraphs immediately above; “Multivariate by category” refers to Table 3-5, and 
“Multivariate across category” refers to Table 3-6. 
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 These tables show that there are some differences between the findings in the 
multivariate models and the bivariate models. In some cases, the bivariate finding for a 
variable is significant but the multivariate findings are not. This not surprising because 
the multivariate models lose statistical power because of the small sample size. As long 
as the positive or negative sign remains the same, the results should be interpreted as 
consistent with one another, even if statistical significance is not uniformly achieved. 
However, there are some cases for which sign for the variable (positive or negative) does 
not remain unchanged across all models. For example, in looking at the impact of 
belonging to a national party on orientations of political openness, we see that the impact 
is positive and significant in the bivariate and the first multivariate models, but it 
becomes negative and significant when regressors from other categories, namely 
demographic ones, are included in the model. Given that demographic variables such as 
race and gender have a consistent and significant impact on political openness, we can 
conclude that the first two models suffered from omitted variable bias and the last 
multivariate model is the most conclusive. As Tables 3-7a and 3-7b show, the impact of 
running for reelection on political openness is the only one other case for which the sign 
shifts unexpectedly and the multivariate model result is statistically significant. I suspect 
that omitted variable bias is a work in the bivariate results here as well, and more 
credence should be given to the multivariate findings.  
Conclusion 
 
 Finally, what can we learn about impact of decentralization on the 
representational attitudes of mayors? First, in order to answer that question, the 
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dimensions of local representation had to be defined. I contribute to literature on local 
governance by positing that the concepts of administrative responsibility and political 
openness capture a large amount of what citizens expect their local government to do. 
Next, I coded data from in-depth interviews to describe the distribution of 
representational orientations in Ecuador. The mayors represent an interesting mix of 
officials, some of whom were in office before, during, and after the new constitution and 
laws that sought to extend and reform decentralization. Others are serving for their first 
period under the new decentralization rules. Therefore, it is too early to state definitively 
the long-term impact of decentralization reforms in Ecuador, but the interview data 
capture an interesting snapshot of mayoral attitudes in a transitional period.  
 As the findings show, administrative responsibility seems to be easier to predict 
from education and party alliances, but political openness is more closely related to 
satisfaction with decentralization and the demographic characteristics of the mayor. 
Also, mayors are likely to talk about the need for more fiscal decentralization; 
interestingly this is positively related to attitudes of political openness and negatively 
related to attitudes of administrative representation. In terms of political openness, 
complaints about decentralization can be viewed as mayors voicing the concerns of their 
people who often have many more needs than a municipal government can ever meet. In 
general, mayors are happy that decentralization is happening and want it to continue 
because they feel that they are the most legitimate government to serve the people 
because of their close proximity to their constituents (personal interview, province of El 
Oro, April 8th 2013). This satisfaction with decentralization is related to increases 
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political openness. So it can be argued that decentralization, if accompanied by the 
promised fiscal resources leads to better local representation. 
 It is important to remember that political openness represents a very new way of 
thinking in comparison with decades of democracy where politics in Latin American as a 
whole and in Ecuador especially excluded the poor, rural, and indigenous sectors of 
society (see Taylor-Robinson 2010, North and Cameron 2003). Notable social 
movements such as CONAIE (Confederation de Nationalidades Indígenas de Ecuador) 
have worked to change the status of marginalized indigenous peoples and have 
succeeded in gaining constitutional recognition and rights at the national level (Smith 
2010). However, these de jure rights often take time to be realized de facto and 
incorporated into the political culture of a locality. My research shows that some mayors 
are early adopters of the openness dimension of representation while other lag behind, 
content to focus only on the single dimension of administration.  It will be interesting to 
see when and if this one-dimensional representation becomes politically intractable as a 
campaign strategy.  
 This is just the beginning for research on local representation, and future research 
has a plethora of questions to address.  For instance, future research should take an 
explicit look at the role of race and gender in providing representation in the political 
openness dimension. Additionally, I plan to use in depth paired case studies that 
compare the situation of two municipalities in greater detail, examining all the 
demographic, budgetary, and mass survey data that is available for the cantons. This will 
serve to validate both dimensions of representation and explain when and where they 
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become salient. In summation, the concepts of political openness and administrative 
responsibility are building blocks for research that shed light on the nature of local 
representation after decentralization reforms. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE DEMOCRATIC PURCHASING POWER OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN 
LATIN AMERICA: CITIZEN EVALUATIONS OF LOCAL REPRESENTATION IN 
THE CONTEXT OF DECENTRALIZATION 
Introduction 
 The central question in my dissertation concerns the impact of decentralization 
on local representation, and its impact on how local officials represent citizen 
preferences. In the previous two chapters I have considered representation from the 
official’s perspective and made assumptions about the nature of citizen preferences and 
evaluations of local government. In this chapter I examine the representation relationship 
between citizens and their elected officials from the citizen’s perspective. It is a look at 
the governance process from the “bottom up” that challenges past notions about the 
impact of participation on how citizens view their local government. It differs from the 
following chapters in that it does not consider representation among elected officials as 
an outcome or an orientation, but rather it looks at how citizens perceive the 
representational behavior of local officials given their contact with them.  In addition, I 
test the idea that mayoral attitudes (which are examined in detail in Chapter III) impact 
citizen attitudes by combining data from my fieldwork with data from the 
AmericasBarometer. In doing so, I highlight that fact that representation in the 
decentralized context is an on ongoing dialogue between the representatives and the 
represented that occurs through participation. 
 Studies of participation often assume that a high level of citizen involvement is a 
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desired end for developing democracies, and indeed decentralization is promoted as a 
means to this end. Furthermore, studies of decentralization and local democracy often 
point to high levels of citizen participation in certain localities as signs of good 
governance and the consolidation of democratic norms at the grass-roots level. This 
research begs the question, what are the results of participation? Past research assumes 
that conventional political participation is a democracy-reinforcing process that results in 
both positive attitudes toward the regime and more responsive governance (see Booth 
and Seligson 2009; Finkel 1978). However, there is some empirical evidence which 
suggests that the process is more complex than previously thought. For example, Booth 
and Seligson (2009) have demonstrated that participation is correlated at the micro-level 
with both positive and negative attitudes about the democratic regime. This insight about 
who participates points to another question about the results of participation: If citizens 
with negative attitudes about the regime are engaging in conventional political 
participation, should we assume that participation will lead to satisfied citizens?  
Relaxing this assumption allows me to investigate two previously unconsidered 
possibilities. The first is that dissatisfied citizens stay dissatisfied even after 
participation, and may eventually disengage with democracy or even attempt to subvert 
it.  Secondly, it is possible that those citizens who start out satisfied with the government 
may become frustrated with the government through engaging with it. Thus, I argue that 
while participation may have profound implications for the quality of democracy, levels 
of local participation may be more relevant in identifying instances of unmet demands 
for services (dissatisfied citizens) than opportunities to build satisfied democrats.  How 
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the government manages this demand and the subsequent beliefs of citizens about its 
responsiveness and effectiveness ultimately determine if the effects of participation are 
truly beneficial to democracy. This study explicitly investigates the impact of 
participation on citizen evaluations of local government responsiveness and 
effectiveness58.  
 In examining local participation, the recent trend in the literature has been to 
move beyond studies of voting for assessing the level of citizen involvement (Baiocchi 
et al. 2011; Booth and Seligson 2008, 2009; Van Cott 2008; Goldfrank 2007). It is 
particularly appealing to examine local participation because as decentralization occurs 
citizens have more possibilities for interaction and involvement at the local level than at 
the national level. That is to say, they have a wider set of relatively low-cost options for 
participation that go beyond casting a ballot in an election. However, it is uncertain if 
merely having more opportunities to participate because of decentralization enhances 
citizen satisfaction with government, as international advocates of state reform suggest it 
should.  If citizens are assumed to receive information about the responsiveness of the 
government during participation, they will update their views on the government 
accordingly. Additionally, they should form evaluations of their local government 
differently based on how they have chosen to interact with it.  Thus research must 
account for diversity among forms of conventional participation and the evaluations of 
                                                 
58 Responsiveness is discussed in a later section and defined as government actions that align with citizen 
demands and preferences. Effectiveness is defined as success in producing a desired outcome (a good or 
service in the case of local governments).  Effectiveness does not imply maximum production with 
minimum wasted expense in the economic sense. 
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the local government they create. In sum this study seeks to understand the democratic 
purchasing power of participation and whether it differs depending on local context (e.g., 
level of decentralization) and the type of participation. In order to assess the relationship 
between participation and government effectiveness I employ a research design that 
extends broadly across Latin America and then takes a closer look at a decentralized 
country in order to examine local variation in participation. 
 This chapter begins with a review of previous research related to government 
responsiveness, local participation, and decentralization. It will show how each part of 
the literature can benefit from a serious consideration of the other parts. In doing so, I 
uniquely address the question of responsiveness from the citizen’s perspective and 
extend the theory into the local arena.  I will then discuss my theory of local government 
responsiveness and participation in the presence of decentralization and develop 
hypotheses to address the gaps in scholarly understanding. This discussion will be 
followed by an explanation of my data and case selection and several empirical tests of 
my hypotheses using cross-national and intra-country comparisons. I will then evaluate 
the overall support for each of my hypotheses and conclude with thoughts about how 
research in this field of study can be advanced.  In general, I find that the relationship 
between participation and government responsiveness is more nuanced that previously 
thought, with direct forms of contact with the government exerting the most influence 
over citizen attitudes. More notably, after multiple tests there is a lack of evidence to 
support that idea that decentralization increases perceptions of local government 
responsiveness either directly or through increases in citizen participation, calling into 
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question the ardent support given to these reforms by international associations such as 
the IMF and World Bank. 
Local Government Responsiveness 
 As previously discussed, in democratic countries, elected officials are expected 
to be accountable to citizens and behave in accordance with their wishes (Dahl 1971). 
While the previous chapter focused on the procedural inclusiveness and responsiveness 
dimensions of substantive representation, the chapter focuses primarily on representation 
as responsiveness.59 Both in the developed and the developing worlds, scholars consider 
government responsiveness an integral part of the functioning of democracy (Binzer, 
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Cleary 2007; Faguet 2004; Anderson and Tverdova 
2003; Conaghan 1996). In fact, many prominent definitions for representation include a 
reference to responsiveness. For example, Pitkin defines representation broadly as, 
“acting in the interests of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (1967, p. 
209). 
 The literature on representation has focused almost exclusively on the national 
level of government, without considering the quality of representation that occurs at the 
local level. I argue that if government responsiveness is linked to the strength of local 
democracy, it is critical not only that local governments are responsive, but that citizens 
perceive this responsiveness. It is mass awareness and agreement with the work of the 
                                                 
59 In this chapter citizens evaluate government responsiveness, but actually citizen participation is related 
to the concept of procedural inclusiveness. In future research I intend to investigate whether or not mayors 
that are politically open in their orientation encourage citizen participation.  
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government60 which ultimately signifies the effectiveness of local government and the 
strength of the linkages between citizens and their elected officials. When considering 
the responsiveness of local government it is important to note that unlike national 
government actions that citizens often evaluate in terms of abstract ideological 
preferences, the effectiveness of local governments is a concrete reality that citizens 
experience every day when they turn on the water or take out the garbage. Thus, 
evaluations of local government effectiveness and responsiveness are more likely to be 
based on the true state of reality, which citizens can observe at a relatively low cost, than 
corresponding evaluations of national government. This is especially the case in the 
presence of decentralization because local governments have some level of fiscal and 
administrative autonomy and thus are more directly responsible for the quality of life 
that citizens experience61.  
Decentralization and Local Government Responsiveness 
 The idea that local governments (in addition to national governments) should 
also be responsive to citizen demands increased in popularity as international actors such 
as the World Bank and IMF advocated decentralization reforms purported to enhance the 
efficiency and quality of governance across the developing world. Some form of 
decentralization has been enacted by a variety of countries in Latin America, under the 
                                                 
60 Survey questions that ask for citizens’ opinions about how much the government cares about them are 
sometimes considered to be measures of “external efficacy” (Miller and Listhaug 1990). While this 
concept is related to my portrayal of local government responsiveness, external efficacy does not capture 
the concrete aspects of citizen evaluations of government.  
61 In the case that local government is not decentralized, citizens still gather information about the 
effectiveness of local government but they attach less weight to that information since the local 
government has less decision-making power. As decentralization increases, I expect that citizens attach 
more weight to the actions of the local government and evaluate it accordingly.  
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assumption that it would increase local government responsiveness (Manor 1997; Blair 
2000; Faguet 2004). As previously stated,  local officials are assumed to have better 
information about the preferences and interests of their constituents (Mitchinson 2003), 
and voters may be able to monitor local officials more effectively (Khemani 2001). Thus 
decentralization is hypothesized not only to influence local governance outcomes (such 
as improving access to water and sanitation), but also to affect the processes by which 
citizens and governments interact to produce these outcomes. These findings have not 
gone uncontested in the literature. Some scholars argue that decentralization should not 
be expected to enhance local responsiveness (see Gelineau and Remmer 2005; 
Vishwanath 2006). 
 Some scholars argue that local governments and decentralized countries are more 
corrupt and prone to elite capture than national governments or centralized countries 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Shah 2006; Treisman 2007). In 
particular, Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2013) show that political decentralization does 
not improve perceptions among citizens that the government is less corrupt. This means 
that having local elections and competition for office at the subnational level do not 
necessarily generate the popular perception that these governments are capable and 
honest. Corruption at any level of government has the ability to drag down citizen 
evaluations and create mistrust even in the participatory processes that are designed 
foster confidence in government responsiveness. It is imperative that research take 
seriously the implications of perceived corruption, because its presence can explain why 
well designed institutions such as decentralization do not work as hypothesized. Taken 
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together, this literature suggests decentralization is not a panacea for bad governance, 
especially in the presence of corruption, but rather that the effects of decentralization on 
responsiveness are mediated through the information and incentives of key actors such 
as citizens and local officials. Thus, in order to fully examine the process of 
representation in conjunction with decentralization, I also consider the role that citizen 
participation plays in shaping local governance. 
Decentralization and Participation 
 The literature on local government participation has increased quickly in recent 
years following the new local practices, most notably in Brazil and other countries in 
Latin America that allow citizens to participate directly in making the budget (Avritzer 
2009; Baiocchi 2011; Fung 2011; Schonwalder 1997). These new practices have 
optimistic implications for government responsiveness because citizens now have an 
additional tool (the budget) with which to shape local government responsiveness. While 
these reforms are usually viewed as part of the general devolution process, they are not 
synonymous with decentralization, which generally empowers local governments but 
does not always involve the creation of programs such as participatory budgeting that 
actively seek citizen input. Anderson and von Laerhoven (2007) make a valuable 
contribution by investigating the incentive structure of local elites who decide how or 
whether to involve citizens in government decision-making processes, but what happens 
after that? The effect of participatory programs on citizen opinions about government 
responsiveness remains uninvestigated. 
In sum, the literature on representation suggests that elections give officials 
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incentives to be responsive to citizens. Advocates of decentralization suggest that 
empowering local governments can improve government responsiveness, and studies of 
participatory budgeting argue that citizen involvement is important for democratic 
outcomes. However, the literature on representation and responsiveness has failed to 
extend these ideas to local governments, and the literature on decentralization has not 
considered the role that citizen participation may play in creating effective outcomes. 
Thus what we lack is a framework for understanding ideas of local governance, 
decentralization, and citizen participation together. I contribute to each of these 
literatures by suggesting a causal story in which citizens evaluations of local government 
responsiveness are based on upon their interactions with it (i.e.-participation), the 
decentralization context in which they find themselves, and the attitudes of elected 
officials. 
Local Participation as an Independent Variable 
 As previously stated, much of the literature on participation at every level of 
government has focused on citizen involvement as the end of the causal process or has 
assumed that it reinforces positive opinions about the government. Past research has 
investigated the idea that citizen attitudes and behaviors contribute to an overarching 
culture that is more or less supportive of democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Booth 
and Seligson 1984; Tiano 1986; Seligson and Booth 1993). However, few explicit tests 
of the effects of participation exist, among which are Finkel’s (1985, 1987) studies of 
political behavior in the United States and West Germany. He finds that voting increased 
regime support and campaign activity increased the individual’s political efficacy. 
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Stenner-Day and Fischle (1992) use simultaneous equation models to show that different 
forms of political participation have varied effects on political efficacy. Bowler and 
Donnovan (2002) use data from U.S. states to show that exposure to direct democracy 
increases popular belief that the government is responsive to the public.  Other 
scholarship shows that having voted in the past increases an individual’s probability of 
voting in a subsequent election (Denny and Doyle 2009; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 
2003). This line of research gives us insight into one possible consequence of 
participation: democracy reinforcement. However, research by Booth and Seligson 
(2009) argues that the relationship between system support and participation is parabolic 
rather than positive-linear.  Thus both citizens having positive evaluations of the 
government and those with negative evaluations of the government are likely to engage 
in conventional forms of participation. Do those who participate because they view 
government negatively think less badly (or less negatively) than before? Clearly, the 
possible negative consequences of participation should be considered.  
 Other empirical evidence suggests that how a citizen feels about the regime is not 
the only determinant of whether or not he or she will participate. In fact, studies about 
participation in Latin America have noted that communal participation, especially in 
rural areas, increased the quality of life for citizens and allowed them to bargain with the 
national government in order to obtain benefits (Nye 1987; Booth and Seligson 1979; 
Fishel 1979). At times citizens may be driven to participate by the hope of obtaining 
tangible benefits.  This research suggests that the purported positive effects of 
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participation can be noted by researchers both in terms of general attitudes of support 
and more specific expectations of material benefits.  
 Recently, attention has been drawn to the multifaceted nature of participation.  
Political participation is no longer limited to voting and campaign activity. Distinctions 
between types of participation are quite helpful because they allow various types of 
participation to be linked either to different causes, or in the case of my theoretical story, 
to different outcomes. For example, Booth and Seligson (2008) consider the 
determinants of several types of participation including voting, contacting a public 
official, communal activism, civil society engagement, campaign-partisan activism, and 
protest involvement (see p. 107). 
Of the types of participation, two, communal activism and civic participation (or 
civil society engagement, see Booth and Seligson 2008), have received significant 
attention from scholars of local governments. Work on communal activism, especially 
pertaining to participatory budgeting processes, argues that it leads to the burgeoning of 
local democracy which increases in the presence of favorable institutional practices such 
as local competition (Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi et. al. 2011; Goldfrank 2007; Wampler 
2007; Davies and Falleti 2012). Civic activism or civil society engagement is sometimes 
distinguished from communal activism (see Booth and Seligson 2008) and sometimes 
considered part of participatory budgeting (see Baiocchi et. al. 2011). As described by 
Putnam (1994), civic activism implies that participation in non-governmental 
organizations can shape citizen opinions about the government, though Booth and 
Richard  (1998) do not find support for this linkage in Central America. However, even 
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considering the recent advances made by scholars in understanding how citizens 
participate, we continue to know little about the attitudinal effects of participation. 
Participation as Information Accumulation 
 My current research addresses this gap in the literature by examining the 
relationship between participation and government responsiveness and effectiveness in a 
decentralized setting from the perspective of an average citizen. Any theory that seeks to 
understand the citizen side of local government responsiveness must take seriously the 
role of information in leading citizens to their opinions of government. Undoubtedly, 
participation provides local officials with information about citizen opinions, but citizens 
gain equally valuable information about their local government both from conventional 
participation experiences-such as voting and meeting attendance, as well as from every 
interaction they have with the local government, including making requests and filling 
out paperwork. They use this information to form evaluations about the responsiveness 
and effectiveness of their government.  At least on the local level it is plausible to 
assume that every citizen has information about their local government just by using the 
basic services they provide. Participation then provides citizens with additional 
considerations upon which to evaluate government. 
 If this is the case, the relationship between participation and local government 
responsiveness could be either positive or negative. It is possible that citizens who 
participate and engage with the local government will be satisfied by their interactions 
and be persuaded that the government is indeed responsive. It is also possible that 
citizens who engage with the local government will be frustrated by its ineffectiveness 
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and may even be alienated if their concerns were not taken seriously. While traditional 
literature would assume that this relationship is always positive for conventional forms 
of participation, according to my argument it is difficult to distinguish the directionality 
of the relationship between participation and government responsiveness.  
H1a: Citizen participation increases the perceived responsiveness of 
government. 
H1b: Citizen participation decreases the perceived responsiveness of 
government. 
 Decentralized institutional arrangements have been argued both to increase the 
absolute levels of local participation and to make local governments more responsive to 
citizen demands. Due to policies of decentralization, local governments become relevant 
to citizens as targets of collective action for the redistribution of goods (Falleti 2005, 
2010). In the complete absence of decentralization, the citizen may attach some 
significance to the ability of the local government to perform a service, but they are both 
less likely to engage with that government and view its performance as separate from 
that of the national government. Whether or not decentralization increases local 
government responsiveness and effectiveness, it usually makes local government a 
relevant actor, thereby increasing the demands of citizens for goods and services and 
generating participatory behavior.  
If local governments are in fact more responsive, it is likely that citizens who 
engage with these governments will have positive experiences that will lead to favorable 
evaluations. As decentralization increases, local governments should have increased 
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ability to meet citizen demands and generate satisfaction. Thus, I hypothesize both that 
decentralization will stimulate local participation and increase the democracy reinforcing 
effects of participation. 
H2: Citizens in decentralized localities will be likely more likely to 
participate.  
H3: Citizen in decentralized localities will be more likely to perceive the 
government as responsive after participation compared to those in 
centralized localities. 
 Additionally, if decentralization advocates are to be believed, decentralization 
should lead not only to shifts in citizen attitudes but also to shifts in the way that elected 
officials view their job. Increasing attitudes of responsiveness may in turn cause officials 
to behave differently toward citizens, who will perceive this responsiveness. Thus there 
are possible indirect effects of decentralization that are mediated through the 
representational attitudes of local officials. By considering the connection between 
citizen and elite attitudes, I capture a previously untested aspect of the purported 
consequences of decentralization. In order to do this, I draw on theories and data that are 
elaborated on in the third chapter. I expect more responsive and inclusive mayoral 
attitudes will lead to more positive citizen perceptions of government.  
H4: Citizens living in a municipality where the mayor higher 
representational orientations will be more likely to have positive evaluations 
of the government.  
 Previous literature has shown that different types of participation might lead to 
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different outcomes. While there are several types of participation available to citizens at 
the local level, not all of them provide the same amount of information about the 
performance of the local government. For instance, I argue that the act of voting likely 
provides little information about the responsiveness and effectiveness of the local 
government compared to a conversation with the mayor or attending a budget meeting. 
The most direct information likely comes from the most direct contact with government 
employees. Community participation and civic activism also provide information about 
the local government, but the signal may be noisy because citizens are engaging in civic 
organizations and not directly with the government. Therefore, the strength of the 
relationship between each type of participation and government effectiveness and 
responsiveness is conditioned upon the level of information that the form of participation 
provides to the citizen. The directionality of the relationship is hypothesized to be 
influenced by the local context, in this case captured by decentralization as outlined 
above. 
H5: All other things equal, the act of voting does not significantly alter a 
citizen’s perceptions of local responsiveness. 
H6: As a citizen’s direct contact with the local government increases, 
perceptions of local government responsiveness will increase62. 
H7: As a citizen’s communal participation and civil society activism increase 
he/she will be more likely to perceive the local government to be responsive, 
                                                 
62 Hypotheses 5 and 6 are bi-directional in the same way as H1. However, they are stated only in the 
positive direction in the interest of being succinct. 
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but less likely than if he/she had direct contact with the government.  
 Other notable work on local governments and decentralization has highlighted 
the role of corruption (see Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013). Corruption enters this 
story as a generator of ineffectiveness, which works contrary to the supposed positive 
effects of decentralization and leads citizens to be aggravated as a result of their 
interactions with the government. To the extent that citizen participation reveals local 
government to be ineffective because it requires bribes or misappropriates tax dollars, 
the results of participation will be dissatisfaction. It is also possible that perceptions of 
corruption indicate a lack of government transparency, which leads citizens to think that 
government is non-responsive. Thus I expect perceptions of corruption to negatively 
impact the directionality of the relationship between participation and responsiveness.  
H8: As a citizen’s perceived level of corruption increases, he/she will be less 
likely to perceive the local government to be responsive. 
I will now discuss the methods used to evaluate each of these hypotheses. 
Data, Case Selection, and Measurement 
 In order to evaluate my hypotheses I need data from democratic countries that 
have experienced different levels of decentralization. Fortunately there are a board range 
of cases that fit this description, which speaks to the generalizability of the theory. As 
discussed in the introduction, many countries in Latin America have implemented 
decentralization, both to solve economic problems and address issues of democratic 
legitimacy. Several countries in Latin America have made the local level of government 
the target of decentralization reforms. Thus Latin America is an excellent context for 
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investigating my hypotheses. I test my expectations using the AmericasBarometer 
survey data for 1863 countries in Latin America during the 2006-2007 wave of the 
survey. The sample contains some countries that had enacted significant political and 
fiscal decentralization reforms (8 of 18) and others that had not (coding based on 
Daughters and Harper 2007). These data allow for a cross-national test of the hypotheses 
with the contextual variable for whether or not the country was decentralized at the time. 
  Since my theory is concerned with local governments and participation, I also 
use two AmericasBarometer datasets from Ecuadorian municipalities. The first dataset 
contains twenty municipalities64 in Ecuador in 2004. A representative sample of 300 
respondents per municipality yields a total of 6000 respondents. The second contains 
data from thirty municipalities in 2012. The drawback to the second dataset is that it was 
stratified so as be a national representative sample, and thus it contains few observations 
per municipality. On average there are 20 respondents per municipality, and never less 
than 1665. In spite of the small sample size, these data are useful because they match 
with the fieldwork data collected by the author in the spring of 2013. Ecuador is a 
developing democracy that had experienced moderate decentralization reforms both in 
2004 and 2006. Both municipal samples contain high levels of subnational variation in 
                                                 
63 Latin American Countries: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Guyana  
64 There are about 220 municipal governments in Ecuador, which are also called cantons. Ecuadorian 
cantons inlcuded: Azogues, Espejo, Mira, Esmeraldas, Eloy Alfaro, San Lorenzo, Cotacachi, Otavalo, 
Saraguro, Babahoyo, Manta, Sucre, Tena, Cayambe, Pedro Moncayo, Ambato, Lago Agrio, Putumayo , 
Cascales, Joya de los Sachas 
65 Local governments in the 2012 sample where the mayor was also interviewed include: Pucará, 
Latacunga, Cañar, La Mana, Santa Rosa, Esmeraldas, Atacames, Colimes, Duale, Milagro, Naranjal, 
Ibarra, Otavalo, Loja, Chaguarpamba, Babahoyo, Montalvo, Vinces, Portoviejo, Chone, Flavio Alfaro, 
Manta, Morona, Archidona, Cayambe, Rumiñahui, Los Bancos, Ambato, and Zamora. 
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terms of geography, population density, and urbanization. There is an eight-year gap 
between the two municipal samples, and much transpired in Ecuadorian politics during 
that time period. The most notable thing was the crafting and implementation of the new 
constitution in 2009, which reshaped decentralization and emphasized the rights of 
marginalized sectors. The previous chapter contains a more complete discussion of the 
new constitution. I expect that if anything, the new constitution has raised citizen 
expectations about what government should do and has placed local government under 
more pressure to respond to citizen demands66.  
 Additionally, Ecuador is an interesting case to study due to the variety of 
opportunities that citizens have to participate in their locality. Particularly in the Andean 
region of the country, citizens and government officials collaborate in mingas, in which 
citizens provide the labor and the government provides the material to construct basic 
infrastructure such as water pipes and roads (North and Cameron 2003). A recent 
interview conducted by the author with an Ecuadorian mayor reveals that mingas can 
also be a Saturday pastime in small urban areas where government officials work 
alongside residents to change street-light bulbs, repaint walls, collect trash, mend fences, 
and fix minor maintenance issues, while everyone brings a sack lunch to eat together 
(Shockley 2013). Some municipalities in the sample also practiced participatory 
budgeting in which neighborhoods gather to decide how local money should be spent 
and then larger assemblies for all neighborhood representatives are conducted in which 
                                                 
66 The dynamic nature of citizen opinions in Ecuador is something I look forward to investigating in future 
research. I can envision a pre- and post- constitutional change set up that uses multiple samples of the 
nationally representative data.  
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the budget is discussed in detail, voted on, and approved67. The municipal building itself 
often contains surprising volumes of citizens who come to see the mayor or someone 
else about issues of all sorts; so direct contact with the local government is not reserved 
only for those who are particularly active in politics but is a cultural expectation in many 
municipalities in Ecuador68.  
Measuring Government Responsiveness 
 When citizens evaluate the responsiveness of their local government, they are 
likely to think about how well the government has done in providing basic services. 
Unlike national legislators who demonstrate responsiveness through making laws, the 
constitutional responsibilities given to local governments in Latin America entail the 
provision of basic tangible goods and services such as water, electricity, sewage systems, 
and trash collection. There are multiple ways to measure the idea of tangible 
responsiveness, and this article employs two in particular. First, I measure government 
responsiveness in Ecuadorian municipalities (2004 sample) using the survey question 
that asks respondents, “Do you think that the mayor and the municipal council respond 
to what the people want, always, the majority of the time, once in a while, almost never, 
or never?” The citizens’ perception of responsiveness is an ordinal measure that ranges 
                                                 
67 The new Ecuadorian constitution of 2009 now mandates that all local government practice participatory 
budgeting, but when the 2004 surveys were conducted, it was practiced in some but not all of the 
municipalities, and was more common in the Andean region than in the Amazonian or coastal region.  
68 Although each municipality has had the same opportunities to decentralize, the municipalities in the 
Ecuador subnational sample do differ in the level of decentralized services that they provide to citizens. 
See the previous chapters for a more detailed description of decentralization and competencies in Ecuador. 
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from 1 (never) to 5 (always)69. This question has face validity in the sense that it couples 
government actions with citizen demands and asks the citizen to rate how often the two 
coincide.  
  Secondly, I measure responsiveness using the question that asks respondents, 
“Would you say that the services that the municipality provides are…(1) very good (2) 
good (3) neither good nor bad or regular (4) bad (5) very bad (the worst)”. This question 
is used for both the Ecuadorian samples (2004 and 2012) and the cross-national sample 
of 18 countries70. It asks respondents to think specifically about what the government 
does, not just how they feel about the mayor or how much they trust it as an institution. 
This question taps a dimension of responsiveness that deals with the effectiveness of 
government and can be informed by participation and active engagement. Thus it is 
more appropriate than other measures that gauge relatively static or general political 
feelings such as partisanship or trust. While both questions are measures of the larger 
concept of responsiveness, to be clear about which dependent variable is used during the 
analysis, the question specifically about responsiveness is labeled responsiveness and the 
question about service delivery is labeled effectiveness.  
Measuring Participation 
 As previously discussed, participation is a multifaceted concept and my data 
offer me the ability to measure several different types. First, I measure direct contact 
                                                 
69 A survey appendix at the end of the dissertation contains all information relevant to question wording 
and coding. 
70 Ideally I would use both questions in each sample; however, the first question is not available for all 
countries in the cross-national sample. Therefore the cross-national sample only has independent variable 
which is termed effectiveness for clarity, and the 2004 Ecuadorian sample has two which are termed 
responsiveness and effectiveness. 
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between the citizen and the local government. The government contact variable was 
created using the following citizen actions, measured dichotomously for having engaged 
in the behavior in the last year:  
1) Asking for help or presenting a petition to an office, government official, 
council member, or the mayor 
2) Attending an open meeting  
3) Attending a municipal session  
4) Attending a meeting of neighborhood government (refers to the level below 
the municipality).  
Factor analysis confirms that the questions above form a single measurement dimension. 
For the 2004 Ecuadorian municipal data, I created an additive index of government 
contact ranging between zero and four. The cross-national data and 2012 Ecuadorian 
sample only contain two of the relevant items and so the additive index for that analysis 
ranges from zero to two. 
The communal activism variable was created using measures that encompass 
community participation that is not necessarily political, but that is directed at problem 
solving and improvement. This conceptualization and operationalization is in keeping 
with the work of others that have used the AmericasBarometer data71 (e.g. Booth & 
Seligson 2008). The following behaviors (completed within the last year) were used 
create the communal activism variable:  
                                                 
71 Booth and Seligson (2009) perform confirmatory factory analysis to show that the same questions used 
in my analysis load on one dimension each for communal and civil participation. My analysis leads to 
similar indices for both samples.   
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1) Donating money or materials to help solve a problem in your community or 
neighborhood 
2) Contributing personal work or labor 
3) Attending community meetings about a problem or improvement 
4) Organizing a new group to solve a neighborhood problem or seek 
improvement.  
These questions were not available on the 2012 survey, so communal activism was 
captured using the following question, “In the last 12 months have you contributed to 
help solve a problem of your community, neighbors, or neighborhood? Please, tell me if 
you did this at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never 
in the last 12 months?”72  
 The civil society engagement variable, which captures the idea of citizens being 
active in society in ways that are not specifically political, was created using the 
following past behaviors: 
1) Attending a religious meeting 
2) Attending an association for parents or family of a primary or secondary 
school student 
3) Attending a committee or council to improve the community 
4) Attending associations for professionals, businessmen, or growers and/or a 
peasant organization. 
 In keeping with more traditional conceptualizations of political behavior, I 
                                                 
72 The variable ranges from 1 to 4, where 1 is never and 4 is once a week.  
 130 
 
include having voted in the most recent mayoral election for the 2004 Ecuadorian 
cantons data. However, the 18 country sample and the 2012 Ecuadorian sample did not 
include a measure of voting at the local level. To capture local voting potential, these 
models include an indicator for whether or not the citizen is registered to vote. 
 It is important to note that all questions asked citizens to think retrospectively 
about participation in the past year and then evaluate the government at the time of the 
interview. So I expect that participation has temporally preceded the evaluations of 
responsiveness and effectiveness. Even though the data do not allow me to control for 
the citizen evaluations of responsiveness and effectiveness before participation, I can 
control for other characteristics of the citizen and his/her attitudes, which I discuss 
below. Also, I am able to look at some of the differences in attitudes overtime with my 
municipal samples from Ecuador. However, since there is an eight-year gap between 
them and they which are not drawn from the same cantons, I do so with caution. 
Second-level Variables 
 According to theory, decentralization is a contextual variable that can impact 
individual-level attitudes, so I measure it at the country level and at the canton level for 
the Ecuador samples. The country-level measures are from Daughters and Harper’s 
classification of Latin American countries on the fiscal dimension of decentralization. 
They use data from the Inter-American Development Bank to assess whether or not the 
country has experienced at least moderate levels of fiscal decentralization73. Fiscal 
                                                 
73 I use a dichotomous measure where 0 means a country has experienced no or very limited fiscal 
decentralization and 1 means that the country has experienced at least moderate levels of decentralization. 
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decentralization is used as opposed to measures that capture other aspects of 
decentralization because it is particularly relevant to local representation.  A canton can 
have local elections, but without fiscal powers and resources to implement changes, 
citizens are not likely to perceive their government as being responsive to their needs. At 
the canton level, I use data from the Basic Municipal Evaluation conducted by the 
Ecuadorian government in association with the German Institute for Development (GIZ). 
This study measures whether or not a canton has requested to have an additional service 
responsibility since the law first allowed for cantons to obtain these competencies in 
1998. Administrative decentralization is a crucial component of local responsiveness in 
Ecuador because taking on additional competencies signals that municipal governments 
are attempting to go above and beyond what is required by the law to address citizen 
concerns. Cantons that have taken on more services are considered to be more 
decentralized than those that have elected not to do so.  
 I also measure the representational attitudes of mayors which are added to the 
data from the 2012 Ecuadorian sample. I assume that citizen expectations for mayors fall 
into two dimensions: political openness and administrative responsibility. Citizens 
expect local officials to address their needs and concerns both through maintaining an 
open style of governance that includes them in government processes and through being 
responsible administrators of local services. I used interview data from face-to-face 
interviews with mayors in Ecuador to code each mayor as demonstrating attitudes of 
high, medium, or low political openness and administrative responsibility. Each 
dimension is coded separately, and mayors are often coded differently for each 
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dimension. For a full explanation of the dimensions and coding scheme, the readers 
should refer to the third chapter. 
Corruption and Control Variables 
 As discussed above, corruption is assumed to play a large role in determining 
both the responsiveness and effectiveness of local governments. I measure citizen 
perceptions of government corruption in their canton for the municipal sample and 
general perceptions of government corruption for the cross-national sample. (The locally 
framed question is not available cross-nationally or in the 2012 sample.) In the survey, 
citizens are asked how widespread they believe corruption to be; answers range from 1 
(not widespread or limited) to 4 (very widespread and common). Additionally, I include 
how frequently the respondent listens to radio news, which controls for political 
attentiveness, because this may influence his/her information about what the local 
government is doing (see Escobar-Lemmon and Ross 2013). Standard controls for 
political ideology (on a left-right scale), gender, age, ethnicity, income, and education 
are also incorporated. Table 4-1 contains a summary of the measure of each of the key 
variables across all three samples. 
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Table 4-1: Summary of Measurement across Samples 
Concept 
Hypothesis 
number 
Cross-national 
Measure  
Municipal 2004 
Measure 
Municipal 2012 
Measure 
Responsiveness DV 
satisfaction with 
local services 
1)Local 
government 
responds to what 
the people want 
2)satisfaction with 
local services 
satisfaction with 
local services 
Contact 
Participation 
6 
1) Asking for help 
or presenting a 
petition 
3) Attending a 
municipal session 
1) Asking for help 
or presenting a 
petition 
2) Attending an 
open meeting 
3) Attending a 
municipal session 
4) Attending a 
meeting of 
neighborhood gov. 
1) Asking for help 
or presenting a 
petition 
3) Attending a 
municipal session 
Civic 
Participation 
7 
1) Attending a 
religious meeting 
2) Attending a 
school association 
3) Attended a 
council to improve 
the community 
4) Attending 
associations for 
professionals 
1) Attending a 
religious meeting 
2) Attending a 
school association 
3) Attended a 
council to improve 
the community 
4) Attending 
associations for 
professionals 
1) Attending a 
religious meeting 
2) Attending a 
school association 
3) Attended a 
council to improve 
the community 4) 
Attending 
associations for 
professionals 
Communal 
Participation 
7 
1) Donating to help 
solve a problem 
community 
2) Contributing 
personal labor 
3) Attending 
community 
meetings 
4) Organizing a 
new group to solve 
a problem 
1) Donating to help 
solve a problem 
community 
2) Contributing 
personal labor 
3) Attending 
community 
meetings 
4) Organizing a 
new group to solve 
a problem 
Contributing to 
help solve a 
problem of 
community, 
neighbors, or 
neighborhood 
(1-4 for frequency 
of participation) 
Voting 5 Registered to vote 
Voting in last local 
election 
Registered to vote 
Corruption 8 
Widespread in 
country? 
Widespread in 
municipality? 
Widespread in 
country? 
Mayor 
Attitudes 
4 Not included Not included 
low, medium, or 
high levels of 
political 
Decentralization 3 
(0/1) for policies of 
fiscal 
decentralization 
(0/1) for having 
requested an 
administrative 
competency 
(0/1) for having 
requested an 
administrative 
competency 
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Results 
 Since my theory involves both individual-level behaviors and attitudes such as 
participation and a contextual factor, i.e. the level of decentralization, I use a multilevel 
model to investigate my hypotheses. More specifically, I estimate a multilevel model 
because I expect individual perceptions of responsiveness to be influenced by country or 
cantonal-level decentralization and the data are structured with individual-level 
observations nested in country or county groups. I allow both the slopes and intercepts to 
vary in the model in order the capture both shifts in the baseline levels of effectiveness 
and responsiveness due to decentralization (intercepts) and any changes in the 
relationship between participation and responsiveness that are conditioned on 
decentralization. Table 4-2 contains a multilevel regression model of government 
effectiveness for 18 countries in Latin America. 
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Table 4-2: Multi-level Model of Satisfaction with Local Services in 18 Countries in 
Latin America* 
 DV: Service Satisfaction 
Estimate  
(Std. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Fixed effects: Level 1 
Participation: Contact with Local 
Gov. 0.043 3.639 
  (0.012)  
 Participation: Communal Activism -0.004 -0.832 
  (0.005)  
 Participation: Civic Activism 0.024 3.494 
  (0.007)  
 Participation: Registered to Vote -0.021 -0.996 
  (0.022)  
 Perceived Level of Corruption -0.075 -9.606 
  (0.008)  
 Ideology (Left to Right) 0.016 6.188 
  (0.003)  
 Political Attentiveness -0.005 -0.838 
  (0.006)  
 Gender (Male) -0.038 -2.944 
  (0.013)  
 Monthly Income 0.021 6.177 
  (0.003)  
 Age 0.001 -1.135 
  (0.000)  
 Years of Education 0.002 1.420 
  (0.002)  
 Survey Weights 0.159 3.746 
  (0.042)  
 Intercept 1.924 18.603 
  (0.103)  
Fixed Effects: Level 2 Decentralization -0.019 -0.169 
  (0.113)  
Random Effects: Level 
2 Intercept: Variance (Std. Dev.) 0.066  
  (0.252)  
 Decentralization: Variance (Std. Dev.) 0.122  
  (0.349)  
Number of  Level 1 18,081  
Observations:  Level 2 18  
*Bolded text indicates p<0.5. 
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The individual-level (or fixed) effects for the participation measures show that 
there is a significant and positive relationship between assessments of government 
effectiveness and the contact dimension of participation, which supports hypothesis 5. A 
weaker, although still statistically significant, relationship also exists between civic 
participation and government effectiveness, providing support for my seventh 
hypothesis. Both of these positive findings support part A of the first hypothesis. 
Interestingly, although a negative relationship exists between both communal 
participation and voting and government effectiveness; the relationship is not 
statistically significant even in this large dataset and thus should not be interpreted as 
support for part B of hypothesis 1. It is also possible that communal participation acts as 
a substitute for effective government rather than a support to it (see Booth and Seligson 
2009). In fact, auxiliary regressions using communal participation as the dependent 
variables show that both government effectiveness and its square (included because the 
relationship was found to be parabolic in the literature) are significantly related to 
communal participation. The effectiveness term is negative, demonstrating that 
disgruntled citizens are active in community projects. This finding is not novel; rather it 
highlights the leverage gained by examining the effect of each form of participation 
separately. As predicted by the fourth hypothesis, being registered to vote has no 
significant influence on how citizens evaluate the effectiveness of their local 
government. The big take-away point is that some forms of participation, most notably 
direct contact with the government, seem to be satisfying to citizens, but other forms, 
such as voting, are not sufficient to change the minds of unhappy citizens. This later 
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finding contradicts much of the previous literature which predicts a strong positive 
relationship between voting and evaluations of the responsiveness of government. 
 Finally, corruption is significantly related to lower levels of perceived 
government effectiveness, which is in accordance with hypothesis 7. The random effects 
show an increase in the percent variance explained when both the varying intercepts 
term and the varying slopes term for decentralization are included in the model. 
However, the decentralization term is not significant at the individual level, suggesting 
that the effect of decentralization is contextual rather than individual. This also 
contradicts previous theories that argue that decentralization should lead to more 
responsive government and hence perception of that responsiveness. 
 Table 4-3 shows the multilevel analysis for 20 Ecuadorian cantons, similar to that 
in Table 4-2, for all Latin America. It includes models of local government effectiveness 
(service approval) on the left and responsiveness on the right. Table 4-3 provides support 
for my hypotheses. In keeping with findings from the cross-national sample, contact 
with the local government is positively related to government effectiveness and 
responsiveness (hypothesis 6). Again, the signs for the other measures of participation 
are negative. Even though they are not significantly related to perceived responsiveness, 
this provides evidence that participation, especially voting, does not always reinforce 
democracy in the developing world. Again, it seems that direct contact and participation 
with the government is the only form of participation with democratic purchasing power 
in Latin America. 
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Table 4-3: Multi-level Model of Government Effectiveness and Responsiveness in 
20 Cantons in Ecuador* 
*Bolded text indicates that p<.05. 
  
DV: Service 
Satisfaction 
DV: Local Gov. 
Responds 
  
Estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
T- value 
Estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
T- value 
Fixed Effects:  
Level 1 
Participation: Contact with Local 
Gov. 
0.061 2.487 0.052 2.119 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  
 
Participation: Communal 
Activism 
-0.004 -0.163 -0.007 -0.265 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  
 Participation: Civic Activism -0.012 -0.441 -0.013 -0.503 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  
 
Participation: Voted in Local 
Election 
-0.128 -1.760 -0.060 -0.822 
  (0.073)  (0.073)  
 Perceived Local Corruption -0.095 -3.458 -0.118 -4.294 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  
 Ideology (Left to Right) -0.002 -0.210 -0.006 -0.585 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  
 Political Attentiveness 0.034 1.254 -0.007 -0.258 
  (0.027)  (0.027)  
 Gender (Male) -0.105 -2.070 -0.122 -2.411 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  
 Ethnicity -0.038 -1.003 0.023 0.612 
  (0.038)  (0.037)  
 Monthly Income 0.013 0.990 0.028 2.101 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  
 Age 0.000 -0.176 0.002 1.065 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  
 Years of Education -0.001 -0.128 -0.001 -0.084 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  
 Intercept 3.321 11.893 2.785 10.170 
  (0.279)  (0.274)  
Fixed Effects:  
Level 2 
Decentralization 0.308 2.193 0.472 3.987 
 (0.141)  (0.118)  
Random  
Effects: 
Intercept: Variance (Std. Err.) 0.081  0.077  
 (0.284)  (0.277)  
 
Decentralization: Variance (Std. 
Err.) 
0.022  0.010  
  (0.140)  (0.100)  
Number of 
Observations 
N Level 1: 1,082  1,101  
N Level 2: 20  20  
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 Corruption is related to decreases in government effectiveness and 
responsiveness, which could partly explain the lack of significant findings. How can 
participation better one’s perceptions of government if taking a closer look at 
government through participation only reveals to the citizen how self-serving it is? 
Contrary to the cross-national analysis, decentralization is positively related to local 
responsiveness and effectiveness at the individual level. Random effects again show that 
both the intercept and slope terms (decentralization) are accounting for second level 
variation, but decentralization accounts for considerably less variation than it did in the 
cross-national model. Additionally, there is little support for the idea that 
decentralization increases participation (hypothesis 2)74 as there are very few differences 
in participation between groups of cantons. One reason for the difference in findings 
between samples is that Ecuadorian counties only varied with respect to administrative 
decentralization, while the cross-national measure of decentralization included political 
and fiscal decentralization. Since Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2013) have shown that the 
type of decentralization matters for citizen attitudes, further research at the county level 
is necessary to investigate the impact of fiscal and political decentralization.  
 In order to test my fourth hypothesis about the indirect impact of decentralization 
that comes through the attitude of local mayors, Table 4-4 displays a multi-level model 
of citizen satisfaction with services, or perceived government effectiveness, in 30 
Ecuadorian cantons in 2012. The specification of the fixed effects is almost identical to  
                                                 
74 Difference of means tests reveal that there is no significant difference in the levels of participation 
between centralized and decentralized cantons, except with respect to civic participation. Fewer citizens in 
decentralized cantons participated in civic organizations.  
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Table 4-4: Local Government Effectiveness in 30 Municipalities in Ecuador in 
2012* 
*Bolded text indicates p<0.5.  
 DV: Service Satisfaction 
Fixed Effects 
Estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Estimate 
(Std. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Estimate 
(Sd. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Participation: Contact Local 
Gov. -1.074 -2.42 -1.084 -2.40 
-1.103 -2.42 
 (0.443)  (0.452)  (0.296)  
Participation: Communal 
Activism 0.267 1.46 0.283 1.53 
0.296 1.59 
 (0.184)  (0.185)  0.186  
Participation: Civic Activism -0.132 -0.76 -0.133 -0.76 -0.131 -0.74 
 (0.175)  (0.175)  0.177  
Participation: Registered to 
Vote 13.692 0.01 14.503 0.01 
14.042 0.02 
 (1078.22)  (1106.18)  (863.01)  
Perceived Corruption -0.048 -0.24 -0.025 -0.31 -0.028 -0.14 
 (0.197)  (0.198)  (0.199)  
Ideology (Left to Right) 0.034 0.56 0.034 0.55 0.031 0.50 
 (0.061)  (0.061)  0.062  
Gender (Male) 0.513 1.53 0.499 1.48 0.508 1.50 
 (0.336)  (0.336)  (0.338)  
Ethnicity 0.018 0.09 -0.023 -0.11 -0.024 -0.11 
 (0.210)  (0.221)  (0.223)  
Monthly Income 0.079 1.59 0.080 1.62 0.081 1.62 
 (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.050)  
Birth Year -0.004 -0.34 -0.003 -0.28 -0.003 -0.25 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
Years of Education 0.031 0.70 0.030 0.69 0.031 0.70 
 (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  
Intercept -8.138 -0.01 -10.268 0.01 -10.232 -0.01 
 (1078.47)  (1106.49)  (863.28)  
Decentralization -0.529 -1.07 -0.318 -0.69 -0.306 -0.68 
 (0.493)  (0.459)  (0.451)  
Mayor’s Political Openness -0.388 -1.20 -0.449 -1.32 -0.417 -1.18 
 (0.325)  (0.340)  (0.353)  
Mayor’s Admin. Respons. 0.073 0.18 0.087 0.22 -0.067 -0.17 
 (0.408)  (0.391)  (0.389)  
Random Effects       
Intercept:  0.000  0.664  0.000  
 (0.512)  (0.260)  (0.528)  
Decentralization:  0.944      
 (0.387)      
Mayor’s Political Openness:   0.000    
   (0.227)    
Mayor’s Admin. Respons. :     0.282  
     (0.103)  
N Level 1: 337  337  337  
N Level 2: 30  30  30  
 141 
 
the previous two models, but random effects include the decentralization measure as 
well as political openness and administrative responsibility. Due to the small number of 
second-level observations, I include the second-level effects one at a time.  
 Unfortunately, not many of the fixed effects are statistically significant at the 
p<.05 level, but this is likely because of the comparatively small sample size. Contact 
with local government officials is consistently statistically significant and negative 
across all three models, indicating that citizens who contact their government are more 
like to evaluate their local government negatively. This is in stark contrast to the 2004 
findings in which direct contact had a positive and significant impact on citizen 
evaluations. Perhaps citizens have grown weary of interacting with local governments 
that are corrupt and inefficient, or perhaps local governments have become more salient 
to citizens in general and are thus the first recipient of citizen complaints that were 
previously leveled at other government entities. Either way, these are not the positive 
and significant effects predicted by the literature. The second-level effects show that 
decentralization and administrative responsibility both account for a moderate share of 
the variance in citizen attitudes between cantons, but political openness does not. These 
findings partially support the fourth hypothesis, and show that at least when it comes to 
administrative factors, the attitudes of citizens are related to the attitudes of their local 
executive. Since the dependent variable is framed in terms of satisfaction with local 
services, it is no surprise the mayors who talk extensively about plans for local service 
provision govern municipalities with citizens who are more satisfied. 
 The findings from the literature about the effects of participation and 
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decentralization clearly lead to the expectation of positive relationships, so in order to be 
completely thorough in my analysis, I preformed additional robustness checks. Another 
way to explore the effects of decentralization as a contextual variable is to make it 
interact with each participation variable. Perhaps the effects of participation vary in the 
presence of decentralization. Table 4-5 uses an individual-level ordinal logit model to 
explore possible interactive effects. Model 1 shows the results for the cross-national 
sample. The main effects, or non-interactive terms, in Table 4-5 are very similar to those 
found in Table 4-2. The interactive effects are mostly insignificant, with the exception of 
the term for civic participation and decentralization. It could be the case that citizens in 
decentralized countries participate in civil society in an attempt to change the 
distribution of goods (see Falleti and Davies 2012), but doing so has not made them 
think more favorably of the government. This suggests that their demands have either 
been unanswered or demand continues to exceed the supply of goods offered by 
municipal officials. In addition, decentralized countries exhibit higher levels of each type 
of participation than centralized countries, suggesting that decentralization increases 
demand on local governments75.  
 Since coefficient magnitudes are not directly interpretable for the ordinal logistic 
regression models shown in Table 4-5, Figure 4-1 was created to model the effects of 
participation in centralized versus decentralized countries (Model 1) using predicted 
probabilities generated by Clarify. I use predictions of the fourth response category 
                                                 
75 A difference in means test suggests that there is a significant difference between levels of communal and 
civic participation in centralized and decentralized countries. 
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Table 4-5: Ordinal Logit Model of Government Effectiveness and Responsiveness 
in 18 Latin American Countries and 20 Cantons in Ecuador* 
*Bolded text indicates p<.05 
  
 
18 Latin American 
Countries 
20 Ecuadorian Counties 
 
Model 1 DV: 
Service Satisfaction 
Model 2 DV: 
Service Satisfaction 
Model 3 DV: 
Local Gov. 
Responds 
 
Estimate 
(Sd. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Estimate 
(Sd. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Estimate 
(Sd. Err.) 
T- 
value 
Contact with Local Gov. 0.158 3.97 0.095 1.24 0.113 1.510 
 (0.039)  (0.076)  (0.074)  
Contact*Decentralize -0.055 -1.010 0.061 0.520 -0.058 -0.510 
 (0.055)  (0.117)  (0.115)  
Communal Activism -0.018 -0.080 0.029 0.380 0.057 0.740 
 (0.018)  (0.078)  (0.077)  
Communal*Decentralize -0.008 -0.350 -0.044 -0.370 -0.118 -1.020 
 (0.024)  (0.119)  (0.115)  
Civic Activism 0.046 2.250 0.040 0.530 -0.093 -1.210 
 (0.020)  (0.076)  (0.077)  
Civic*Decentralize -0.061 -2.150 -0.082 -0.680 0.134 1.100 
 (0.028)  (0.120)  (0.121)  
Register (M1)/Vote(M2-3)  -0.007 -0.120 -0.453 -1.990 -0.400 -1.830 
 (0.058)  (0.228)  (0.219)  
Register/Vote*Decentralize -0.125 -1.390 0.398 1.170 0.514 1.560 
 (0.090)  (0.340)  (0.330)  
Decentralize 0.149 1.320 0.692 0.790 1.114 1.340 
 (0.112)  (0.876)  (0.830)  
Perceived Corruption -0.152 -8.970 -0.286 -4.210 -0.280 -4.370 
 (0.016)  (0.068)  (0.064)  
Ideology (Left to Right) 0.044 7.270 0.021 0.910 -0.005 -0.210 
 (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.022)  
Political Attentiveness -0.001 -0.050 0.062 1.050 0.053 0.880 
 (0.013)  (0.059)  (0.060)  
N 18,081  1,101  1,082  
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signifying that local services are “good”. 
 In Figure 4-1, we see that when all other variables are set to their mean value, the 
baseline probability of perceived effectiveness for decentralized countries is higher than 
for centralized countries, even though the individual-level variable is not significant in 
Model 1. In both types of countries, increasing the amount of contact the citizen has with 
the local government and his/her level of civic participation each generate increases in 
the probability that he/she will evaluate services as good. Meanwhile, increases in 
corruption generate negative deviations from the baseline probabilities. Although the 
error bars in both figures are overlapping, indicating that these effects are not 
statistically significant, the basic results are in keeping with the finding from the multi-
level model in Table 4-2.This shows that while decentralization can raise expectations 
about government performance, neither decentralization nor participation can greatly 
improve perceptions, especially when corruption is present.  
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Figure 4-1: The Predicted Probability of Effectiveness in Centralized and Decentralized 
Countries. 
 
Figure 4-1: The Predicted Probability of Effectiveness in Centralized and Decentralized 
Countries. Please note that the mean values for main effects in the model are as follows: 
effectiveness: 2.988, contact: .269, communal: .781, civic: 1.392, voting: 1.103, corruption: 
3.266, presidential approval: 3.039, political ideology: 5.689, gender: .486, education: 9.064, 
income: 4.209, age: 38.422, political attentiveness: 2.778. To create deviations from the mean 
for simulations, I set participation variables to one level above the mean value as a general rule. 
 
 
 
 In order to test the possible interactive nature of the relationship between 
participation and decentralization in the Ecuadorian sample, Models 2 and 3 of Table 4-5 
present individual-level ordinal logistic regression models for government effectiveness 
and responsiveness. Again, the model clearly supports the interpretation that we can 
expect little from the participation and decentralization variables. As with the cross-
national analysis, I conducted simulations using Clarify for the fourth category of the 
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government effectiveness variable, indicating that services are “good.” 
 
Figure 4-2: The Predicted Probability of Effectiveness in 20 Ecuadorian Cantons. 
 
Figure 4-2: The Predicted Probability of Effectiveness in 20 Ecuadorian Cantons. Please 
note that the mean values for main effects in the model are as follows: effectiveness: 2.988, 
contact: .269, communal: .781, civic: 1.392, voting: 1.103, corruption: 3.266, presidential 
approval: 3.039, political ideology: 5.689, gender: .486, education: 9.064, income: 4.209, age: 
38.422, political attentiveness: 2.778. To create deviations from the mean for simulations, I set 
participation variables to one level above the mean value as a general rule. For example the 
mean is .492 so the simulation increased contact from the mean to 1, indicating one interaction 
with the government. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 shows that when all other variables are set to their mean values, the baseline 
probability of evaluating the local government to be effective is higher for decentralized 
cantons (counties) than centralized ones. The error bars are once again overlapping, and 
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thus these differences are not statistically significant. However, we do see that 
corruption lowers the probability of effectiveness in both groups, while contact with 
local government increases the probability of effectiveness but only in centralized 
cantons. Communal participation lowers the probability of effectiveness but only in 
decentralized cantons while voting lowers the probability in both groups. While not 
statistically significant at conventional levels, these negative effects suggest that some 
forms of participation have a negative impact on effectiveness, and certainly the 
relationship is not strictly positive. The findings about voting are the most clear in this 
regard. They indicate a story in which disgruntled citizens who go to the polls are more 
dissatisfied with the government than those that did not vote at all because they had 
higher expectations of the government that were not fulfilled. Finally, auxiliary 
regressions to check for reciprocity find that perceived effectiveness and responsiveness 
do not predict any type of participation. This suggests that both satisfied and dissatisfied 
citizens interact with the local government, which is consistent with past literature. 
Rather than seeking to nullify past research on the causes of participation, my analysis 
draws attention to lesser studied effects of participation, which are certainly surprising 
given past research. Table 4-6 summarizes the findings for each covariate across all 
three samples. 
Conclusion 
 The findings are clear. We can scratch both participation and decentralization off 
the list of potential panaceas for the developing world, especially in Latin America. The 
results from Ecuador in 2004 and 2012 especially support this interpretation. In the first 
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two models, there seems to be one bit of good news for those concerned about the 
development and depth of local democracy, namely that direct citizen contact with the 
local government leads to positive evaluations of government responsiveness and 
effectiveness, in both cross-national and 2004 sub-national samples. This suggests that  
 
Table 4-6: Summary of Findings across Models 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Expectation 
Cross 
National 
Municipal 
2004: 
Responsive 
Municipal 
2004: 
Service 
Sat. 
Municipal 
2012 
Contact 
Participation 
6 + + p<.05 + p<.05 + p<.05 - p<.05 
Civic 
Participation 
7 + + p<.05 - - - 
Communal 
Participation 
7 + - - - - 
Voting 5 none - - - + 
Corruption 8 - -p<.05 - p<.05 - p<.05 - 
Mayor Attitudes 
(second-level) 
4 + NA NA NA + 
Decentralization 
(second-level) 
3 + + + + + 
 
 
citizens who engage with their government either because of a problem or to request an 
improvement do not automatically go away frustrated and dissatisfied; rather, it seems 
that contact with the government has genuine democratic purchasing power. The picture 
presented by Ecuadorian municipalities in 2012 is less encouraging. It suggests that 
citizens could be more frustrated with services offered by local governments as a result 
of contact with the government. One must be careful about generalizing with the sample 
given that it is admittedly non-random and relatively small. Still, the negative finding 
here is robust to several different specifications and suggests that dissatisfaction grows 
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alongside citizen participation in local government.  
  As regards communal and civic participation, the lack of findings suggests that 
citizens do not receive clear information about the competence of the government from 
these activities. It could also be, especially in Ecuador where levels of communal work 
remain high, that community involvement may at times be a substitute for effective 
government. In places where the government begins to be more effective and responsive, 
citizen may feel that the urgency of communal participation has decreased. Thus, the 
relationship between communal work and effective government is more complicated 
than first expected. The negative finding could be due to the fact that decentralization 
has raised citizen expectations that the government should provide services without the 
necessity of communal work. The continued need to engage in communal work may 
suggest to citizens that the government is unresponsive. Further research is needed to 
parse out the effects of communal and civic participation.  
 The most consistent individual-level finding is that citizens who think the 
government is corrupt will be less likely to view it as effective or responsive. In a way, 
this is good news for democracy because it means that citizens are not duped by political 
rhetoric into accepting a corrupt government. When it comes to evaluating local services 
and responsiveness, if corruption is rampant, citizens will “tell it like it is” rather than 
pretending that corruption does not have negative repercussions. This honesty is the 
beginning of democratic accountability which hopefully translates into better 
governance. 
 In terms of local context, decentralization largely fails to enhance perceptions of 
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government effectiveness and responsiveness. This is bad news for researchers and 
international actors such as World Bank and IMF who have argued for the 
implementation of decentralization as a means of improving the quality of local 
governance and boosting local democracy. On the other hand, at least from the citizen’s 
perspective, decentralization has raised expectations of what the local government 
should do. It is also true that in the Ecuadorian sample decentralization positively 
affected perceptions of responsiveness, but this was not the case in the cross-national 
sample. As mentioned above, one possible explanation for discrepancies between cross-
national and sub-national findings is the nature of the decentralization measure. Scholars 
have shown that decentralization occurs in political, fiscal, and administrative arenas 
(Falleti 2005, 2010). While the cross-national decentralization measure includes fiscal 
aspects, the municipal sample only allows for a dichotomous measure of variation in 
administrative decentralization. Perhaps it is a local government’s willingness to accept 
additional administrative responsibilities that truly signals competence and 
responsiveness to the people more than just receiving fiscal transfers that can easily be 
misappropriated by corrupt politicians. And in terms of politicians, we see that local 
government attitudes about administrative responsibility are more relevant to citizen 
evaluations that attitudes about political openness, which fits with the idea that citizens 
desire an effective government that is capable of providing services. 
 By bringing together scholarly works related to participation, government 
responsiveness, and decentralized government, I shed new light on each literature. I find 
little support for the commonly held idea that participation, especially voting, increases 
 151 
 
perceptions of government responsiveness. Rather, some forms of citizen participation, 
such as voting and communal activism, correlate with more negative evaluations. 
However, citizens do gain information about the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
local government through direct contact. Thus it alone has the power to sway popular 
attitudes in Latin America that other forms of participation were purported to have. By 
treating participation as a multidimensional independent variable, I add to the literature a 
more nuanced understanding of how mass political behaviors shape mass attitudes. 
Finally, although there is surely room for future scholarly efforts to clarify the 
relationship of decentralization to participation, after careful analysis, I must add my 
name to the list of its naysayers. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: LOCAL REPRESENTATION EXISTS AND MATTERS 
The Puzzle Solved? 
 This research project set out to investigate whether decentralization enhances the 
quality of local representation and under what contexts local representation emerges. 
Along the way, I constructed three conceptualizations of local representation based on 
the responsiveness and procedural inclusiveness dimensions of substantive 
representation. In the end, it seems that evidence for decentralization is mixed. It 
certainly increases options for mayors, which may allow them to make allocation that 
better fit citizen needs, as we learn from Chapter II, but whether an individual mayor 
will be oriented toward providing quality representation exclusively as a result of 
decentralization is unlikely given the findings in Chapter III. Chapter IV demonstrates 
that decentralization accounts for the differences in citizen evaluations of government 
between cantons, but it does not do so through increasing citizen participation (which 
has little to do with citizen perceptions of responsiveness). The moral of the story is that 
decentralization can provide a space in which local officials are empowered to represent 
citizens, but whether or not they choose to do so and whether or not citizens perceive 
this responsiveness depends on other individual and contextual factors. 
 I build on and extend the past literature in several important ways. First, I explore 
representation at the local level, while most theorizing has examined at the national 
level. I also focus on executives instead of legislators, meaning that theories constructed 
for national legislators have to be further adapted to explain the behavior of local 
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mayors. Secondly, I relax the assumption that decentralization is strictly a national-level 
concept that impacts all municipalities equally. By examining subnational variation in 
decentralization, I capture the uneven progress of democracy that occurs within 
developing countries. Finally, I believe that this research project has been fruitful 
because it serves as a foundation for understanding the relationship between 
decentralization and local representation and leads to a plethora of other questions about 
mayors and citizens that are interesting in themselves, including the implications of 
gender and race for the representation of marginalized groups at the local level. 
Local Representation: It Exists 
 The underlying assumption of my dissertation has been that local representation 
exists, is distinct from national-level representation, and creates patterns of local 
governance that are empirically observable. I have demonstrated the validity of this 
assumption in several ways. First, if there was any doubt about the existence of local 
representation, my interview data show that it exists in the minds of local government 
officials, many of whom take their representational role as elected government officials 
very seriously. Additionally, my survey data show that the actions of the local 
government are salient to the mass public. So, if citizens expect local officials to be 
responsive to their needs, and local officials believe that they are representing the 
people, we can be confident that local representation does in fact exist in Latin America. 
 If one concedes that local representation does in fact exist, then the second 
question becomes, how do we know that it occurs in meaningful patterns? Stated another 
way, how do we know that it’s not just random noise (especially in a chaotic country 
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such as Ecuador)? I demonstrate the presence of a systematic component to local 
representation in two ways. First, I show that of the dimensions of representational 
orientations, political openness and administrative responsiveness (Chapter III) fit with 
theoretical expectations about other variables such as gender, ethnicity, and education 
(construct validity). The finding about education is particularly important because it 
measures the personal capacity of the mayor, which was part of the capacity parameter 
in the formal model (Chapter II). Then it shows up again in Chapter III as a significant 
predictor of administrative responsibility, which emphasizes that local representation can 
(and should) be explained systematically. Secondly, it is not just that local elected 
officials have systematic behavior, but, according to Chapter IV, citizens also have 
systematic and predictable opinions about the performance to their local government. So 
local representation exists, but does it matter? In case the reader remains unconvinced, I 
will address the importance of local representation after summing up the main findings 
of the dissertation.  
Summing Up the Evidence 
What We Learn about Representation  
 The reader will recall that local representation has been conceptualized in three 
different but harmonious ways. In Chapter II, representation meant the fit between the 
outcomes produced by the mayor (in terms of sector and scope) and citizen preferences, 
broadly construed. In Chapter III, representational orientations of mayors included the 
separate dimensions of administrative responsibility and political openness which 
capture ideas of responsiveness and procedural inclusiveness respectively. In the final 
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chapter, representation was viewed as a dialogue in which citizen participation can shape 
opinions about local government services and responsiveness. Since each chapter has a 
different conceptualization, we learn something different from each part, but the parts fit 
together to give a more complete picture of the representational process. Chapter II 
shows us that in order to be representative, mayors should allocate a minimum level of 
resources to areas (sectors) of citizen concern; in other words, they must be minimally 
responsive, but institutional factors such as decentralization constrain the availability of 
such resources. We also find out that mayors are better equipped to deal with the 
challenges presented by their institutional context when they have greater personal 
capacity.  
 In Chapter III we saw that the explanatory factors for administrative 
responsibility and political openness are very different, suggesting the possibility of two 
separate representational dimensions, one that emphasizes citizen participation and 
awareness of constituent needs, particularly those of marginalized groups, and another 
that focuses on administering service provision. Each mayor decides for him- or herself 
what mix of these two dimensions to employ, but overall most mayors are stronger on 
the administrative responsibility dimension than the political openness dimension, 
suggesting that in spite of concerns about the prevalence of populism (high political 
openness, low administrative responsibility) in Ecuador that might arise because of the 
style of the current president, technocratic (low political openness, high administrative 
responsibility) local governance is far more common. This means that the weakness of 
local democracy in Ecuador is not that it does not attempt to address the service needs of 
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its citizens, but that it does not do so, by and large, in an inclusive way. Yet Chapter III 
demonstrates, on the whole, that citizens do not just want to be included in the process, 
but they also want results. Thus local representation must compromise both results for 
citizens in terms of outcomes as well as avenues for them to express their needs through 
participation. If either is lacking, the risk increases that citizens will be alienated from 
politics, causing erosion in the support for democracy.  
What We Learn about Decentralization 
 In each chapter, I have attempted to keep in mind the differences between the 
different types of decentralization: fiscal, political, and administrative. In the formal 
chapter I am able make the most distinctions between each type, with the result being 
that we do see different predictions for fiscal and administrative decentralization. 
Administrative decentralization increases the number of pieces into which the local 
fiscal pie must be divided, while fiscal decentralization increases the size of the pie. As it 
turns out, administrative decentralization that is not accompanied by sufficient fiscal 
decentralization will constrain the ability of the mayor to provide the threshold level of 
representation in budgetary outcomes necessary for success in reelection. This finding is 
consistent with predictions in the literature. Escobar-Lemmon (2001) argues that “fiscal 
decentralization is especially important because the power of the purse can make or 
break subnational government, affecting the quality of representation” (p. 24). Thus we 
see that when we treat decentralization as part of the institutional context, it can in fact 
impinge upon the behavior of local mayors, which is something that I look forward to 
exploring in future research. 
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 The idea that decentralization affects the behavior of local mayors is seen again 
in the chapter examining mayoral attitudes. In this case, the institutional context can be 
thought of as the rules of the game. Some mayors are better at playing this game than 
others. Mayors who complained about the lack of fiscal decentralization were less likely 
to demonstrate high levels of administrative responsibility, emphasizing that a lack of 
fiscal decentralization can deter mayors from developing representational attitudes and 
providing works projects that address citizen needs. 
 Finally, in the chapter on citizen attitudes, decentralization again acts as a 
contextual factor that accounts for significant amounts of variance in citizen evaluations 
of local government between cantons in Ecuador and between 18 countries in Latin 
America. Additionally, in the 2004 municipal sample, decentralization has a positive and 
significant individual-level impact on citizen attitudes. Being careful not to overstate the 
findings of this chapter, I think there is some evidence that decentralization is related to 
citizen attitudes about the representativeness of local government, but the relationship is 
not as clear or as strong as the impact of decentralization on mayoral attitudes and 
behaviors. This makes sense because we expect that institutions will shape elite attitudes 
and behaviors first and then trickle down to impact mass opinion. Thus the fact that there 
are any findings, even weak ones, about how decentralization shapes mass opinion 
supports my theoretical expectations. 
What We Learn about Local Politics 
 Decentralization is not the only factor that shapes local politics. I also consider 
the role of electoral processes in Chapters II and III of the dissertation. Ambitions for 
 158 
 
reelection are expected to shape the incentives of all elected officials, including local 
mayors. Electoral constraints are necessary to the formal model in Chapter II, and we see 
that they are important for determining the amount of representation the mayor provides. 
The data from local official interviews in Ecuador provide an interesting follow-up to 
this finding. Many mayors stated that an excess of politics is a problem for local 
government, and that they do not find it helpful to think about the next election. Rather, 
they were choosing to focus on doing a good job and providing services for citizens 
while in office, deferring to some combination of the citizens and God Almighty to 
decide their fate in the next election. It is worth restating that quite a low percentage of 
mayors that ran for reelection were successful in recent elections, which is probably 
more a result of the disorganized nature of the Ecuadorian party system than a lack of 
prayer.  
 Partisan politics, as Chapter III shows, are not generally viewed as healthy for 
local politics in Ecuador. As many officials explained, each elected official should take 
off the banner or the shirt of their political party and put on the shirt of the canton, 
signifying that everyone is on the same team. Political parties are only for elections; 
afterward, it is expected that everyone will join forces to combat things like lack of 
potable water, pollution of water sources, and unsafe roads. Of course, some cantons will 
follow this guideline more than others, but in my observation, the majority of 
disagreements between local officials do not follow partisan lines but are sparked by 
substantive and practical issues related to governance, such as how much money should 
be spent in the rural sector versus the urban sector. On the other hand, while politics 
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appear to be nonpartisan or at least less partisan at the local level, Chapter III shows that 
partisanship does matter for the quality of mayors that enter office. Mayors that belong 
to a party that has members in the national legislature are consistently more 
representative than mayors that are independent or elected by a local movement. This 
suggests both that parties are effective at selecting strong candidates and that the 
accountability structure of the party could provide oversight for mayors. Parties may also 
give mayors a platform for political advancement beyond the local level. So ironically, 
even though Ecuadorian officials are not fans of politics, especially partisan politics, 
parties provide an important boost in quality of representation.  
What We Learn about Mayors 
 While this dissertation research has focused heavily on contextual factors such as 
decentralization, it also contains interesting findings about the relevance of the 
individual characteristics of mayors and citizens (which will be addressed in the 
following section). As previously mentioned, one of the strongest findings is that the 
level of education of the mayor has a strong positive effect on administrative 
responsibility, showing that mayors who have a higher capacity for navigating the 
institutional context are able to provide better representation to citizens. Additionally, 
being female or a member of a minority ethnic group is related to increases in the level 
of political openness that a mayor exhibits. This is likely the case because women and 
ethnic minorities are traditionally political outsiders, and once inside the government, 
they work to include and attend marginalized sectors and place a high importance on 
citizen participation. In doing so, they are providing a new alternative to mestizo-centric 
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male-dominated local politics, which has been prevalent throughout the history of 
Ecuador, and raising the bar for future local executives in terms of citizen relations. In 
particular, the idea that women provide representation of a different set of issues from 
men is consistent with the literature on women’s representation (see Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson forthcoming, Schwindt-Bayer 2006, Franceschet and Piscopo 
2008), and I plan to investigate gender differences among local officials in future 
research.  
What We Learn About Citizens  
 In this dissertation, primarily in the third chapter, we discover a key thing about 
the individual-level determinants of citizen attitudes in Ecuador. The most important 
finding is that citizens who perceive higher levels of corruption in their canton or 
country will be less likely to have a positive evaluation of their local government. 
Interestingly the measure of corruption in Chapter IV is very general; it does not ask 
specifically about corruption in the government or a particular part of society. However, 
corruption has been shown to lower trust in national-level government institutions (see 
Seligson 2002), and it appears that local governments are not exempt. This means that 
widespread corruption in local government in Latin America still has the potential to 
undo the positive democratic effects of decentralization. Where government is corrupt, it 
will matter very little how many opportunities citizen have to participate; if they do trust 
the government, they will not be satisfied with their democratic experience. 
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Future Research 
 I plan to extend my research on local representation and decentralization in two 
ways. First, I plan to fully analyze all the data that I collected during my fieldwork in 
Ecuador. This includes a more extensive analysis of the budget data collected while in 
Ecuador, which would allow me to test the allocation outcomes aspect of representation 
related to the formal model more thoroughly. I also envision an additional chapter or 
article that considers the role of local councilors as representatives and how they work 
together with the mayor to serve the canton. This would allow me to compare and 
contrast the representation that is provided by local executives and local legislators 
within the same canton. Though I would have fewer canton-level data points, looking at 
variation within the canton would allow me to hone in on the causes of representation 
even further by controlling for canton level factors. Finally, I would like to investigate 
the attitudes of mayors toward NGOs and other non-government sources of development 
funding. Can we predict when collaborative versus competitive attitudes will emerge? 
 The second way that I plan to extend this research agenda is by testing the 
components of the theory in other country contexts. I hope to find evidence for similar 
dimensions of representation in other Latin American and developing world countries, in 
order to demonstrate the generalizability of my conceptualizations of local 
representation. In particular, I believe that testing the theory in Costa Rica in particular 
would be helpful because it has a longer history of stable democracy than Ecuador, as 
well as an institutionalized party system, and has been well-studied by political science 
scholars. Dissertation fieldwork in Costa Rica was planned but not funded, and therefore 
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remains to be done in the future. Other promising avenues of research on local 
representation are before me as I start my new job at Qatar University in the Social 
Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI). Although not a democracy, Qatar has held 
municipal elections every four years since 1999, and according to the government 
website, municipal council members are tasked with urban planning, infrastructure 
regulation, and management of economic, financial, and administrative affairs76.  
 Other extensions to the project include plans to further study the role of NGOs in 
local representation, which was originally planned as a part of this dissertation. 
Unfortunately, as explained in the introduction, it was not possible to collect the needed 
data during my fieldwork in Ecuador. To further study this aspect of local governance, I 
need to collect data on NGOs through surveying and interviewing directors about their 
involvement with local government and citizens. Unless policies change, Ecuador is not 
a possible country case for this research. Costa Rica is a sensible option, but other 
opportune countries will also be considered.  
 If plans for future extensions of the research move forward, I have hopes of 
publishing this research as an academic book. Meanwhile, a similar version of at least 
one of the chapters will be submitted for publication as a stand-alone article77. In 
conclusion, I hope to launch into a vibrant scholarly dialogue about what local 
representation is, how we conceptualize it, and when and where it emerges, both in Latin 
America and globally. This research agenda also has the potential to contribute to 
                                                 
76 They also oversee agriculture, but I am guessing that competency is not incredibly meaningful. Source: 
Qatar e-government website:  portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/about-qatar/municipalcouncil  
77 I welcome feedback from the committee on the best publication strategy for this project.  
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existing literatures on decentralization, participation, and local governance, in order to 
further scholarly understanding of the local roots of democracy in the developing world.  
Broader Impacts: Why Local Representation Matters 
 My research on local representation and decentralization has implications for the 
quality of the democratic process as a whole. Decentralization reforms have promised to 
enhance the quality of governance and responsiveness to citizen needs. If citizens view 
their democracy as legitimate and feel that they have a voice in the decision-making 
process, democracy will be more stable. Clarifying the linkages that exist between 
citizens and government officials will aid policy practitioners in understanding how to 
enhance and strengthen these linkages. Strengthening linkages will mean more 
opportunities for minority or underrepresented voices to be heard in government, and 
more opportunities for them to contribute to the policy-making process. Additionally, 
policies of decentralization continue to be popular with international donors such as the 
World Bank, and governments across the developing world continue to enact them. My 
research provides interesting information to such actors about the consequences of their 
institutional choices.  
 During my fieldwork in Ecuador, it was easy to see the real-world relevance of 
local governance and the impact that it has on citizen quality of life, whether it was 
being surrounded by the smells of yesterday’s trash as I threaded my way through 
crowded streets, or sitting in the municipal building with people who had walked from 
miles away and would wait for hours to file one document. But perhaps the most 
poignant moment occurred at the end of an interview with a mayor, when he suddenly 
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asked me what I thought he could do to improve the working of his municipal 
government. Of course, I explained that the purposes of the study were academic and 
that it was not my job to tell him how to run his municipality, but he did not like this 
answer. He insisted that he was genuinely interested in results of the study and learning 
ways that he can govern better. I was very impressed by his humility and honesty, and I 
have never thought of my work the same since then. 
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APPENDIX A 
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 
The payoffs for the Mayor and Voter: 
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑀(ri; V; C) = {
ri – c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
– c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
ri – rm 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
rm – c 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
}  
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑉(ri; V; C)
=
{
 
 
 
 𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔
𝑟𝑖 − ((𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚)−𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 = 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑘 }
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 1: The Strategy of the Voter 
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟′𝑠 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 (𝑟𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 >
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 <
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣) }
 
 
 
 
 
Derivation of Equation 1:  
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑝 𝑏𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑎 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟.  𝑉 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛:  
(𝑝)(𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2) + (𝑝 − 1) (𝑟𝑖 − ((𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑣)
2
)
> (𝑝)(𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2) + (𝑝 − 1)(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2) 
𝑟𝑖
2 − 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚
2 − 2𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑣 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐
2 + 2𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 < 𝑝(
−2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚
2 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣
−2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣
) 
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
+ 1 < 𝑝 
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*does not hold if the faction is positive 
 
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐) < 0 
 
𝑟𝑖
2 − 2𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐
2 − 2𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑐 
*holds if ri < rc 
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣) < 0 
 
𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣 < 2𝑟𝑖 
1
2
𝑟𝑚 + 𝑟𝑣 < 𝑟𝑖 𝑜𝑟   𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 + 
1
2
𝑟𝑚 
*Which leads to Cases 1 and 2 below 
Equation 2: Strategy of the Voter- continued 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝑝(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟);  𝑟𝑖)
=
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 >  
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚  
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚     
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖(𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣) + 𝑟𝑐(2𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐)
𝑟𝑚(−2𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣)
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≥ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚      𝑜𝑟  𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Voter will retain the Mayor for a given (ri) in either of the following two cases, 
given that both conditions are true.  
{
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 1: 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 < 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 2: 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑣 +
1
2
𝑟𝑚
}  
Derivation of Equation 2: 
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To show that M will Replace for all p=1  
𝑟𝑖 − (𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 < 𝑟𝑖
− (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝐼𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 
To show when M will Retain for all p=0 
𝑟𝑖 − ((𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑣)
2 > 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 
((𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑣)
2
> 𝑟𝑚 − (𝑟𝑐 − 𝑟𝑣)
2 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2 
Equation 3: Best Response of the Mayor 
𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑟𝑖) =  {
𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚
𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑐 − 𝑟𝑚
} 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒, 𝑟𝑖) = {
𝑟𝑚 >  𝑐 +  𝑝𝑟𝑚
𝑜𝑟
𝑝 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑟𝑚
} 
Derivation of Equation 3:  
𝐸𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑟𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛) = 𝑝(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚) 
𝑝𝑟𝑖 − 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟𝑖 + 𝑝𝑟𝑚 
0 < −𝑝𝑐 + 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚 +  𝑝𝑟𝑚 
𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 −  𝑝𝑟𝑚 
𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑐 − 𝑟𝑚
 
𝐸𝑈𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑟𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒) = 𝑝(−𝑐) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑐) 
−𝑝𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚 − 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 
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0 <  𝑟𝑚 − 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚 
𝑟𝑚 >  𝑐 +  𝑝𝑟𝑚 
𝑝 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑟𝑚
 
Equation 4: Strategy of the Mayor 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟(𝑝(𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟); 𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛, 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒))
=
{
  
 
  
 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑟𝑚 + 𝑝𝑐 − 𝑝𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 <  
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑐 − 𝑟𝑚
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 0
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 = 1
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑚 > 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝑉 =  𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑟𝑚 }
  
 
  
 
 
Equation 5: Best Response of Voter  
Take the partial derivative of Equation 1 with respect to ri, which yields:  
(2𝑟𝑖 − 2𝑟𝑣)
−2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 2𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑚
+
𝑟𝑖
2 − 2𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑖 + 2𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 − 𝑟𝑐
2
(−2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑖 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 2𝑟𝑣𝑟𝑚) (−𝑟𝑖 +
𝑟𝑚
2 + 𝑟𝑣)
 
Solve for ri, which yields:  
𝑟𝑖 =
1
2
(𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣 ±√−4𝑟𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣) 
Equation 6: Best Response of the Mayor 
Take the partial derivative of Equation 3 with respect to rm, which yields 
For retain 
–𝑐−𝑟𝑚+𝑟𝑖−𝑟𝑚
(𝑐−𝑟𝑚)2
 
For replace –
𝑐−𝑟𝑚
𝑟𝑚
2  
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Solve for rm, which yields 
For retain: 𝑟𝑚 =
𝑟𝑖−𝑐
2
 
For replace: 𝑟𝑚 = 𝑐 
Equation 7: Equilibria 
Substituting rm from the mayor into Equation 5 for the Voter yields  
For retain: 𝑟𝑖
∗ =
1
2
(
𝑟𝑖−𝑐
2
+ 2𝑟𝑣 ±√−4𝑟𝑐 + (
𝑟𝑖−𝑐
2
)2 + 8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 + 2(
𝑟𝑖−𝑐
2
)𝑟𝑣) 
Solved for 𝑟𝑖
∗ =
1
4
(7𝑟𝑣 − 2𝑐 ± √−81𝑟𝑣2 − 32𝑟𝑐 + 64𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 − 20𝑟𝑣𝑐) 
For replace: 𝑟𝑖
∗ = 
1
2
(𝑐 + 2𝑟𝑣 ±√−4𝑟𝑐 + (𝑐)2 + 8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 + 2(𝑐)𝑟𝑣) 
Now substitute ri into Equation 5 (Best Response of the Mayor). 
For retain: 𝑟𝑚
∗ =
1
2
(𝑟𝑚+2𝑟𝑣±√−4𝑟𝑐+𝑟𝑚
2 +8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣+2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣)−𝑐
2
  
Which simplifies to:   
𝑟𝑚
∗ = 
1
4
(𝑟𝑚 + 2𝑟𝑣 ±√−4𝑟𝑐 + 𝑟𝑚2 + 8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣 + 2𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑣) −
𝑐
2
 
Therefore there are two equilibria which can be characterized as follows.  
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 1 𝑟𝑖
∗ =
1
4
(7𝑟𝑣−2𝑐± √−81𝑟𝑣2−32𝑟𝑐+64𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣−20𝑟𝑣𝑐)
𝑟𝑚∗ =
1
7
(6𝑐−22𝑟𝑣±√512𝑟𝑣2−320𝑟𝑣𝑐+64𝑐2+448𝑟𝑐−896𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣)
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑢𝑚 2 𝑟𝑖
∗ = 
1
2
(𝑐+2𝑟𝑣±√−4𝑟𝑐+(𝑐)
2
+8𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑣+2(𝑐)𝑟𝑣)
𝑟𝑚∗ = 𝑐
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APPENDIX B 
FIELDWORK 
 At once chaotic, colorful, and expressive, local politics in Ecuador are anything 
but boring. In addition to a memorable adventure, I learned valuable lessons about the 
reality of local politics that I attempt to convey in the following chapters. I am grateful 
for the generous financial support of the Melbern G. Glasscock Center for Humanities 
Research, the Texas A&M College of Liberal Arts Dissertation Enhancement Fund, the 
Bush Presidential Library Travel Fund, and the Graduate Office of the Department of 
Political Science at Texas A&M University. With the help of these generous supporters, 
I was able to spend three months in Ecuador conducting interviews with local officials 
and NGO representatives78.  I was in Ecuador during February, March, and April of 
2013. During this time, I conducted around 70 interviews with local government 
officials, and around 50 of them were with mayors or vice-mayors. I was personally in 
every region, and conducted interviews in 20 out of the 29 provinces, and 50 out of the 
220 cantons.  
 In general, the protocol for conducting an interview involved setting up an 
interview with the mayors of a particular canton79 via email and phone, although in some 
cases, the best thing to do was just to show up at the municipal building and wait to be 
attended. I used public transportation in all its lively and colloquial forms to arrive at the 
                                                 
78 This is in addition to a pre-fieldwork and language study experience that took place in Quito, Ecuador in 
July of 2012 and was made possible by money from the College of Liberal Summer Travel Funds.  
79 Please note that sample was not random, but it is fairly representative and based on the cantons where 
the AmericasBarometer conducted surveys in 2004 and 2012, which allows me to produce some merged 
analysis mayoral and citizen attitudes in Chapter IV.  
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municipal buildings. The semi-structured interviews lasted between 30 minutes to an 
hour, and afterward I would ask the official to fill out a closed-ended survey. Then, I 
would request access to budgetary documents from the mayor80 and to be introduced in 
the office of the councilors. Few councilors keep regular hours, especially in rural 
municipalities, so I usually had to interview whoever was available at the time. 
However, my interviews with councilors often gave me an opposition perspective on the 
performance of the mayor and proved to be useful for understanding the dynamics of 
local politics in that municipality. Most of the interviews took place in the office of the 
local official, though some took place in less formal spaces such as parks, restaurants, 
and occasionally the mayor’s home. In all but a handful of rare cases, I interviewed and 
observed the local official in his/her own canton, which gave me some idea of the level 
of development, the availability of basic services, and the level of citizen activity in and 
around the municipal building.  
 Additionally, I talked with directors of local- and national-based non-government 
organizations about their connections with local government and citizens. In doing so, I 
found that the non-government sector was experiencing a sudden and severe decline in 
influence due to political conflicts with Ecuador’s president and national government 
and increased regulations. While these interviews provided me with interesting ideas for 
future research, they also showed me that the non-government sector in Ecuador is not at 
                                                 
80 The annual budget statements are legally pubic information and are usually posted to the municipal 
website in large cities. However, most municipalities required special permissions from the mayor to 
access the documents and some refused out right to grant me access to their budget information, even after 
granted me an interview. 
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all fulfilling the mediating representational role that I had previously theorized that it 
would. This is not to say that NGOs are unable to fulfill this role, only that present 
circumstances in Ecuador precluded me from collecting meaningful data to test this part 
of my theory. My interviews with local officials suggest that in the past NGOs were 
particularly active and successful at things like providing potable water to rural areas and 
support to agrarian peasants. The majority of mayors lamented the loss of NGO support, 
but some expressed frustration with the sector and were glad to be rid of them. In sum, 
this dissertation does not give further consideration to the NGO sector either in terms of 
theory or data, but focuses instead on the direct relationship between citizens and their 
elected officials.  
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APPENDIX C 
ADDITIONAL TABLES 
Multinomial Logistic Regression: The Impact of Political Experience on Mayor 
Type 
Baseline= 
Compliant Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Populist-Failure 
    political experience 0.29 1.38 0.21 0.84 
Constant -1.39 1.12 -1.24 0.22 
Technocrat-
Failure 
    political experience -0.41 1.55 -0.26 0.79 
Constant -1.39 1.12 -1.24 0.22 
Populist-Leaner 
    political experience -16.65 1274.10 -0.01 0.99 
Constant 0.56 0.63 0.89 0.37 
Technocrat-
Leaner 
    political experience -2.48 1.24 -2.00 0.05 
Constant 0.69 0.61 1.13 0.26 
Populist 
    political experience -16.65 2383.62 -0.01 0.99 
Constant -0.69 0.87 -0.80 0.42 
Technocrat 
    political experience -1.32 1.06 -1.25 0.21 
Constant 0.22 0.67 0.33 0.74 
Superstar 
    political experience -1.79 1.29 -1.39 0.17 
Constant 0.00 0.71 0.00 1.00 
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Control Variables for Table 4-2 
 
18 Latin American 
Countries 
20 Ecuadorian Counties 
 
Model 1 DV: Service 
Satisfaction 
Model 2 DV: Service 
Satisfaction 
Model 3 DV: Local Gov. 
Responds 
 
Estimate (Std. 
Err.) 
T- 
value 
Estimate 
(Std. Err.) T- value 
Estimate (Std. 
Err.) 
T- 
value 
Gender (Male) -0.110 -3.930 -0.284 -2.420 -0.259 -2.200 
 0.028  0.117  0.118  
Monthly Income 0.084 12.450 0.002 0.080 0.047 1.530 
 0.007  0.032  0.030  
Age -0.004 -3.680 0.003 0.580 0.012 2.460 
 0.001  0.005  0.005  
Years of Education -0.016 -4.430 0.015 0.920 0.017 1.030 
 0.004  0.016  0.016  
Ethnicity   -0.257 -3.400 -0.102 -1.430 
   0.076  0.072  
Survey Weights 0.037 0.660     
 0.056      
Constant 1 -2.871  -4.011  -2.565  
 0.132  0.745  0.684  
Constant 2 -1.398  -2.053  -0.496  
 0.130  0.735  0.677  
Constant 3 .798  0.003  1.970  
 0.129  0.731  0.681  
Constant 4 3.406  2.772  3.69  
 0.135  0.740  0.695  
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APPENDIX C 
SURVEY APPENDIX 
 All variables are taken from the Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), Municipal Survey of Ecuador, 2004, the 2006 and the 2012 waves of the 
Democracy Audit. Available at: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/. Please note that some 
survey questions have been re-coded from the original survey items to allow for clearer 
model interpretation. The questions and responses below are the ones that appear in the 
models. The letter and number codes before the question identifies the LAPOP question, 
and have no theoretical significance. Where recoding has taken place, the question code 
is followed by the letter ‘r’. Translations from Spanish are my own. 
Effectiveness (municipal and cross-national samples) 
SGL1r: Would you say that the services offered by the municipality are… 
1) Very bad 2) bad 3) neither good nor bad 4) good 5)very good 
Responsiveness (municipal sample only) 
LGL4r: Do you believe that the mayor and the municipal council respond to what the 
people want… 
1)Never 2)Almost never 3)Once in a while 4)The majority of the time 5)Always  
Participation-Contact 
(municipal and cross-national samples) 
NP1r: Have you attended an open city council meeting or an open meeting convened by 
the mayor during the past twelve months? 0)No 1)Yes 
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(municipal sample only) 
NP1Ar: Have you attended a municipal meeting convened in the last 12 months? 0)No 
1)Yes 
 
(municipal sample only) 
NP1Br: Have you attended a parochial (neighborhood) meeting convened in the last 12 
months? 0)No 1)Yes 
 
(municipal and cross-national samples) 
NP2r: Have you asked for help or have you presented a petition to an office, government 
official, council member, or the mayor during the last 12 months?  0)No 1)Yes 
Participation-Communal (municipal 2004 and cross-national samples) 
(municipal 2012 sample) 
CP5r:  Now to change the topic, in the last 12 months have you contributed to help solve 
a problem of your community, neighbors, or neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did 
this at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 
12 months? 1) Never 2) Once or twice a year 3) Once or twice a month 4) Once a week 
 
(municipal 2004 and cross-national samples) 
CP5Ar: In the last year have you donated money or materials to help solve a problem in 
your community or neighborhood? 0) No 1) Yes 
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CP5Br: In the last year have you contributed your own work or labor? 0) No 1) Yes 
 
CP5Cr: In the last year have you attended community meetings about a problem or 
improvement? 0) No 1) Yes 
 
CP5Dr: In the last year have you tried to help organize a new group to solve a 
neighborhood problem or seek improvement? 0) No 1) Yes 
 
(municipal 2012 sample only) 
CP5r “In the last 12 months have you contributed to help solve a problem of your 
community, neighbors, or neighborhood? Please, tell me if you did this at least once a 
week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never in the last 12 months?” 1) 
never in the last 12 months 2) once or twice a year 3) once or twice a month 4) at least 
once a week 
Participation-Civic (municipal and cross-national samples) 
(Prompt) Now I am going read a list or groups and organizations, please tell me if you 
have attended their meetings… 
CP6r: Meetings of a religious organization? You attend… 
1) Having ever attended (weekly or yearly) 0) Never attending 
 
CP7r: An association for parents or family of a primary or secondary school? You 
attend… 
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1) Having ever attended (weekly or yearly) 0) Never attending 
 
CP8r: A committee or council to improve the community? You attend… 
1) Having ever attended (weekly or yearly) 0) Never attending 
 
CP9r: Associations for professionals, businessmen, or growers and/or a peasant 
organization? You attend… 
1) Having ever attended (weekly or yearly) 0) Never attending 
Participation-Voting 
(municipal sample only) 
VB5r: Did you vote in the last local election for mayor and council members in 2000? 
0)No 1)Yes 
 
(cross-national sample only) 
VB1: Are you registered to vote? 
 1)Yes 2)No 3)In process 
Corruption 
(municipal sample only) 
EXC7Ar: Taking into account your own experiences and those of others that you have 
heard mentioned, would you say that corruption is your municipality is… 
1)not widespread 2)a little widespread 3)somewhat widespread 4) very widespread 
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(cross-national sample only) 
EXC7r: Taking into account your own experiences and those of others that you have 
heard mentioned, would you say that corruption of public officials is… 
1)not widespread 2)a little widespread 3)somewhat widespread 4) very widespread 
Political Ideology (municipal and cross-national samples) 
L1: According to the significance that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, where 
would you place yourself on the following scale, with 1 being the most left and 10 being 
the most right? 
Answer is on an ordinal scale from 1 to 10. 
Political Attentiveness (municipal and cross-national samples) 
A1r: How often do you listen to radio news?  
1) Never 2) Rarely 3) Once or twice a week 4) Everyday 
Presidential Approval (municipal and cross-national samples) 
M1r: And speaking in general about the government, you say that the job that (the 
current president) is doing is… 
1) Very bad 2) Bad 3) Neither good nor bad 4) Good 5) Very good  
Education (municipal and cross-national samples) 
Ed: What was the last year of schooling that you completed? 
Answer is continuous 0-20+ 
Age (municipal and cross-national samples) 
Q2: How old are you? 
Answers continuous 18 through 99 
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 Q2y: In what year were you born? 
Answers continuous 1932 - 1994 
Income  
(municipal 2004 and cross-national samples) *Monetary differed per country. 
Ecuadorian municipal sample scale is given here, but the cross-national scale is 0-10. 
Q10: In which of the following ranges would you find your family’s monthly income? 
00)No income 01)less than $25 02)between $26-50 03)$51-100 04)$101-150 05)$151-
200 
06)$201-300 07) $301-400 08) $401-500 09) $501-600 10)$750-$1,000 11)$1001-1500 
12) $1501-2000 13)$2000 and more 
 
(municipal 2012 sample) 
Q10new: In which of the following ranges would you find your family’s monthly 
income, include all remittances from abroad and the income of all adults and children 
that work? 
00) No income 01) less than $40 02) between $40 - $90 03) between $91 - $130 04) 
between $131 - $180 05) between $181 - $220 06) between $221 - $260 07) between 
$261 - $310 08) between $311 - $350 09) between $351 - $400 10) between $401 - $460 
11) between $461 - $530 12) between $531 - $790 13) between $791 - $1060 14) 
between $1061 - $1580 15) between $1581 - $2110 16) more than $2110  
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Gender (municipal and cross-national samples) 
Q1r: Gender? 
0) Male 1) Female 
Ethnicity (municipal sample only) 
ETIDr Would you consider yourself… 
1) White 2) Mestizo 3) Indigenous 4) Black 5) Other 
 
